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DANGEROUS DIAGNOSES, RISKY ASSUMPTIONS, 
AND THE FAILED EXPERIMENT OF “SEXUALLY 
VIOLENT PREDATOR” COMMITMENT 
DEIRDRE M. SMITH* 
In its 1997 opinion, Kansas v. Hendricks, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld 
a law that reflected a new model of civil commitment. The targets of this 
new commitment law were dubbed “Sexually Violent Predators” (SVPs), 
and the Court upheld indefinite detention of these individuals on the 
assumption that there is a psychiatrically distinct class of individuals who, 
unlike typical recidivists, have a mental condition that impairs their ability 
to refrain from violent sexual behavior. And, more specifically, the Court 
assumed that the justice system could reliably identify the true “predators,” 
those for whom this unusual and extraordinary deprivation of liberty is 
appropriate and legitimate, with the aid of testimony from mental health 
professionals.  
This Article evaluates those assumptions and concludes that, because 
they were seriously flawed, the due process rationale used to uphold the 
SVP laws is invalid. The “Sexually Violent Predator” is a political and 
moral construct, not a medical classification. The implementation of SVP 
laws has resulted in dangerous distortions of both psychiatric expertise and 
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important legal principles, and such distortions reveal an urgent need to re-
examine the Supreme Court’s core rationale in upholding the SVP 
commitment experiment. 
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I. Introduction 
In 1990, the state of Washington was consumed by news of a highly 
publicized, violent sexual crime committed against a young child by an 
offender with prior convictions for violence against children.1 In response 
to public outcry, the Washington legislature enacted a statute allowing the 
state to continue to detain certain sex offenders after they had completed 
their criminal sentences.2 The targets of these new laws were dubbed 
“Sexually Violent Predators” (SVPs), a label intended to connote a subclass 
of sex offenders who run a high risk of recidivism after their release due to 
the presence of a mental abnormality or personality disorder.3 Soon 
thereafter, a few other states, including Kansas, enacted their own 
commitment laws modeled closely after Washington’s.4 The first person 
committed under Kansas’s law, Leroy Hendricks, challenged the 
constitutionality of his indefinite detention on due process, ex post facto, 
and double jeopardy grounds in a case that reached the U.S. Supreme 
Court.5 In its 1997 opinion Kansas v. Hendricks, the Court upheld this new 
commitment model.6 In the wake of that case, other states (a total of twenty 
to date) and the federal government enacted SVP laws.7 Since 1990, the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.  
 2. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010 to .09.903 (West 2014); see infra notes 78-84 
and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra notes 63-79 and accompanying text. 
 4. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to 29a24 (West 2008); WIS. STAT. §§ 
980.01 to .14 (2013). 
 5. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).  
 6. Id. at 371. 
 7. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 
Stat. 587 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2012)). ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701 to -
3717 (2009); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600-6609.3 (West 2010); D.C. CODE §§ 22-3803 
to 3811 (2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.910-.932 (West 2011); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
207/1 to /99 (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 229a.1 to .16 (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 59-29a01 to -29a24 (West 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123a, §§ 1-16 (West 2003); 2007 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253d.01 to .36 (West & Supp. 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 632.480-.513 
(West 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-1201 to -1226 (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 135-E:1 to :24 (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-27.24 to .38 (West 2008); N.Y. 
MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 10.01-.17 (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-
03.3-01 to -24 (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-48-10 to -170 (2002 & Supp. 2008); VA. CODE 
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federal government and the states have committed several thousand people 
under SVP laws, the vast majority of whom remain in indefinite detention.8 
The core rationale in Hendricks, as well as the follow-up case, Kansas v. 
Crane,9 is that indefinite preventive detention is consistent with substantive 
due process principles where a mental disorder limits the committed 
individual’s ability to control his behavior.10 Although a finding of such 
mental disorder is, consequently, a constitutional prerequisite for these 
indefinite commitments, the Court also conferred broad discretion on 
legislatures regarding how states could satisfy this requirement.11 The Court 
based its opinions regarding SVP laws on the assumption that there is a 
medically distinct class of individuals who are not “typical recidivists” but 
who have mental conditions that impair their ability to refrain from violent 
sexual behavior and for whom this unusual and extraordinary deprivation of 
liberty is appropriate and legitimate.12 More specifically, the Court assumed 
that the justice system could reliably distinguish between the two groups 
and, with the aid of mental health professionals, could identify the true 
“predators.”13 
In this Article, I evaluate the extent to which those assumptions were 
correct, both at the time of the SVP laws’ enactment and as they have been 
implemented. First, I consider psychiatry’s own views of the relationship 
between mental pathology and sexual violence and the field’s ability to 
predict such violence.14 Second, I review key features of psychiatric 
                                                                                                                 
ANN. §§ 37.2-900 to -920 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010 to .903 (West 2014); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.01 to .14 (2013).  
 8. See infra notes 193-196 and accompanying text. 
 9. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
 10. Crane, 534 U.S. at 412-13; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357-58. 
 11. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358-59. 
 12. Crane, 534 U.S. at 413. 
 13. See id. at 413-14, 416-17.  
 14. I will generally use the term "psychiatry" to refer to the professional field concerned 
with the identification of mental illness in the Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) context 
because it is closely associated with the overall development of mental pathology 
classification and nosology, such as through the Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals of 
Mental Disorders (DSM) published by the American Psychiatric Association. I refer to 
"psychology" in the context of research regarding human behavior. Parties in court 
proceedings often present expert evidence through the testimony of forensic or clinical 
psychologists. See GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE 
COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 23-24 (3d ed. 
2007); Roy B. Lacoursiere, Evaluating Offenders Under a Sexually Violent Predator Law: 
The Practical Practice, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: 
LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 75-77 (Bruce J. Winick & John A. La Fond eds., 2003). 
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expertise offered by prosecutors to support SVP commitment and analyze 
how courts have used this expertise when deciding whom to commit under 
SVP laws. Ultimately, these examinations reveal that the assumptions upon 
which the Court based the Hendricks-Crane rationale were erroneous.  
The Court’s most consequential error was its failure to acknowledge that 
the category of the “Sexually Violent Predator” is a political and moral 
construct, not a medical classification. Mainstream psychiatry has never 
claimed an ability to accurately predict who is at risk of committing acts of 
sexual violence and has never conceptualized sexual aggression as the 
product of volitional impairment.15 Indeed, the American Psychiatric 
Association (APA), the leading professional organization in American 
psychiatry, and other voices from within the mental health profession have 
vociferously opposed SVP laws since their enactment precisely because of 
the role assigned to psychiatric expertise to identify those who should be 
committed.16 
The controversies regarding admission of expert testimony in individual 
SVP cases reveal the troubling consequences of the Supreme Court’s failure 
to heed the APA’s warnings. Trial courts permit prosecution experts to 
offer diagnoses and predictions of risk in support of these commitments 
notwithstanding the fact that such testimony often strays far from current 
scientific understanding of the relationship between acts of sexual violence 
and psychopathology.17  In so doing, courts distort and disregard key values 
in our justice system, such as limiting the admission of expert testimony to 
that based on scientifically sound methodology and reliable facts and data.18 
Rulings in such cases have become even more dubious in the years since 
the SVP laws’ initial development, as the debate regarding the medical 
basis of SVP commitment has only intensified.  The controversy reveals the 
unsteady foundation upon which the medical and, by extension, 
constitutional premise of SVP was based.19 
The SVP laws generally,20 and the Hendricks opinion specifically,21 have 
been the target of extensive criticism from scholars as well as from legal 
                                                                                                                 
 15. See infra notes 323-336 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 178-201 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 455-489 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 578-605 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 567-597 and accompanying text. 
 20. ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND THE 
RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE 61-66 (2006); Aman Ahluwalia, Civil Commitment of 
Sexually Violent Predators: The Search for a Limiting Principle, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y 
& ETHICS J. 489, passim (2006); Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational 
People, 88 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1076-77 (2002). 
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and mental health professionals. While some have focused upon specific 
problems in the implementation of SVP laws, including experts’ reliance 
upon controversial diagnoses or their use of actuarial instruments to assess 
risk, many in both groups—scholars and mental health professionals—have 
argued that the laws are inherently flawed policy.22 Although critical of the 
SVP laws, these commentators generally assume that, in light of the 
Hendricks opinion, the question of the laws’ constitutionality is now a 
settled matter.23  However, these and related criticisms, combined with a 
review of how the laws have actually operated, demonstrate that this 
assumption of constitutionality is itself questionable. 
This Article analyzes the SVP laws as a legislative experiment in 
preventive detention endorsed by the Supreme Court in Hendricks and 
Crane through a rationale based upon a set of hypotheses and assumptions 
regarding psychiatry and psychiatric testimony.  This analysis reveals that 
such hypotheses and assumptions are dubious. As an initial matter, the 
rationale first developed in Hendricks was strictly theoretical: the Court was 
evaluating a new statutory model for indefinite preventive detention and 
Leroy Hendricks was among the first people to challenge it.24 The Supreme 
Court expected mental health professionals to help courts and fact finders 
discriminate between the typical recidivist and the truly ill, thereby 
ensuring that the new laws did not reach too far.25 These expectations 
stemmed largely from courts’ longstanding reliance on psychiatric expertise 
to help answer difficult questions about the mental status of persons 
appearing before them. However, the actual use of such expertise in SVP 
proceedings reveals that such faith in psychiatry was, in fact, misplaced.  
Commentators have noted that the use of certain diagnoses in SVP 
proceedings runs counter to the APA’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Michael L. Perlin, “There's No Success Like Failure/and Failure's No Success at 
All”: Exposing the Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1247, 1248-49 
(1998). 
 22. See, e.g., Melissa Hamilton, Adjudicating Sex Crimes As Mental Disease, 33 PACE 
L. REV. 536, passim (2013). 
 23. See, e.g., John Q. La Fond, Sexually Violent Predator Laws and the Liberal State: 
An Ominous Threat to Individual Liberty, 31 INT’L. J. L & PSYCHIATRY 158, 162-63 (2008); 
Shoba Sreenivasan et al., Normative Versus Consequential Ethics in Sexually Violent 
Predator Laws: An Ethics Conundrum for Psychiatry, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 
386, 388 (2010). 
 24. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997). 
 25. See infra notes 175-183 and accompanying text. 
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of Mental Disorders (DSM) system of psychiatric classification.26 But the 
problems with the psychiatric evidence offered in these cases are far 
broader than occasional misclassification and, in fact, stem from limitations 
inherent to the field of psychiatry generally. Justifying SVP preventive 
detention based on the notion that psychiatric testimony will ensure that 
such detention adheres to due process principles reflects a fundamental 
misunderstanding of psychiatric evaluation and diagnosis.  
The problems seen in the use of expert evidence in these proceedings 
cannot be avoided through technical fixes. Indeed, they reveal that there are 
no means to implement SVP laws consistent with notions of due process 
and individual liberty. A sexual predator is a legal classification that 
depends on medical line-drawing to be constitutionally sound. But because 
there is no concept in psychiatry resembling a “sexual predator,” the 
implications of this incongruence go to the essential question of the 
constitutionality of the SVP laws. Written opinions reveal that courts base 
SVP commitments largely on the respondents’ criminal records27 because 
the expert opinions themselves are based on little else.28 As a result, expert 
opinions in SVP cases are not in fact “medical” but moral. And because 
such conclusions are essentially normative ones, courts are improperly 
delegating commitment decisions to psychiatric professionals, which flies 
in the face of both legal principles and psychiatric practice. This is not 
merely a problem of labels and professional realms; this experiment has 
resulted in the indefinite detention of thousands of people at an enormous 
monetary cost to governments and an enormous personal cost to those 
committed and their families. 
II. The Supreme Court Sanctions the “Sexually Violent Predator” 
Experiment 
The notion of the “sexual predator” originated in the early 1990s amid 
intense and widespread public concern about sexual abuse of children.29 
Fear and hatred of those who committed such crimes fueled a view of them 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Hamilton, supra note 22, at 23-29; Robert A. Prentky et al., Sexually Violent 
Predators in the Courtroom: Science on Trial, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 357, 367-68 
(2006). 
 27. Court opinions refer to those individuals who are the targets of SVP commitment 
petitions primarily as “respondents” and occasionally as “defendants”; I will primarily use 
the former term. 
 28. See infra notes 449-479 and accompanying text. 
 29. ROGER N. LANCASTER, SEX PANIC AND THE PUNITIVE STATE 78 (2011); Amy Adler, 
To Catch a Predator, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 130, 130-31 (2012). 
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as “the ultimate other.”30 In the wake of media reports of a spate of high-
profile sexual crimes against children, some state legislatures passed 
measures in an attempt to control offenders. Legislatures passed the new 
laws based on the assumption that these criminals had unusually high 
recidivism rates and posed a special risk to the public.31 They were sick, the 
laws’ supporters reasoned, with a condition that rendered them resistant to 
typical forms of deterrence.32 Policymakers concluded that these unique 
attributes—combined with the particularized harm resulting from sexual 
abuse—warranted unique measures.33 Legislatures enacted new or 
enhanced laws addressing punishments for the possession and viewing of 
child pornography.34 They created registries and notification 
requirements.35 And, at the extreme end of the spectrum, they established 
programs for the indefinite detention via civil commitment of individuals 
identified as SVPs.36 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Perlin, supra note 21, at 1248. 
 31. Adler, supra note 29, at 130-32. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text. 
 34. CHARLES PATRICK EWING, JUSTICE PERVERTED: SEX OFFENDER LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 119 (2011); see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-196d (West); PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 6312 (West). 
 35. JANUS, supra note 20, at 66-73. 
 36. Both the laws and common parlance use a range of terms to describe those who 
commit, or are at risk of committing, multiple crimes of sexual violence. I will use the 
abbreviation “SVP” throughout the article to describe such category of classification as this 
was the one used by Washington in the first such law and it is the most commonly used by 
other states. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701(7) (2009) (“Sexually violent person”); 
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a)(1) (West 2010) (“Sexually violent predator”); D.C. 
CODE § 22-3803(1) (2013) (“[S]exual psychopath”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912(10) (West 
2011) (“Sexually violent predator”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/5(f) (West 2006) (“Sexually 
violent person”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.2(12) (West 2014) (“Sexually violent predator”); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (West 2008) (“Sexually violent predator”); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 123A, § 1 (West 2003) (“Sexually dangerous person”); 2007 MINN. STAT. § 
253D.02(16) (West & Supp. 2009) (“[S]exually dangerous persons” or persons with a 
“[s]exual psychopathic personality”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.480(5) (West 2014) (“Sexually 
violent predators”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1203(5) (West 2009) (“[D]angerous sex 
offender”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:2(12) (2015) (“Sexually violent predator”); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (West 2008) (“[S]exually violent predator”); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. 
LAW § 10.03(q)-(r) (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2011) (“Sex offender requiring civil 
management” or “strict and intensive” supervision); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-01(8) 
(2014) (“Sexually dangerous individual”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30(1) (2002 & Supp. 
2008) (“Sexually violent predator”); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (2013) (“Sexually violent 
predator”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(18) (West 2014) (“Sexually violent 
predator”). 
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 The first SVP commitment law was enacted by the state of Washington 
against the backdrop of the mid-twentieth century’s “sexual psychopath” 
laws and the heightened attention to the problem of repeated acts of sexual 
violence committed by certain individuals, notwithstanding efforts to 
control, punish, and deter their behavior through the criminal justice 
system.37 But once the U.S. Supreme Court sanctioned Washington’s new 
form of commitment in Hendricks, the model spread, and there are now 
several well-established SVP commitment programs across the country, 
which continue to indefinitely detain thousands of people.38 
A. The Origins of SVP Commitment 
1. Rise and Fall of Sexual Psychopath Laws 
The SVP laws conceived in the early 1990s were not the first laws 
targeting sex offenders. States enacted the first generation of laws 
permitting the detention of sex offenders between the 1930s and 1960s, 
although these laws differed significantly from contemporary SVP laws.39 
While these earlier laws were in place, mainstream psychiatry explained 
that “sexual psychopaths” were ill, which placed them in the realm of 
medicine in terms of both identification and care.40 These earlier laws 
assured the administration of treatment, rather than detention alone, and 
thus they were open-ended in terms of the length of hospitalization.41 
Courts could order the hospitalization and treatment of men charged with 
sex crimes, rather than sentencing them to prison, with the hope that 
treatment would prevent recidivism.42 
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld this form of commitment in 1940,43 but 
the laws eventually faced widespread criticism.44 A growing number of 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See infra notes 39-54 and accompanying text. 
 38. See infra notes 205-217 and accompanying text. 
 39. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS: A TASK FORCE REPORT OF 
THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION 11-12, 18 (1999) [hereinafter APA, DANGEROUS 
SEX OFFENDERS]. 
 40. Id. at 11. 
 41. EWING, supra note 34, at 7. 
 42. APA, DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS, supra note 39, at 13. 
 43. Minn. ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey Cnty., 309 U.S. 270, 274 (1940). 
The Minnesota statute upheld in that case required  
proof of a ‘habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters' on the part of the 
persons against whom a proceeding under the statute is directed, which has 
shown ‘an utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses', and hence that 
they ‘are likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on 
the objects of their uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire.’  
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commentators within psychiatry attacked the “sexual psychopath” legal 
classification, as there was no agreed-upon definition or basis to attach this 
label to any individual.45 Moreover, it became clear that many of these 
hospitalized men were not mentally ill and received little, if any, treatment 
in these hospitals.46 The laws were little more than extended detention on a 
preventive basis.47  
Most of these laws were either repealed or no longer used by the early 
1980s,48 but the final nail in the coffin for the remaining laws came from 
the psychiatric establishment.49 The Group for the Advancement of 
Psychiatry (GAP)50 Committee on Forensic Psychiatry concluded in a 1977 
report that there was little real prospect for effective treatment of sexual 
offenders and that the “discrepancy between the promises in sex statutes 
and performances have rarely been resolved.”51 “In retrospect,” the GAP 
Committee reported, “we view the sex psychopath statutes as social 
experiments that have failed and that lack redeeming social value. These 
experiments have been carried out by the joint participation of the 
psychiatric and legal professions with varying degrees of acquiescence by 
the general public.”52 The GAP Committee acknowledged the “unjustified 
optimism” at the time of the laws’ enactment regarding the “effectiveness 
of clinical approaches in identifying and predicting” those who posed a risk 
of engaging in sexual violence.53 The profession could not separate out the 
                                                                                                                 
Id. at 274 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court reasoned that there was no violation of due 
process because such “underlying conditions, calling for evidence of past conduct pointing 
to probable consequences are as susceptible of proof as many of the criteria constantly 
applied in prosecutions for crime.”  Id.  
 44. See EWING, supra note 34, at 8; Tamara Rice Lave, Only Yesterday: The Rise and 
Fall of Twentieth Century Sexual Psychopath Laws, 69 LA. L. REV. 549, 579-89 (2009). 
 45. EWING, supra note 34, at 8; Lave, supra note 44, at 581-82. See generally GROUP 
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHIATRY AND SEX PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION: 
THE 30S TO THE 80S 839-44 (1977) [hereinafter GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHIATRY AND SEX PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION]. 
 46. EWING, supra note 34, at 8. 
 47. Id. 
 48. APA, DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS, supra note 42, at 13-15. 
 49. EWING, supra note 34, at 9. 
 50. The GAP identifies itself as the “think tank” for American psychiatry. Psychiatry 
Think Tank, GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, http://ourgap.org/think-tank. 
aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2015). 
 51. GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHIATRY AND SEX PSYCHOPATH 
LEGISLATION, supra note 45, at 935. 
 52. Id. at 840. 
 53. Id. at 853-54. 
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mentally ill sex offenders from the others, and there was little psychiatry 
could provide in the way of treatment once the men were committed. The 
report went on to starkly and unambiguously state: 
The notion is naive and confusing that a hybrid amalgam of law 
and psychiatry can validly label a person a “sex psychopath” or 
“sex offender” and then treat him in a manner consistent with a 
guarantee of community safety. The mere assumption that such a 
heterogeneous legal classification could define treatability and 
make people amenable to treatment is not only fallacious; it is 
startling.54 
Remarkably, however, only a short time after the sexual psychopath laws 
were discarded, the states resurrected them in a new, more extreme form of 
experiment, one also “carried out by the joint participation of the 
psychiatric and legal professions”—this time completely disregarding the 
psychiatric profession’s own conclusions. 
2. The New Experiment: Washington’s Model SVP Law 
Under public pressure following a set of horrific and highly publicized 
sexual violence cases committed by previously incarcerated offenders, state 
legislatures, led by Washington in 1989, dusted off the early sexual 
psychopath laws’ basic concepts but transformed them in several important 
respects.55 Most notably, the commitment of convicted offenders would 
occur not as an alternative to a prison sentence—as was the case for most 
of the earlier sexual psychopath laws—but as an additional period of 
indefinite detention after the offender completed his criminal sentence.56 
Some commentators have noted that states enacted the current generation 
of SVP laws in response to the rise of determinate sentencing, which gave 
states less control over release dates for those convicted of crimes, 
including sex crimes, and the public perception that sentences for sex 
crimes were too short.57 Indeed, the first SVP law’s enactment in 
Washington State involved precisely that scenario. Earl Shriner, a man with 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Id. at 935. 
 55. EWING, supra note 34, at 9-10. 
 56. Id. at 10. 
 57. APA, DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS, supra note 42, at 34; La Fond, supra note 23, at 
160. “[D]eterminate sentencing” laws, which often included sentencing guidelines, required 
courts to fix the period of incarceration for “offenders and removed the flexibility of 
incarcerating sex offenders until they were no longer considered dangerous (which, very 
often, was never).” Ahluwalia, supra note 20, at 490.  
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a record of crimes against young people and who was officially described 
as “mildly retarded,” was released from prison in 1998 after completing his 
sentence for kidnapping two girls.58 Several months after his release, and 
while other charges against him were pending, prosecutors charged Shriner 
with raping and mutilating a young boy, apparently at random, in Tacoma.59 
The public outrage was immediate, widespread, and intense. An editorial 
in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer summed up the belief, shared by many, that 
the criminal justice system had failed Shriner’s latest young victim:  
This case makes clear that a class of criminal exists that is 
beyond reach of rehabilitation because of mental 
deficiencies . . . . 
 . . . .  
 . . . . The legal system needs to be changed to make it possible 
to remove the criminally insane from society, quickly and 
permanently. In such obvious cases as this, the law should err, if 
it errs at all, on the side of protecting the innocent.60 
Within days of Shriner’s arrest, Washington Governor Booth Gardner 
called for the development of legislation to prevent people like Shriner 
from “‘fall[ing] through the cracks.’”61 Specifically, he asserted: “‘[T]here 
should be a way to involuntarily commit people who have a profile of an 
individual that is a known risk with a high degree of probability that they 
would commit this type of crime.’”62 Less than a week after the crime, 
Gardner created a task force to study the Shriner case and draft legislation 
to address “‘gaps that exist between civil and criminal commitments, 
                                                                                                                 
 58. David Boerner, Confronting Violence: In the Act and in the Word, 15 U. PUGET 
SOUND L. REV. 525, 526-27, 542 n.10 (1992). This article is an invaluable glimpse into the 
development of the Washington SVP law, which served as the model for all current laws. It 
was written soon after the law’s enactment by David Boerner, a former prosecutor and law 
professor who was the lead drafter of the law (and who proposed the basic framework), and 
it provides a frank and personal account of his thinking during the events leading to the 
enactment of the law. 
 59. Id. at 525-27. 
 60. Id. at 529. 
 61. Id. at 530. 
 62. Id. The arrest of Shriner occurred six months after the murder in Seattle of Diane 
Ballasiotes. Id. A convicted sex offender participating in a work-release program was 
charged (and eventually convicted) of her murder. Id. at 534. 
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particularly regarding predatory offenders’”—gaps that had presumably 
permitted Shriner the opportunity to commit his most recent crime.63 
The fact that the state had previously been unsuccessful in its attempt to 
commit Shriner highlighted the limitations of using the standard 
involuntary hospitalization statutes to “quickly and permanently” remove 
the dangerous mentally ill from society.64 In terms of their purpose and 
outcome, such laws were indeed a poor fit for the goal of detaining 
criminally violent men like Shriner for an extended period of time, or at 
least until they no longer posed a high risk of committing sexually violent 
acts.  
The central objective of contemporary involuntary hospitalization laws is 
to provide a means of addressing the acute medical needs of a person 
suffering from severe mental illness, such as schizophrenia or bipolar 
disorder, by administering treatment, usually in the form of psychotropic 
medications such as antipsychotics or mood stabilizers.65 A series of U.S. 
Supreme Court and lower court opinions in the 1960s and 1970s clarified 
the constitutional limitations on such a deprivation of liberty.66 According 
to these opinions, involuntary hospitalization must be based upon a 
showing that the person posed a danger to himself or others (demonstrated 
through a recent overt act) and that the hospitalization would end as soon as 
the acute danger had passed.67 Additionally, involuntary hospitalization can 
occur only when there is a crisis, as evidenced by either threats to others or, 
more commonly, an inability to care for one’s basic needs.68 If this 
threshold showing is met, a court will order treatment in a secure 
community hospital or state hospital, with a maximum length of 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Id. at 534-35. Other reasons given for the enactment of the SVP laws include a 
rising perspective that government has a critical role to prevent harm to its citizens. Eric S. 
Janus, Sexual Predator Commitment Laws: Lessons for Law and the Behavioral Sciences, 18 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 5, 8 (2000). They also reflect the influence of the “victims’ rights” 
movement. Michael M. O’Hear, Perpetual Panic, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 69, 74 (2008). 
Finally, such laws were seen as an example of the growing success of feminists to reform the 
legal responses to sexual violence. LANCASTER, supra note 29, at 14.  
 64. Boerner, supra note 58, at 533. Washington’s sexual psychopath law, which had 
been the subject of controversy regarding its scope and implementation, was repealed in 
1984. Id. at 551-52. 
 65. La Fond, supra note 23, at 160-61. 
 66. MELTON ET AL., supra note 14, at 327-34. 
 67. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574-77 (1975); Lessard v. 
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds, Schmidt v. 
Lessard, 414 U.S. 473 (1974). 
 68. O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 574-77; Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1093-94.  
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hospitalization set by statute.69 As a result of reforms brought about by the 
“deinstitutionalization” movement that ended the long-term warehousing of 
the mentally ill, the average length of hospitalization is now measured in 
days.70   
In light of these developments in mental health law, the Washington 
legislature noted in its findings that a “small but extremely dangerous group 
of sexually violent predators exist who do not have a mental disease or 
defect that renders them appropriate for” involuntary civil commitment 
under the “existing involuntary treatment” law.71 As the legislature saw it, 
the problem with existing involuntary commitment law was that the state 
could not meet the overt act requirement when seeking commitment of a 
person already serving a sentence because that person would not “have 
access to potential victims.”72 The legislature acknowledged that the target 
for the new SVP legislation was not those with “classic mental illness” as 
understood and used in traditional commitment laws.73 Instead, the 
Washington lawmakers were concerned about a different set of people: 
those convicted of a sex crime who, because of some severe mental 
disorder, posed a high risk of recidivism.  
The social problem posed by these individuals’ existence could not be 
addressed by short-term hospitalization and the administration of 
medication because such measures would presumably do nothing to prevent 
recurring criminal conduct. Only long-term removal from society—and, 
thus, separation from potential victims—would reduce the risk of future 
                                                                                                                 
 69. MELTON ET AL., supra note 14, at 344-45; see, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 
3864(7) (2010) (limiting term of first period of involuntary hospitalization to four months). 
 70. Indeed, many states are moving in the direction of adopting involuntary outpatient 
treatment laws, where the medication is administered without full-time hospitalization. 
Nisha C. Wagle et al., Outpatient Civil Commitment Laws: An Overview, 26 MENTAL & 
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 179, passim (2002). It should be noted that recurring 
hospitalizations are not uncommon. See id. at 179. 
 71. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 2014). 
 72. Id.; see also Black v. Voss, 557 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1109-10 (C.D. Cal. 2008) 
(rejecting habeas corpus petition of person committed under California SVP law and noting 
that the statute has no overt act requirement to establish dangerousness under SVP 
commitment). 
 73. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010. The reference to “classic mental illness” arose 
in the public testimony of Professor Boerner, the lead drafter of the law. Young v. Weston, 
898 F. Supp. 744, 750 n.3 (W.D. Wash. 1995). One scholar has argued that this “new 
generation” of SVP laws is the product of a confluence of two criminal justice trends: (1) a 
blurring of the civil-criminal distinction; and (2) increased use of “risk assessment,” 
particularly through actuarial instruments and conclusions based upon what groups of 
individuals do (what he dubbed “actuarial justice”). Ahluwalia, supra note 20, at 491. 
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acts of sexual violence. In contrast to the targets of typical involuntary 
commitment proceedings, those to be detained under the SVP laws were not 
the severely mentally ill struggling to live in society, such as those who 
were homeless or dependent on family members for care. Instead, the SVP 
laws targeted people who were incarcerated or otherwise detained because 
they had committed or been charged with a sexual offense and were about 
to be released.74 Rather than seeking to detain someone at large, lawmakers 
wanted to prevent a return of such persons to society. Perhaps for these 
reasons, the SVP measures might have seemed less extreme than those 
entitling a police officer to pick someone off of the street and bring him to 
an emergency room against his will.75  
Another distinguishing feature of the new SVPs laws is that the 
commitment is indefinite, and the committed person must petition for 
review of his commitment.76 The Washington legislature reasoned that the 
statute could not include any set time frame for detention because “the 
prognosis for curing sexually violent offenders is poor, the treatment needs 
of this population are very long term, and the treatment modalities for this 
population are very different" from those appropriate for individuals 
confined under the general commitment laws.77  With no clear treatment 
protocol for persons classified as “predators,”78 the treatment-oriented laws 
for standard commitment of the mentally ill were a poor fit for SVP 
commitment for this reason as well. 
Their legislative history reveals that SVP laws were based upon two 
critical and commonly-held assumptions about those who commit sex 
crimes: first, they are criminals who “specialize” in a particular type of 
crime; and, second, they have a particularly high rate of recidivism because 
of a mental pathology—a compulsion of some sort—that leads to repeated 
acts of sexual violence.79 Such specialization and compulsion rendered 
these men “predators” and, the reasoning went, because their sexually 
violent conduct resulted from a mental disorder, mental health professionals 
                                                                                                                 
 74. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.030(1). 
 75. See, e.g., MELTON ET AL., supra note 14, at 344 (explaining typical emergency 
involuntary commitment procedure). 
 76. La Fond, supra note 23, at 161, 164. 
 77. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010. 
 78. The state of Washington conceded in one of the first legal challenges to these 
statutes that the treatment prospects for detainees was “poor” and therefore “prolonged 
incarceration is to be expected.” Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 749 (W.D. Wash. 
1995). 
 79. Leonore M. J. Simon, An Examination of the Assumptions of Specialization, Mental 
Disorder, and Dangerousness in Sex Offenders, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 275, 275-76 (2000). 
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could identify those offenders likely to engage in such conduct in the 
future.80  
It follows, then, that SVP laws were also based on a third crucial, though 
less obvious, assumption: the role that psychiatric diagnosis could play in 
ensuring such laws would not have an overbroad reach. The significance of 
this assumption is apparent from the following statement by the California 
legislature, made when it enacted its SVP law in 1995:  
The Legislature finds and declares that a small but extremely 
dangerous group of sexually violent predators that have 
diagnosable mental disorders can be identified while they are 
incarcerated. These persons are not safe to be at large and if 
released represent a danger to the health and safety of others in 
that they are likely to engage in acts of sexual violence.81  
However, none of the crucial assumptions about so-called sexually 
violent predators has a footing in scientific or clinical findings, as discussed 
further in Part III.A below.82 At the time the rise of SVP laws occurred, data 
already indicated that the significant majority of sex crimes were in fact 
committed not by stereotypical “predators” who stalked, lured, and pounced 
on random hapless victims, but, rather, and particularly in the case of the 
sexual assault of children, by family members and acquaintances of the 
victims.83 Similarly, studies indicated that, contrary to popular belief,84 
sexual offenders did not have unusually high levels of recidivism85 or 
specialization with regard to victims.86 Rare as they were, however, crimes 
such as Earl Shriner’s were so compelling that many members of the public 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Id. at 280. 
 81. S.B. 1143, 1995 Leg. (Cal. 1995) (emphasis added). 
 82. See infra notes 265-398 and accompanying text. 
 83. HOWARD N. SNYDER, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHILDREN AS REPORTED TO LAW 
ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM, INCIDENT, AND OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS 10-11 (2000), available 
at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/saycrle.pdf. For a general discussion on these 
statistics, see EWING, supra note 34, at xvi-xvii. 
 84. Tamara Rice Lave, Inevitable Recidivism—The Origin and Centrality of an Urban 
Legend, 34 INTL. J. OF L. & PSYCH. 186, 187-89 (2011); Paul Good & Jules Burstein, A 
Modern Day Witch Hunt: The Troubling Role of Psychologists in Sexual Predator Laws, 28 
AM. J. FORENSIC. PSYCH. 23, 40 (2010) (noting significant number of erroneous statements 
about rates of sex offender recidivism in the media, including statements to the effect that 
such rates more than 75% or near 100%). 
 85.  PATRICK A. LANGAN, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 
1994, at 1-2 (2003), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf.  
 86. Simon, supra note 79, at 281-84.  
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were persuaded that children were at a high risk of random victimization 
unless the state acted quickly to protect them. 
Washington’s “Community Protection Act of 1990” provided the model 
for the new incarnation of sexual psychopath laws, not least in giving legal 
status to a new term, “sexually violent predator,” which spread quickly 
through common parlance. Governor Gardner’s use of the phrase 
“predatory acts” in a press statement soon after Earl Shriner’s arrest struck 
a chord with former prosecutor and law professor David Boerner, the new 
law’s lead drafter. Boerner saw it as a way to specify the class of 
individuals to be reached by this unique form of indefinite detention.87 He 
defined the term “predatory acts” as those “‘directed towards strangers or 
individuals with whom a relationship has been established or promoted for 
the primary purpose of victimization,’” and he recommended that only 
those who engaged in such acts would be eligible for commitment.88 
Because one who commits such “predatory acts” is a “predator,” that 
category of persons, along with a putative medical diagnosis and rationale 
for detention, was built directly into the statute. A “sexually violent 
predator” was, therefore, defined by Washington’s new law as: “any person 
who has been convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual violence and 
who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes 
the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not 
confined in a secure facility.”89 
Thus, Washington’s SVP law set out four prerequisites to civil 
commitment: (1) a history of criminal sexual conduct, resulting in either a 
conviction or a charge (i.e. a predicate offense); (2) the presence of a 
mental disorder, personality disorder, or mental abnormality of some kind 
at the time the commitment was under consideration; (3) a likelihood of 
engaging in sexual criminal behavior in the future; and (4) a causal link 
between the disorder or abnormality and the risk.90 These essential 
requirements, although often phrased somewhat differently, can be found in 
all SVP laws.91 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Boerner, supra note 58, at 569. 
 88. Id. at 569 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(3) (Supp. 1990)). 
 89. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(18) (West 2014) (emphasis added). 
 90. Id.; Janus, supra note 63, at 9.  
 91. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 358; EWING, supra note 34, at 21; see, e.g., CAL. 
WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a)(1) (West 2010) (“‘Sexually violent predator’ means a person 
who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims and who 
has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of 
others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.”); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912(10) (West 2010) (“‘Sexually violent predator’ means any person 
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The procedure established under the Washington SVP statute provides 
that proceedings for indefinite detention can be initiated at the conclusion 
of a period of incarceration for a sex crime committed as an adult or 
juvenile.92 They can also be initiated after a person charged with such a 
crime has been found not competent to stand trial or is acquitted on the 
basis of a finding of insanity.93 Or they can be initiated after a person 
previously convicted of a sexual offense commits a “recent overt act.”94 
After a probable cause hearing, the court may order the individual to be 
held in state custody and to be evaluated by “experts” hired by the state.95  
The commitment trial must occur within forty-five days of the filing of 
the petition, and either side may request a jury.96 At the trial, the person is 
entitled to counsel and court-appointed experts to assist with his defense.97 
If the fact finder concludes that the state has demonstrated beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the person is “a sexually violent predator,” the person 
is committed to a “secure facility . . . for control, care, and treatment” until 
the mental abnormality or personality disorder “has so changed that the 
person no longer meets the definition of a sexually violent predator.”98 
B. Legal Challenges to the New SVP Laws 
Preventive detention is very limited in American law because it is seen 
as antithetical to fundamental liberty interests and the presumption of 
innocence. In each instance of preventive detention—even where an 
individual apparently poses a threat to public safety—there are generally 
                                                                                                                 
who: (a) Has been convicted of a sexually violent offense; and (b) Suffers from a mental 
abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual 
violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment.”); 
2007 MINN. STAT. § 253D.02(16) (West & Supp. 2009) (“Sexually dangerous person. (a) A 
‘sexually dangerous person’ means a person who: (1) has engaged in a course of harmful 
sexual conduct as defined in subdivision 8; (2) has manifested a sexual, personality, or other 
mental disorder or dysfunction; and (3) as a result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful 
sexual conduct as defined in subdivision 8. (b) For purposes of this provision, it is not 
necessary to prove that the person has an inability to control the person's sexual impulses.”). 
 92. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.030(1).  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. §§ 71.09.040 to .050. 
 96. Id. § 71.09.050. 
 97. Id. § 71.09.040. 
 98. Id. § 71.09.060(1). The statute now provides that a person may also be conditionally 
released to a less restrictive alternative so long as conditions are imposed to protect the 
community. Id.; see also Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 747 (W.D. Wash. 1995) 
(summarizing key requirements of SVP law). 
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strict limitations on when detention can be imposed and when it must end. 
For example, courts permit pretrial detention of criminal defendants only 
where there is probable cause to believe they committed a crime and only to 
the extent necessary to secure their appearance at trial (thus, defendants are 
usually given the opportunity to post bail and be released).99 The only 
exceptions to our reluctance to impose long-term preventive detention 
target individuals belonging to two of the American public’s most feared 
and despised groups: enemy combatants seized on the battlefield in foreign 
countries and sex offenders.100   
1. Background of the Hendricks-Crane Litigation 
As Washington’s SVP law, and those modeled after it, presented a new 
and extreme form of preventive detention, critics immediately challenged 
the laws’ constitutionality on a range of grounds, including the violation of 
the right to substantive due process, the prohibitions against ex post facto 
laws, and double jeopardy. Andre Young, one of the first men committed 
under the Washington’s SVP law, challenged the constitutionality of the 
law in both state101 and federal102 courts. The Washington Supreme Court 
upheld the law while the federal district court held it was 
unconstitutional.103 These differing outcomes were among the first in a 
series of sharply divided judicial responses to the new law and to the 
similar SVP laws enacted by the Kansas104 and Wisconsin105 legislatures 
soon thereafter.  
The focus of the substantive due process challenges stemmed from the 
same theories used to limit the reach of other forms of involuntary 
commitment and preventive detention: that using state power to deprive a 
person of liberty outside of the realm of criminal punishment runs afoul of 
                                                                                                                 
 99. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987). 
 100. See Daniel M. Filler, Terrorism, Panic, and Pedophilia, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 
345 (2003) (noting the “surprising prevalence of rhetorical links between terrorism and 
pedophilia” and the risk to civil liberties posed by detention policies resulting from the 
associated “panic”); Norman J. Finkel, Moral Monsters and Patriot Acts: Rights and Duties 
in the Worst of Times, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 242, 243 (2006); Good & Burstein, 
supra note 84, at 42; Christopher Slobogin, Preventive Detention in Europe, the United 
States, and Australia passim (Vanderbilt Pub. Law Research, Working Paper No. 12-27, 
June 27, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2094358. 
 101. In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993). 
 102. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995). 
 103. Id. at 754; In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1018. 
 104. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 to -29a24 (West 2008). 
 105. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.1 to .14 (2013). 
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core values enshrined in the due process clause. The Supreme Court has 
acknowledged: “[T]he Due Process Clause contains a substantive 
component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions 
‘regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.’”106 
Such guarantee against excessive government interference applies with 
particular import in the context of involuntary detention, the Court has 
noted, because “[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core 
of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary 
governmental action.”107 Accordingly, a court must subject such detention, 
even if sought pursuant to statute, to a rigorous review and invalidate it if it 
does not fall under one of the few narrow exceptions to the broad general 
prohibition of preventive detention.108 
When applying these principles to their review of the new SVP laws, the 
Washington and Wisconsin Supreme Courts were sharply divided—the 
published opinions were fractured and featured vehement dissents.109 Most 
of the debates about whether the laws were consistent with the “substantive 
component” of due process focused on the states’ open acknowledgment 
that the targets of the new laws were people who did not have a mental 
illness that could subject them to commitment under standard civil 
commitment laws and the fact that, in lieu of serious mental illness, the 
laws used terminology such as “mental abnormality” and “personality 
disorder.”110 Justice Shirley Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
found the nebulous language of “mental abnormality” in the Wisconsin law 
to be especially troubling.111 That term, she observed, does not translate to 
any well-settled or understood concept in psychiatry.112 
                                                                                                                 
 106. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 
U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). 
 107. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). 
 108. Id. at 81-86; see also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (holding 
that involuntary commitment of those who “are dangerous to no one and can live safely in 
freedom” is a violation of due process principles); cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 
749-50 (1987) (upholding pretrial detention under limited circumstances where the 
government’s interest was compelling).  
 109. State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115 (Wis. 1995); In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 
1993), superseded by statute as stated in In re Thorell, 72 P.3d 708 (2003). 
 110. See, e.g., Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 749-50 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (“The 
essential component missing from the Sexually Violent Predator Statute is the requirement 
that the detainee be mentally ill.”). 
 111. Post, 541 N.W.2d at 142-45 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
 112. Id. at 145; La Fond, supra note 23, at 161. 
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For the courts reviewing the constitutionality of the first SVP laws, a key 
source of guidance was the then-recent opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Foucha v. Louisiana.113 The Court held that a state could not continue to 
detain an “insanity acquitee” who no longer had a mental illness on the 
basis of medical opinions that he had an “antisocial personality” and would 
be a danger if released.114 The Court rejected Louisiana’s argument that the 
state could continue “to hold indefinitely any other insanity acquitee not 
mentally ill who could be shown to have a personality disorder that may 
lead to criminal conduct.”115 The Court ruled that, in the absence of a 
mental illness, Louisiana’s detention of Foucha was contrary to 
fundamental notions of due process.116 It noted:  
The same would be true of any convicted criminal, even though 
he has completed his prison term. It would also be only a step 
away from substituting confinements for dangerousness for our 
present system which, with only narrow exceptions and aside 
from permissible confinements for mental illness, incarcerates 
only those who are proved beyond reasonable doubt to have 
violated a criminal law.117 
Many concluded from this language that, in Foucha, the Court had made 
clear that “dangerousness” alone was not a sufficient basis for preventive 
detention and that an indispensable constitutional requirement for such 
                                                                                                                 
 113. 504 U.S. 71 (1992). 
 114. Id. at 78-80. An “insanity acquitee” is a criminal defendant who has been acquitted 
of a charged crime on the basis of a finding that he was “insane” at the time of the crime. See 
id. at 73. 
 115. Id. at 82. The Court’s holding here flowed explicitly from its earlier ruling in 
Addington v. Texas that 
to commit an individual to a mental institution in a civil proceeding, the State is 
required by the Due Process Clause to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
the two statutory preconditions to commitment: that the person sought to be 
committed is mentally ill and that he requires hospitalization for his own 
welfare and protection of others. 
Id. at 75-76 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)). 
 116. Id. at 83. 
 117. Id. at 82-83 (emphasis added). The Court noted that other forms of preventive 
detention were narrowly tailored to a specific legitimate need and a finite duration, such as 
pretrial detention in limited circumstances, which was upheld in United States v. Salerno. Id. 
at 81, 83. 
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detention was a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, of “mental 
illness.”118  
In 1994, two years after Foucha, Kansas enacted the “Sexually Violent 
Predator Act.”119 Modeled closely on the Washington law, it required a 
finding of mental abnormality or personality disorder as a prerequisite to 
commitment.120 As defined by the Kansas statute, a “[m]ental abnormality” 
is “a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional 
capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses 
in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of 
others.”121 The law did not have a requirement for a finding of “mental 
illness.”122  
Leroy Hendricks, who was serving a sentence for sexual victimization of 
children, was the first person Kansas committed under its new SVP law 
pursuant to a jury’s determination.123 If the State selected him for the first 
petition under the law on the assumption that his case would be the first 
challenge to the new law, and therefore subject to close scrutiny, the State 
chose well; Hendricks had a long history of sexual offenses against children 
and therefore exemplified the seemingly undeterrable “predator” the law’s 
drafters had in mind.124 
At trial, the State called as its expert witness Dr. Charles Befort, the chief 
psychologist at Larned State Hospital.125 Befort, who had evaluated  
Hendricks, testified that he had concluded it was “likely that Hendricks 
would engage in predatory acts of sexual violence or sexual activity with 
children if permitted to do so.”126 Befort based his opinion, as he stated, on 
his view that “‘behavior is a good predictor of future behavior,’ [on] his 
                                                                                                                 
 118. See, e.g., Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 750-51 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (striking 
down Washington’s SVP law on the basis that it violated the holding in Foucha that a state 
may not indefinitely detain a person who is not found to be have a mental illness); see also 
Ahluwalia, supra note 20, at 500-03. 
 119. S.B. 525, 1994 Leg., ch. 316 (Kan. 1994) (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 
to 29a24 (West 2008)).  
 120. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02.  
 121. Id. § 59-29a02(b). 
 122. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 138 (Kan. 1996), rev’d, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 
U.S. 346 (1997). 
 123. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350. 
 124. Id. at 353-55. 
 125. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 131. The State also called Hendricks himself as a 
witness after the court ruled that, because the proceedings were civil rather than criminal, 
Hendricks had no right to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 130-31; see 
also Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 372-73 (1986). 
 126. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 131. 
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professional knowledge that pedophiles tend to repeat their behavior, and 
[on] Hendricks’s poor understanding of his behavior.”127 Befort concluded 
that Hendricks was not mentally ill and did not have “a personality 
disorder,” but that “as [Befort] interpreted the Act, pedophilia was a mental 
abnormality.”128 The psychiatrist who testified on behalf of Hendricks 
challenged Befort’s testimony regarding the tendency of pedophiles to 
recidivate, observing that, “based on current knowledge, ‘a psychiatrist or 
psychologist cannot predict whether an individual is more likely than not to 
engage in a future act of sexual predation.’”129 The jury found that 
Hendricks was a “sexually violent predator” and, under the new Kansas 
statute, the court committed him to Larned State Hospital.130 
In reviewing Hendricks’s appeal, the majority opinion of the Kansas 
Supreme Court noted that the Kansas had modeled its law on that of 
Washington (including adopting Washington’s legislative “findings”) and 
that the latter was already facing constitutional challenges.131 Hendricks’s 
attorneys based their substantive due process argument on the key holding 
in Foucha that mental illness was an indispensable requirement for 
indefinite detention on the basis of dangerousness and that the Kansas law’s 
“mental abnormality or personality disorder” standard fell short of that 
requirement.132 The Kansas Supreme Court agreed, holding that Kansas’s 
SVP law was invalid under both Foucha and an earlier civil commitment 
opinion, Addington v. Texas, since the law did not require a showing of an 
“illness.”133 In so ruling, the majority found the reasoning of the federal 
district court’s decision in Young v. Weston striking down the Washington 
SVP law to be more persuasive than the Washington Supreme Court’s 
opinion upholding the law.134 The term “mental abnormality,” it concluded, 
was not equivalent to “mental illness.”135 The Kansas Supreme Court based 
this conclusion in part upon the testimony of the State’s own expert 
witness, who had testified that the term was not a diagnosis but rather “a 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. Befort conceded in his testimony that the statute’s definition of “mental 
abnormality” was “circular in that certain behavior defines the condition which is used to 
predict the behavior.” Id. at 138. 
 129. Id. at 131. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 131-32. 
 132. Id. at 133-34.  
 133. Id. at 138. 
 134. Id. at 136-38. 
 135. Id. at 138. 
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phrase used by clinicians to discuss abnormality or deviance.”136 The 
majority also contrasted that description with the definition of “mental 
illness” found in the Kansas standard involuntary commitment statute.137 
2. The Supreme Court Upholds the SVP Model of Commitment 
Once these questions reached the United States Supreme Court, they 
received a quite different reception by the five-justice majority. In Kansas 
v. Hendricks, the Court reversed the Kansas Supreme Court and upheld the 
state’s SVP law.138 On the question of whether Kansas’s definition of SVP 
satisfied the “mental illness” element in Foucha, the parties took 
significantly different positions. The State noted in its brief that in the line 
of cases requiring “mental illness” as a matter of substantive due process 
the Supreme Court had never defined the term.139 This was understandable, 
the State argued, since there is no universally accepted definition of the 
term. What was more important for constitutional purposes, it claimed, was 
that “mental health professionals [can] give the definition content by 
identifying specific mental disorders that may or may not satisfy the 
definition.”140 In Hendricks’s case, the State’s argument continued, the 
commitment satisfied constitutional requirements because the respondent 
had a mental disorder of “pedophilia,” as defined by the DSM.141 
Hendricks’s attorneys countered that the “mental abnormality” language in 
the Kansas statute, when examined closely, was nothing more than 
“pseudoclinical terminology” useful for “after-invented rationalizations.”142 
Indeed, the Kansas legislature used the language specifically to empower 
the state to detain people who did not have a “mental illness,” since those 
with such illnesses could be committed under the standard commitment 
statute.143 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Id. at 137. 
 137. Id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2902(h) (repealed 1996)) (defining a person with 
“mental illness” as one who: “(1) [i]s suffering from a severe mental disorder to the extent 
that such person is in need of treatment; (2) lacks capacity to make an informed decision 
concerning treatment; and (3) is likely to cause harm to self or others”). 
 138. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).  
 139. Brief for Petitioner at 39, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (No. 95-1649), 
1996 WL 435941. 
 140. Id. at 40. 
 141. Id. at 41. 
 142. Brief for Respondent at 21-22, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (Nos. 95-
1649, 95-9075), 1996 WL 528985. 
 143. Id. at 22. 
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Justice Clarence Thomas, who had dissented in Foucha five years 
earlier,144 wrote the majority opinion reversing the Kansas Supreme Court 
and upholding the SVP law under all three constitutional challenges 
Hendricks’s attorneys raised: that the law violated his rights under the due 
process clause, under prohibitions of ex post facto laws, and under the 
double jeopardy clause.145 With respect to the substantive due process 
analysis, the focus of this Article, Justice Thomas stated that the Court has 
long recognized the importance of the state’s authority to detain, through 
civil proceedings, those “who are unable to control their behavior and who 
thereby pose a danger to the public health and safety.”146 The Court has 
upheld civil commitment of this sub-population, he explained, so long as 
states follow proper procedures and standards.147 Prior cases clearly 
established that dangerousness alone would not satisfy due process 
requirements; it was only when commitment statutes coupled a 
dangerousness requirement with “proof of some additional factor, such as a 
‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormality’” that the laws would not 
impermissibly infringe on a person’s liberty interests.148 There must be a 
“link,” therefore, between an individual’s potential to commit future 
violence and “the existence of a ‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality 
disorder’ that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control 
his dangerous behavior.”149 Under this framework, Justice Thomas 
reasoned, the Kansas SVP law satisfied these essential due process 
requirements. The law limited the potential class of individuals subject to 
commitment to those with either a “mental abnormality” or “personality 
disorder,” which, he wrote, sufficiently “narrow[ed] the class of persons 
eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control their 
dangerousness.”150 
Thus, Justice Thomas dispensed with the specific finding of “mental 
illness” as a prerequisite to involuntary civil commitment that Foucha and 
Addington suggested, opting instead for a broader finding of any form of 
“mental abnormality.” The term “mental illness,” he explained, has no 
“talismanic significance.”151 Rather, the critical factor to satisfy substantive 
                                                                                                                 
 144. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 120-24 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 145. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).  
 146. Id. at 357. 
 147. Id. at 358-59. 
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due process is “limit[ing] involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer 
from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their 
control.”152 He stated that the Court had never required states to adopt 
particular medical terms for involuntary commitment statutes.153 
Legislatures, he said, are not required to adopt terms that “mirror those 
advanced by the medical profession.”154 Since Hendricks’s “pedophilia” 
diagnosis met the statute’s mental abnormality requirement, and Hendricks 
had conceded in his own testimony that he lacked control over his urges, 
Hendricks’s “condition” easily met the constitutional requirements for 
commitment.155 Justice Thomas acknowledged that the record on appeal 
included evidence of extensive controversy within the psychiatric field 
regarding whether pedophilia was a mental illness; nonetheless, he 
indicated that the debates in fact support the conclusion that legislatures 
should be provided the “widest latitude in drafting” SVP laws.156 Justice 
Thomas then considered Hendricks’s remaining constitutional arguments 
that the law violated the ex post facto and double jeopardy prohibitions in 
the Constitution and—based on the categorization of SVP commitment as a 
civil, not criminal, proceeding—rejected them.157 
Justice Kennedy joined the majority in Hendricks but wrote separately to 
underscore that the Kansas SVP law could not be used for retribution, only 
for treatment.158 He noted some concern with the real potential for 
Hendricks and others to be detained for life, given that “medical 
knowledge” did not hold great promise for treatment of pedophilia.159 He 
acknowledged that the Court was permitting states to proceed into 
uncharted waters with these laws and noted that, in its implementation, the 
SVP model could fall short of constitutional requirements.160  He cautioned:  
“[I]f it were shown that mental abnormality is too imprecise a category to 
offer a solid basis for concluding that civil detention is justified, our 
precedents would not suffice to validate it.”161 As Kennedy’s concurrence 
makes clear, the Hendricks opinion endorsed pure preventive detention—
                                                                                                                 
 152. Id. at 358 (emphasis added). 
 153. Id. at 359. 
 154. Id.  
 155. Id. at 360. 
 156. Id. at 360 n.3. 
 157. Id. at 361-71. See generally Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the 
Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261 (1998). 
 158. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 159. Id. at 372. 
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with protection of the community from the committed person its sole 
benefit—as consistent with substantive due process. 
Justice Breyer wrote for the four-justice minority and dissented only with 
respect to the majority’s analysis of the ex post facto clause argument. He 
largely agreed with the majority’s substantive due process conclusion but 
adopted a slightly different analysis. Characterizing pedophilia as a “serious 
mental disorder,” Justice Breyer concluded that Hendricks’s condition was 
essentially akin to the well-established “irresistible impulse” concept in 
criminal and preventive detention law.162 The medical evidence at the 
hearing (as well as Hendricks’s own admission), he wrote, clearly 
established Hendricks’s inability to control his conduct, which brought him 
squarely within the scope of the statute’s limited reach.163 The debate 
within psychiatry regarding the limits of mental illness, he observed, can 
serve to inform a state legislature’s course of action and does not mean that 
the legislature may not act at all.164  
Five years later, in Kansas v. Crane, the Court revisited the Kansas 
statute and clarified its volition-oriented requirement.165 In an opinion by 
Justice Breyer, the Court held that the volitional requirement was a 
substantive and meaningful limitation on a state’s power to commit under 
the law.166 It also held that a finding that a person may be detained under 
the SVP law does not require a determination that the person entirely lacks 
any control over his behavior, since it is unlikely that the state could ever 
meet such standard.167 A person’s “‘inability to control [his] behavior’” is 
not, Justice Breyer wrote, a standard subject to a requirement of 
“mathematical precision.”168 Rather, a state must merely provide  
proof of [the respondent’s] serious difficulty in controlling 
behavior. And this, when viewed in light of . . . the nature of the 
psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality 
itself, must be sufficient to distinguish [between] the dangerous 
sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or 
                                                                                                                 
 162. Id. at 375-76 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 163. Id. at 376. 
 164. Id. at 375. Justice Breyer’s analysis of the substantive due process issue was joined 
by Justices Stevens and Souter. Id. at 373. Justice Ginsberg, who did not author an opinion, 
joined only those parts of Breyer’s dissent on the ex post facto analysis, and not his due 
process analysis. Id. 
 165. 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
 166. Id. at 412-13. 
 167. Id. at 411-12. 
 168. Id. at 413. 
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disorder subjects him to civil commitment[, and] the dangerous 
but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.169   
Significantly, the Crane majority commented on the role of courts in 
setting standards in cases in which the deprivation of a liberty interest turns 
on a finding of a particular mental condition or impairment. The Court 
acknowledged that its reading of Hendricks “provides a less precise 
constitutional standard than would those more definite rules for which the 
parties have argued.”170 The Court concluded, however, that “the 
Constitution's safeguards of human liberty in the area of mental illness and 
the law are not always best enforced through precise bright-line rules.”171 
The Court explained this reasoning as follows: 
For one thing, the States retain considerable leeway in defining 
the mental abnormalities and personality disorders that make an 
individual eligible for commitment. For another, the science of 
psychiatry, which informs but does not control ultimate legal 
determinations, is an ever-advancing science, whose distinctions 
do not seek precisely to mirror those of the law.172 
In sharp contrast to the majority’s optimism that the Court’s SVP rulings 
provided sufficient clarity to the states, Justice Scalia argued in dissent that 
the majority’s interpretation of the “volitional impairment” requirement had 
gutted the core holding of Hendricks and created an unworkable framework 
for implementing SVP laws.173 Although his critique was based on a view 
that states should have more leeway in enforcing civil commitments, he 
accurately identified some of key problems with the Court’s analysis that 
rendered it a poor foundation for ensuring the limited reach of these laws. 
3. The Core Assumptions Underlying the Stated Rationales of Hendricks 
and Crane 
As the Crane opinion makes clear, the Supreme Court upheld the SVP 
experiment based on a number of core assumptions about how courts 
determine whether an individual should be subject to indefinite detention. 
The Court saw an indispensable role for the psychiatric community in 
informing the determinations of courts and fact-finders and in supplying 
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proof of volitional impairment.174 One federal appeals court later 
characterized Crane’s constitutional requirement of separating “inability to 
control from unwillingness to control” as a means “to separate the sick 
person from the vicious and amoral one,” in order “to prevent fear of 
recidivism from leading to indefinite preventive detention.175 In Hendricks 
and Crane, the Court rationalized this unusual form of preventive detention 
by reframing SVP commitment so that it seems more consonant with other 
commitment laws.176 The essential component of all involuntary 
commitments is the presence of a pathology that limits the person’s ability 
to regulate his or her behavior. By using nebulous terms such as 
“impairment,” “abnormality,” or “condition,” and by restricting detention 
only to those who presumably already have impaired free will,177 the Court 
suggests that we are not truly depriving persons of their “liberty.” Thus in 
Hendricks, the Court wrote: “The precommitment requirement of a ‘mental 
abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ is consistent with the requirements of 
. . . other statutes that we have upheld in that it narrows the class of persons 
eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control their 
dangerousness.”178 
Without this requirement, the indefinite detention permitted under SVP 
statutes would amount to no more than punishment, thereby implicating all 
of the constitutional protections afforded to those subjected to punishment, 
including prohibitions on ex post facto laws and double jeopardy.179 As one 
commentator observed, “Hendricks teaches that the role of the mental 
disorder element is to limit civil commitment and prevent it from 
swallowing the criminal law.”180  
Therefore, the constitutionality of SVP laws and their consistency with 
core U.S. values hang entirely on the finding of a mental condition so 
                                                                                                                 
 174. Id. at 414-15.  
 175. Varner v. Monohan, 460 F.3d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). 
 176. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358-59 (1997); Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 415 
(2001). 
 177. David L. Faigman, Making Moral Judgments Through Behavioural Science: The 
'Substantial Lack of Volitional Control' Requirement in Civil Commitments, 2 L. 
PROBABILITY & RISK 309, 314 (2003). Faigman criticizes the “volitional impairment” 
requirement of Hendricks-Crane on the basis that “there is no empirical/scientific basis for 
determining when an act was (or, much less, will be) a product of 'free will'. Free will is a 
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at 319. 
 178. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358 (emphasis added). 
 179. Faigman, supra note 177, at 314. 
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severe that it deprives a person of the ability to exercise volition. But how 
would this identification—of those who are unable to control their behavior 
specifically due to mental impairment—be made? If trial courts could not 
make this finding accurately, they would run the risk of detaining 
unimpaired citizens based only on a perceived risk. The Court was 
evidently confident that trial courts could turn to the expertise of 
psychiatrists and other mental health professionals to identify when such 
pathology was present and, moreover, that these experts could distinguish 
with sufficient precision someone volitionally impaired from the 
“dangerous but typical recidivist.”181 Depending on “the nature of the 
[respondent’s] psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental 
abnormality,” the Court assumed these professionals could identify the key 
features to consider in assessing whether someone is a true predator.182  
Confidence in the ability of psychiatrists to draw such distinctions grew 
at the same time that courts were giving psychiatry an increasingly 
prominent role in legal proceedings. An important factor here was the 
appearance of the third edition of the DSM, which the APA published in 
1980. This edition (DSM-III), which shed most Freudian concepts from its 
nosology, or classification of mental disorders, and instead focused on a 
biological basis for classifying such conditions, quickly became a 
courtroom fixture.183 Its science-and-research orientation, in contrast to the 
psychoanalysis-inspired prior editions, suggested a new and more reliable 
role for psychiatrists helping courts make scientifically informed findings 
and to unlock the minds of litigants.184  
Psychiatric evidence, including diagnostic assessment, became 
ubiquitous in legal proceedings. Members of the legal community grew 
accustomed to seeing mental health professionals offer opinions on a range 
of legal questions—from parenting ability to the extent and causes of 
psychological injuries to insanity, commitment, and sentencing.185 These 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Faigman, supra note 177, at 314. 
 182. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002). 
 183. EDWARD SHORTER, A HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE ERA OF THE ASYLUM TO 
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2015]        DANGEROUS DIAGNOSES, RISKY ASSUMPTIONS 649 
 
 
experts now play a critical role in many cases, informing fact-finders on 
some of the most difficult and consequential decisions, including whether a 
person should be held criminally responsible or whether a particular parent 
is fit to raise a child.186  
On the urging of prosecutors, courts have expanded the scope of 
psychiatric evidence from assessments of past and present mental states to 
testimony predicting future conduct.187 Courts have become protective of 
their continued ability to admit and consider such testimony.188  
In a crucial decision, Barefoot v. Estelle, the Supreme Court upheld the 
admissibility of expert testimony on future dangerousness in the sentencing 
phase of a death penalty case.189 The State of Texas offered the testimony of 
two psychiatrists who opined, in response to hypotheticals regarding the 
defendant, that the defendant “would probably commit further acts of 
violence and represent a continuing threat to society.”190 Despite the 
dissent’s argument that research had shown that psychiatrists’ predictions 
of future violent conduct are accurate in only one out of three cases, the 
Court’s majority declined to required exclusion of such predictions at 
sentencing hearings.191 Significantly, the APA sided with the defendant in 
its amicus brief, noting that psychiatrists have no expertise at predicting 
dangerousness and are no better at doing so than anyone else.192  
One of the Barefoot majority’s rationales in rejecting this argument was 
that excluding prediction testimony in this context would limit use of 
psychiatric testimony in other contexts, including that of involuntary 
commitment: “Acceptance of petitioner's position that expert testimony 
about future dangerousness is far too unreliable to be admissible would 
immediately call into question those other contexts in which predictions of 
future behavior are constantly made.”193 The majority contended that the 
tools of the adversarial process, such as cross-examination and contrary 
expert opinion, would be a sufficient check on the reliability of 
predictions.194 Thus, the Supreme Court paved the way for psychiatric 
                                                                                                                 
 186. MELTON ET AL., supra note 14, at vii-viii. 
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predictions of future dangerousness to have a central role in SVP 
proceedings.  
Perhaps in light of the outcome in Barefoot and the GAP report’s strong 
rejection of the sexual psychopath laws,195 the psychiatric establishment 
was quick to distance itself from the SVP laws from the initial development 
of the model. In 1995, the Washington State Psychiatric Association 
submitted an amicus brief in the Young v. Weston litigation, indicating that 
nothing in the state’s SVP statute restricted its reach to those whom 
psychiatrists identified as mentally ill.196 Rather, in limiting its application 
to “sexually violent predators,” the law established nothing more than an 
“unacceptable tautology.”197  
The APA made similar arguments in the amicus brief it submitted to the 
U.S. Supreme Court in support of Hendricks’s position. There, the APA 
argued that legislatures should not be free to define “mental illness”; 
otherwise, it warned, “the limits on deprivations of liberty to protect the 
public safety would quickly disappear.”198 The APA also argued that the 
definition of mental illness for involuntary commitment purposes should 
not be tied to the diagnoses contained in the DSM.199 As the APA 
explained, the DSM’s “classification schemes are developed . . . to serve 
diagnostic and statistical functions, forming a common (and always 
imperfect) language for gathering clinical data and for communication 
among mental health professionals.”200 The APA’s elaboration of this 
argument is striking:  
[DSM diagnoses are not] designed to identify those subject to 
various legal standards, such as those for involuntary 
confinement. Thus, the authors of DSM-IV caution that “[i]n 
most situations, the clinical diagnosis of a DSM-IV mental 
disorder is not sufficient to establish the existence for legal 
purposes of a ‘mental disorder,’ ‘mental disability,’ ‘mental 
                                                                                                                 
on preventing unreliable expert testimony from being given undue weight by a fact finder 
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disease,’ or ‘mental defect.’” The authors further caution that “a 
DSM-IV diagnosis does not carry any necessary implication 
regarding the individual’s degree of control over the behaviors 
that may be associated with the disorder.” Not all individuals 
who come within a DSM-IV category suffer an impairment that 
diminishes their autonomy, much less one justifying involuntary 
confinement for the individual's own good.201 
The Supreme Court majority implicitly rejected the psychiatric 
establishment’s strong words of caution. Instead, it upheld a model law that 
drew a line ostensibly based upon the identification of a mental disorder but 
couched in language completely alien to the field that oversees such 
identifications. To save the law, the Court conferred upon that field a 
central role in ensuring the constitutionality of the future application of 
such laws, thereby sanctioning an extreme use of preventative detention 
based upon an unworkable procedure. 
C. The Spread of SVP Laws and Their Impact 
The drafters of the original SVP law in the state of Washington 
apparently thought the imposition of indefinite commitment would be 
limited to exceptional cases like those of Earl Shriner or Leroy Hendricks, 
where the risk of recidivism seemed unquestionably high due to seemingly 
obvious indications of future violence.202 However, the number of 
individuals committed under SVP laws in Washington and elsewhere 
suggests that states have applied the laws much more broadly than 
anticipated by the drafters.203 At the same time, the laws have not, in fact, 
made communities safer.204  
After the Court upheld the constitutionality of SVP laws in Hendricks, 
several states followed the lead of Washington and Kansas. Today, a total 
of twenty states have adopted SVP laws.205 Additionally, Congress adopted 
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an SVP commitment scheme as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection 
and Safety Act.206 The federal law applies to those incarcerated by the U.S. 
Bureau of Prisons, so it involves a somewhat different set of potential 
respondents, since, other than crimes committed in “Indian Country,” most 
sexual abuse and assault cases are prosecuted in state courts.207 However, 
one class of offender prevalent in federal prisons is those serving sentences 
for child pornography convictions.208 In some instances, a pornography 
charge serves as a predicate offense,209 or even the sole predicate offense,210 
for an SVP commitment under the Adam Walsh Act.211 The law faced 
immediate challenge on the grounds that, by enacting a federal civil 
commitment program, Congress had acted outside of its ”enumerated 
powers”;212 the Supreme Court resolved this question of Congress’s 
                                                                                                                 
229a.1 to .16 (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a22 (West 2008); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 123a, §§ 1-16 (West 2003 & Supp. 2009); 2007 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253d.01 
to .36 (West & Supp. 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 632.480 to .513 (West 2014); NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 71-1201 to -1226 (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 135-E:1 to :24 
(2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-27.24 to .38 (West 2008); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 
10.01-.17 (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-03.3-01 to -24 (2014); 
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-48-10 to -170 (2002 & Supp. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.2-900 to -
920 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010-.903 (West 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 
980.01-.14 (West 2013).  
 206. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 
Stat. 587 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2012)). 
 207. One commentator has raised concerns about the large number of Native Americans 
who have been subject to commitment under the federal law. Karen Franklin, Appellate 
Court Rejects "Past As Prelude" Myth, IN THE NEWS (Feb. 12, 2014), http://forensicpsy 
chologist.blogspot.com/2014/02/appellate-court-debunks-past-as-prelude.html. 
 208. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES i-ii (2012), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-rep 
orts/sex-offense-topics/201212-federal-child-pornography-offenses/Full-Report_to_Congress. 
pdf. 
 209. See, e.g., United States v. Timms, 664 F.3d 436, passim (4th Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Wetmore, 766 F. Supp. 2d 319, passim (D. Mass. 2011), aff'd, 700 F.3d 570 (1st 
Cir. 2012).  
 210. See, e.g., United States v. Volungus, 730 F.3d 40, 43-46 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 211. The Walsh Act provides that a federal prisoner can be “certified” as an SVP under 
the statute without a judicial determination. See United States v. Broncheau, 645 F.3d 676, 
690-93 (4th Cir. 2011). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that such 
determination must be subject to review “within a reasonable period of time” and failure to 
provide access to such determination may constitute a deprivation of due process. Id. at 687. 
 212. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133-49 (2010), reversing United States v. 
Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d 522 (E.D.N.C. 2007); see also Volungus, 595 F.3d 1, passim (1st 
Cir. 2010); United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497, passim (8th Cir. 2009). 
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authority when it upheld the Act in the 2010 opinion United States v. 
Comstock.213  
As New York was about to implement its own SVP law in 2007, the New 
York Times published a three-part series examining the SVP commitment 
programs already in place across the country.214 The series’ authors made 
several findings that suggest the operation of SVP programs falls far short 
of their promise. Notably, although nearly 3000 people had been committed 
under the nineteen state SVP laws then in effect, (1) the programs were not 
committing the most violent and dangerous offenders because they released 
rapists while committing exhibitionists; (2) the treatment programs were 
largely ineffective in rehabilitating offenders; (3) few of those committed 
were ever released, resulting in effectively permanent detention; and (4) 
few states have developed adequate programs for monitoring those who are 
released.215 In spite of these problematic findings, commitment programs 
continue to expand.216 A 2013 survey of eighteen state-based SVP programs 
found that 4779 individuals are presently committed, with an additional 861 
in detention awaiting the outcome of SVP proceedings.217  
The expanding reach of SVP programs originates, in part, in the fact that 
states can, and do, base SVP commitment petitions on a wide range of 
predicate offenses.218 In many states, such as those following the 
Washington model, SVP laws permit indefinite commitment based on 
juvenile offenses, on offenses for which the person was acquitted on the 
basis of insanity, or on uncharged conduct.219 In Minnesota, for example, 
more than 7% of those committed under that state’s SVP program had 
never been convicted of an adult crime prior to their commitment.220 
                                                                                                                 
 213. 560 U.S. at 149-50.  
 214. Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After 
Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/us/04civil.html? 
pagewanted=all. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. D’ORAZIO ET AL., supra note 203, at 7.  
 218. See Melissa Wangenheim, Note, ‘To Catch a Predator,’ Are We Casting Our Nets 
Too Far?: Constitutional Concerns Regarding the Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 62 
RUTGERS L. REV. 559, 580-84 (2010). 
 219. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.030 (West 2009). 
 220. Chris Serres, Minnesota Sex Offenders: Are They Really the 'Worst of the Worst'?, 
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis) (Dec. 2, 2013, 10:38 AM), http://www.startribune.com/local/ 
233945281.html (profiling the case of a developmentally disabled man who was committed 
at the age of nineteen for acts of child molestation that he committed before the age of 
fourteen). Courts in several other states, by contrast, have held that a sex offense committed 
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Moreover, given the broadly worded statutory requirements for prior 
convictions or criminal offenses, courts have based indefinite commitments 
for sexually violent predators on sexual offenses that do not involve any 
physical contact with a victim, such as exhibitionism, indecent conduct, or 
possession of pornography.221  
The high number of individuals committed under SVP statutes also 
suggests that it may be difficult, though not impossible, for a respondent to 
prevail in an SVP trial.222 The state enjoys several advantages in the 
conduct of such trials. The Supreme Court’s holding in Hendricks that SVP 
schemes are civil rather than criminal in nature has had significant 
implications for the procedural rights of respondents in SVP proceedings.223 
Respondents in SVP proceedings are not afforded the same Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment protections required in criminal trials with respect to burdens 
of proof,224 competency,225 effective assistance of counsel,226 self-
incrimination,227 and confronting witnesses.228  
The promise of treatment under SVP statutes is tied to the mental-
abnormality rationale of all forms of involuntary commitment. However, 
                                                                                                                 
as a juvenile cannot be a predicate crime for an SVP commitment. See, e.g., In re Geltz, 840 
N.W.2d 273, 279-80 (Iowa 2013) (reviewing case law on question). 
 221. See, e.g., United States v. Volungus, 730 F.3d 40, 43-44 (1st Cir. 2013) (possession 
of child pornography and charges associated with online communication with a law 
enforcement agent posing as an underage girl). Commitments have also been based on 
attempted sexual abuse or assault, where there was no actual physical contact with a victim. 
See, e.g., Reinhardt v. Kopcow, No. 13-cv-2513-WJM-KMT, 2014 WL 4375931, at *3 (D. 
Colo. Sept. 4, 2014) (attempted sexual assault); United States v. Perez, 752 F.3d 398, 401 
(4th Cir. 2014) (transportation of a minor in foreign commerce with intent to engage in 
criminal sexual activity). 
 222. I have not located any empirical studies of rates of success of SVP commitment 
petitions. 
 223. Tamara Rice Lave, Throwing Away the Key: Has the Adam Walsh Act Lowered the 
Threshold for Sexually Violent Predator Commitments Too Far?, 14 U. PA. J. OF CONST. L. 
391, 399 (2011). 
 224. See infra notes 403-411 and accompanying text. Several SVP laws, including 
Kansas and Washington’s, require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-
29a07 (West 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060 (West 2009).  
 225. See, e.g., In re Morgan, 253 P.3d 394, 403 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011); In re Luttrell, 
2008 WI App 93, ¶ 11, 312 Wis. 2d 695, 754 N.W.2d 249, 253 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). 
 226. See Heather Cucolo & Michael Perlin, “Far from the Turbulent Space”: Considering 
the Adequacy of Counsel in the Representation of Individuals Accused of Being Sexually 
Violent Predators 20-25 (Jan. 24, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2384899. However, all laws provide for some access to counsel. 
 227. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986). 
 228. See, e.g., United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1140 (D. Haw. 2008). 
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the treatment outcomes from SVP programs have been uneven. Scores of 
those committed as SVPs receive little to no treatment whosoever, and 
some states have been involved in protracted litigation regarding access to 
treatment.229 One such case was brought by Andre Young, who challenged 
Washington’s law.230 By the time his case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, 
the Court had already decided the Hendricks case.231 In dismissing Young’s 
challenge based upon an as-applied theory, the Court noted in dictum that, 
if a person is detained for the purpose of incapacitation and treatment, then 
“due process requires that the conditions and duration of confinement under 
the Act bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are 
committed.”232 Such language has provided no guidance to lower courts 
evaluating right-to-treatment claims.233 Most state SVP laws do not offer 
immunity for disclosure of criminal conduct, so the threat of self-
incrimination during treatment is real.234 Furthermore, social scientists have 
yet to reach anything approaching a consensus on whether the various kinds 
of inpatient treatment programs administrated to SVPs prevent 
recidivism.235  
The burden on an SVP respondent, once committed, to obtain release 
from detention is considerable. Proving that one’s “condition” has changed 
so as to make one no longer fit the definition of “sexually violent 
                                                                                                                 
 229. See, e.g., Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001); Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 
978, 983 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated on other grounds, 556 U.S. 1256 (2009); Karsjens v. 
Jesson, 6 F. Supp. 3d 916, 922 (D. Minn. 2014). 
 230. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 745 (W.D. Wash. 1995). 
 231. Young, 531 U.S. at 258.  
 232. Id. at 265. 
 233. Even where some form of treatment is offered, many detainees refuse to participate 
in the treatment offered because a condition of such treatment is full disclosure (checked by 
polygraph tests) of all sexual offenses, including those which the detainee had previously 
denied under oath or for which the detainee was never charged or convicted, thus exposing 
him to potential further criminal liability or extended commitment. Jeslyn A. Miller, Sex 
Offender Civil Commitment: The Treatment Paradox, 98 CAL. L. REV. 2093, 2095 (2010); 
see also La Fond, supra note 23, at 167-69. 
 234. EWING, supra note 34, at 56. The Supreme Court has held that conditioning the 
constitutionally required treatment on such disclosure (and removing privileges and 
increasing the level of detention as a penalty for refusing treatment) does not run afoul of the 
Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against compelled self-incrimination. McKune v. Lile, 536 
U.S. 24, 46-48 (2002). Justice Kennedy concluded that the treatment program did not truly 
compel self-incrimination because the penalties imposed for refusing to participate in the 
treatment program were not severe and the state had a valid objective in encouraging 
rehabilitation and deterring future sexual offenses by leaving the possibility of future 
prosecution. Id. at 33-36. 
 235. EWING, supra note 34, at 52-55. 
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predator”236 is difficult, particularly when one lacks opportunities either to 
demonstrate self-restraint or to receive effective treatment.237 The 
respondent’s burden on a petition for release requires evidence that both 
predicts the future and proves a negative—a nearly insurmountable task. As 
a result, thousands of people detained for lengthy periods have little 
likelihood of ever being released.238 Surveys of release rates suggest that 
most individuals are committed for extended periods.239 The New York 
Times’ 2007 study revealed that, of the nearly 3000 individuals who had 
been committed nationwide under SVP laws, only fifty had been released 
on an assessment by a clinician and state-appointed evaluator that they were 
“ready” for release.240  This means that individuals who were among the 
first committed in the 1990s have been held in detention for twenty years or 
more.  Because release is nearly impossible, there is now a growing and 
aging group of people living out their lives in detention.241 The Times 
authors noted that Leroy Hendricks, who was seventy-two years old in 
                                                                                                                 
 236. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060 (West 2009); In re Lieberman, 955 
N.E.2d 118, 139 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (denying SVP respondent’s petition for release because 
he had not provided expert evidence that he “is no longer a sexually violent person or that it 
is not substantially probable that respondent will engage in future acts of sexual violence”); 
cf. In re West, 2011 WI 83, ¶ 96-102, 800 N.W.2d 929, 950-51 (Wis. 2011) (rejecting 
constitutional challenge to Wisconsin SVP statute’s assignment of burden of proof for 
release to respondent). 
 237. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 380-81 (noting that many programs are grossly 
inadequate, while at the same time, a person’s lack of improvement in treatment is often 
used as a basis to extend their detention); see, e.g., In re West, 800 N.W.2d at 947-48 
(holding that placing burden on committed person to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that he is no longer a “sexual violent person” in order to be released from commitment does 
not violate due process). 
 238. La Fond, supra note 23, at 166-70; see also EWING, supra note 34, at 22. 
 239. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 380. (“Those discharged or released range from 0 in 
North Dakota, New Jersey, and Iowa to 1 in Minnesota, 4 in Massachusetts, 6 in Missouri, 
and fewer than 20 in Washington, Kansas, Illinois, and Florida. The only states that have 
released a sufficient number of committed offenders to permit a follow-up are Arizona 
(221), California (67), and Wisconsin (56).”); cf. WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, 
COMPARISON OF STATE LAWS AUTHORIZING INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY 
VIOLENT PREDATORS: 2006 UPDATE, REVISED 3 (2007), available at 
www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/07-08-1101.pdf. 
 240. Davey & Goodnough, supra note 214. Another 115 people had been released 
because of “legal technicalities, court rulings, terminal illness or old age.” Id. 
 241. Several studies have noted that the risk of recidivism for sexual violence decreases 
significantly for those over the age of sixty. United States v. Wilkinson, 646 F. Supp. 2d 
194, 208 (2009) (citing R. Karl Hanson, Recidivism and Age: Follow-Up Data From 4,673 
Sexual Offenders, 17 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1046, 1059 (2002)). 
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2007, “spen[t] most days in a wheelchair or leaning on a cane, because of 
diabetes, circulation ailments[,] and the effects of a stroke” and that those 
who remained in detention included a 102-year-old man with poor 
hearing.242  
Minnesota’s SVP program, established in 1993, provides perhaps the 
most extreme example of the challenges of obtaining release. Between the 
program’s enactment in 1993 and 2012, 635 people (nearly all men) were 
committed under that state’s SVP law.243 Not one was released until 
2012.244 That state’s program has come under criticism for its failure to 
provide adequate treatment for detained offenders, as well as for its 
stringent release requirements.245 In 2012, the British High Court refused to 
extradite to Minnesota a sex offender who faced possible SVP commitment 
on the basis that such commitment would constitute a “flagrant denial” of 
his human rights.246 More recently, the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Minnesota held that the state’s “[SVP] statutes and sex offender program 
do not pass constitutional scrutiny.”247 In its decision, the court stated: “The 
overwhelming evidence at trial established that Minnesota's civil 
commitment scheme is a punitive system that segregates and indefinitely 
detains a class of potentially dangerous individuals without the safeguards 
of the criminal justice system.”248 In short, as one commentator wrote in 
reference to the realities of SVP laws: “Involuntary commitment is both 
incarceration and exile.”249 
Since so many who are committed under SVP laws remain in detention, 
these programs are becoming a significant fiscal burden on the states that 
have adopted them. Estimates of the cost to house each detainee range from 
                                                                                                                 
 242. Davey & Goodnough, supra note 214. 
 243. Rupa Shenoy, Families of Sex Offenders Find Hope in Clarence Opheim's Release, 
MPRNEWS (Mar. 5, 2012), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2012/03/05/minne 
sota-sex-offender-program. 
 244. Mary Lynn Smith & Dave Hage, Minnesota Sex-Offender Lawsuit Takes Step 
Forward, STAR TRIB. (July 25, 2012, 6:35 AM), http://www.startribune.com/local/163607 
246.html. 
 245. Id.  
 246. John Aston, Court Blocks Shawn Sullivan’s U.S. Extradition, INDEPENDENT, June 
28, 2012, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/court-blocks-shawn-sullivans-us-ex 
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 247. Karsjens v. Jesson, No. 11–3659, 2015 WL 3755870, at *2 (D. Minn. June 17, 
2015). 
 248. Id. 
 249. Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences 
of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of "Sexually Violent Predators", 93 
MINN. L. REV. 670, 708 (2008). 
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$94,000 to $175,000 annually.250 These figures do not include capital 
expenditures to build new facilities for SVP programs or the litigation costs 
associated with a state’s petitions for commitment or a respondent’s petition 
for release.251 One study suggests that the cost of detaining a sex offender 
under an SVP law is four times more expensive than that of incarcerating a 
prisoner.252 
Notwithstanding the failure of SVP programs to achieve their ostensible 
purposes and the extreme financial burden they impose on states 
prosecuting them, states continue to identify individuals for SVP 
commitment at the conclusion of their prison sentences.253 Since the public 
has become accustomed to SVP detention as the standard course for those 
convicted of sex crimes, legislatures appear to have boxed themselves in. 
The likelihood of public outrage at the idea of releasing “sexual predators” 
or not permitting their further detention makes such options appear 
politically unfeasible. Indeed, a Florida newspaper criticized that state for 
not detaining enough people under its SVP program, and the legislature 
responded by loosening the commitment criteria even further.254 
                                                                                                                 
 250. EWING, supra note 34, at 57. The Times study noted that wheelchairs, walkers, and 
high blood pressure medication are among the growing costs for an increasing aging 
population of people in SVP detention. Davey & Goodnough, supra note 214. Florida’s SVP 
detention center filled 229 prescriptions for arthritis medication one month, and 300 for 
blood pressure and other heart problems. Id. 
 251. EWING, supra note 34, at 57-59. The latter include costs of court-appointed counsel 
and expert witnesses, which are estimated to double those costs. Media reports have 
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Christine Willmsen, State Wastes Millions Helping Sex Predators Avoid Lockup, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2013, http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/state-wastes-millions-helping-
sex-predators-avoid-lockup/. 
 252. Davey & Goodnough, supra note 214. 
 253. Id.   
 254. In 2013, the Sun Sentinel released a series of articles, collectively titled “Sex 
Predators Unleashed,” that was highly critical of how many convicted sex offenders were 
not being committed under that state’s SVP law and calling on state lawmakers to make it 
easier to detain such offenders. Sally Keston & Dana Williams, Florida Sets Rapists and 
Child Molesters Free to Strike Again, SUN SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Aug. 18, 2013, 
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Despite their central objective of increasing public safety, SVP laws do 
not appear to have decreased the overall incidence of sexual violence in 
those states that have enacted such laws. It is difficult to empirically assess 
whether there are broad public safety benefits to SVP programs—that is, 
beyond ensuring that specific individuals have no access to anyone outside 
of the SVP detention facility—but some researchers have attempted to do 
so. In one recent study, researchers concluded: “SVP laws have had no 
discernible impact on the incidence of sex crimes.”255 Further, by enacting 
SVP laws and implementing these expensive programs, policymakers are 
often shifting resources away from other, arguably more relevant and 
effective, programs, including those aimed at enhancing probation and 
community monitoring programs, preventing domestic violence and child 
abuse, and providing treatment to sex offenders during their 
incarceration.256 
III. Distortions of Science and Law in SVP Commitment Proceedings 
As discussed in the prior section, the language in the Hendricks and 
Crane decisions confirming the constitutionality of SVP laws confers broad 
discretion on courts in their application of statutory terms to meet the due 
process requirement of mental abnormality. The Supreme Court reasoned in 
Crane that the science of psychiatry is “ever-advancing” and its 
“distinctions do not seek precisely to mirror those of the law.”257 The Court 
also made clear that it was not going to establish specific principles to guide 
lower courts and legislatures, reasoning that “bright-line rules” are not 
always the best way to ensure “the Constitution's safeguards of human 
liberty in the area of mental illness and the law."258 In effect, it invited 
policymakers and courts to experiment with their approaches to establishing 
eligibility for SVP commitment.  
The Hendricks-Crane rationale assumes that however legislatures choose 
to precisely define the contours of each state’s SVP commitment laws, 
mental health professionals would reliably identify those whose medical 
                                                                                                                 
December described the Florida Legislature’s response to the paper’s investigation as 
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conditions put them at higher risk of committing sexual violence due to 
volitional impairment, thus ensuring that SVP commitment laws would not 
sweep too broadly.259 By framing the standard for commitment in terms of 
mental disorder and making findings of volitional impairment from such 
disorders a constitutional requirement, legislatures and courts have assigned 
psychiatry a central role in the implementation of SVP laws by providing 
expert opinion on the likelihood of future sexual violence stemming from 
mental conditions in specific individuals.  
In effect, the constitutionality of SVP laws was saved by the promise of 
psychiatry. The Court’s rationale is valid, however, only if it is based on 
accurate assumptions about the contributions psychiatry can make to ensure 
SVP laws do not overreach. Justice Kennedy explicitly made that point in 
his Hendricks concurrence when he noted that if it turns out “mental 
abnormality is too imprecise a category to offer a solid basis for concluding 
that civil detention is justified,” then the constitutionality of the SVP 
scheme would again be called into question.260 It follows that, if the very 
concept of a mental health predicate is highly imprecise, then the entire 
model of SVP laws similarly falls short of meeting due process 
requirements. 
Using psychiatric evidence to determine who qualifies as an SVP raises 
two major problems. One is that sexual deviance has an uncertain place in 
the classification of psychopathology.261 The other is that psychiatry does 
not operate in terms of predicting behavior.262 It is a profession whose 
orientation is to identify the disordered primarily for the purposes of 
treating them—to relieve suffering and improve functioning. As noted 
earlier, the psychiatric profession never claimed that it had the knowledge 
or instruments to identify those at an especially high risk of committing acts 
of sexual violence,263 and the past twenty-five years of SVP proceedings 
indicate that the Court’s evident assumption that it could make that crucial 
identification was misplaced. The years since those opinions have, in fact, 
borne out the warnings of the APA in its Hendricks amicus brief.264 It has 
become clear that the Supreme Court based its ruling regarding the class of 
“sexually violent predators” on a legal, rather than psychiatric, construct, 
and its assignment of the role of determining such classification to the field 
                                                                                                                 
 259. See supra notes 176-182 and accompanying text. 
 260. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 261. See infra notes 282-338 and accompanying text. 
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of psychiatry involved a distorted view of that field with dire consequences 
for those targeted by the statutes.  
This section first reviews the historical and current approaches within 
psychiatry to identifying disorders involving sexual arousal. Next it 
examines how such approaches became significantly distorted in SVP 
proceedings under the framework set forth in Hendricks-Crane. This 
section gives particular attention to the problem of relying on psychiatry to 
predict sexual violence. Finally, this section reviews some of the attempts 
to address these problems, primarily through proposed revisions to 
psychiatric diagnoses and use of alternative methods of prediction. 
A. Psychiatry’s View of Diagnosing and Predicting Sexual Violence 
The holdings in Hendricks and Crane assigned psychiatric experts a 
central, indispensable role in the prosecution of SVP commitments. The 
State cannot obtain an order for detention without proving dangerousness, 
and such dangerousness must be couched in terms of abnormality, or a 
“mental disorder that has some medical legitimacy.”265 When experts speak 
of mental pathology, particularly in courtrooms, they tend to do so in terms 
of diagnoses.266 However, the diagnoses that, on their face, appear to 
identify those individuals who present the greatest threat of sexual 
dangerousness are not consistent with the conceptualization of mental 
abnormality or mental disorder evidently contemplated by the Court and the 
SVP statutes it has upheld. 
1. Role of Diagnosis and the DSM Generally in Psychiatric Assessment 
As an initial matter, even the broad concept of “mental disorder” does 
not enjoy a consensus definition within psychiatry. Beginning with the third 
edition, the DSM, the APA’s standardized nosology, has offered a 
definition for mental disorder, although the definition has varied over the 
years.267 In one recent edition, the editors acknowledged that, in making a 
diagnosis, the line between disordered and non-disordered is elusive and 
variable: “The concept of mental disorder, like many other concepts in 
medicine and science, lacks a consistent operational definition that covers 
                                                                                                                 
 265. Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Sexual Predator Laws: A Two-Decade 
Retrospective, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 90, 93 (2008). 
 266. Hamilton, supra note 22, at 2-4; Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 364. 
 267. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 5-6 (3rd ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III].  
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all situations.”268 Recent editions of the DSM also feature cautionary 
language about using the manual’s diagnostic classifications in legal 
situations, where such line drawing has far greater implications than in 
clinical settings. The “Cautionary Statement for Forensic Use” in the most 
recent edition, published in 2013, advises: “When DSM-5 categories, 
criteria, and textual descriptions are employed for forensic purposes, there 
is a risk that diagnostic information will be misused or misunderstood.”269 
However, the Supreme Court clearly anticipated that experts testifying in 
SVP cases would frame their opinions, at least in part, in terms of a 
diagnosis. Crane referenced diagnosis specifically by noting that the 
sufficiency of the evidence offered by a state in support of an SVP 
commitment will take into account “the nature of the psychiatric 
diagnosis[] and the severity of the mental abnormality itself.”270 And the 
Hendricks majority noted that the State had satisfied the “mental 
abnormality” requirement in Hendricks’s case because the respondent had a 
“disorder” listed in the DSM.271 However, in neither opinion did the Court 
indicate the specific diagnoses that would be sufficient for purposes of a 
constitutionally permissible preventive detention. In the absence of any 
clear direction, uncertainties abound for those in both law and psychiatry. 
Indeed, it appears that virtually any diagnosis by a mental health 
professional could suffice to justify the indefinite commitment of someone 
as a sexually violent predator if a testifying expert links such condition to a 
risk of committing sexual violence.272 
Criminal defendants often present psychiatric diagnoses in support of an 
insanity defense, but there are important differences between this setting 
and the civil commitment of SVPs. In the context of determining criminal 
responsibility, the diagnosis helps the factfinder reconstruct the defendant’s 
past frame of mind at a given moment in time.273 This reconstruction is less 
dependent upon a specific label (e.g. schizophrenia) than on an overall 
                                                                                                                 
 268. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS xxx (4th ed. text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].  
 269. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 25 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]. The DSM-IV-TR’s “cautionary 
statement” was quoted in the APA’s amicus brief to the Court in Hendricks. See supra note 
201 and accompanying text. 
 270. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002) (emphasis added).  
 271. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997). 
 272. Allan Frances et al., Defining Mental Disorder When It Really Counts: DSM-IV-TR 
and SVP/SDP Statutes, 36 J. AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & L. 375, 379 (2008). 
 273. Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental 
Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 561-64 (1978).  
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assessment of how the person’s mind functioned at that particular 
moment.274 More importantly, in insanity defense cases, it is usually the 
defendant himself who puts a diagnosis in evidence through his own expert 
testimony as part of a defense he raised.275 Absent a defendant’s choice to 
assert an insanity defense, there is no role for psychiatric testimony, 
including diagnoses, at trial. By contrast, in SVP proceedings, because a 
diagnosis of mental abnormality is required for due process reasons, it is the 
linchpin for the deprivation of liberty. It is how we rationalize preventive 
detention for a subset of the population. And if that is the case, then the 
specific diagnosis offered to meet that requirement must align with due 
process principles by, at a minimum, having a basis in medical 
knowledge.276  
In Hendricks, the Court noted the lack of consensus among psychiatrists 
regarding where to draw the line between ill and not ill and also how to 
identify and characterize specific mental disorders.277 This led the majority 
to conclude that legislatures, in drafting the laws, and judges, in reviewing 
the evidence and applying the laws in individual cases, should do the line-
drawing.278 But the lack of consensus279 here should have instead signaled 
that the deciding factor in SVP commitments cannot be so variable and 
subjective. This is particularly true given the massive deprivation of 
liberty—indefinite preventive detention for terms far longer than in the 
standard involuntary hospitalization context—and because the respondent 
bears the burden to prove that he has sufficiently recovered from such 
“condition” to be released.280 This reasoning also fails to account for the 
high degree of deference courts generally grant to mental health experts and 
the limited ability of courts and juries to assess the reliability of such 
experts’ opinions.281 The Court’s rulings, when implemented in the context 
of the on-the-ground realities of trials, paved the way for scores of SVP 
                                                                                                                 
 274. In fact, Stephen Morse has argued that insanity opinions could be based entirely on 
the defendant’s capacity at the moment of the crime using descriptive rather than diagnostic 
terms. Id. at 604-13. 
 275. JOHN PARRY, CRIMINAL MENTAL HEALTH AND DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE AND 
TESTIMONY 131 (2009).  
 276. See McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 577 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 277. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357-60 (1997). 
 278. Id. at 359-60.  
 279. The Hendricks Court was divided 5-4, with Justice Kennedy concurring. Id. at 350, 
371, 373. 
 280. See supra notes 236-242 and accompanying text.  
 281. See infra notes 572-605 and accompanying text.  
664 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:619 
 
 
commitments to be based upon expert opinions with highly dubious 
scientific foundation. 
2. Origins of Lack of Consensus Regarding Relation of Pathology to 
Sexual Deviance 
In the case of SVP laws, mental health professionals are asked to make a 
very specific finding of dangerousness: the person must be at risk for 
committing sexual violence, not any kind of violence. Most civil 
commitment statutes have a blanket “harm to self or others” requirement,282 
which provides for a range of prognostication. The requirement of the 
specific risk in SVP laws leads many to assume there must be a specific 
diagnosis tied to that specific risk. Given this central role assigned to 
psychiatric diagnosis in SVP proceedings, we must consider carefully what 
psychiatry has to say about the underlying pathology of those who engage 
in sexual violence. 
The history of pathologizing sexual attitudes and conduct is long, 
complicated, and inextricably caught up with cultural and ethical views—
often tacit—that construct deviance and perversion in contrast with a 
presumed normality. As other scholars have set out this history in some 
detail,283 I will only summarize some key developments here, particularly 
as they pertain to implications for the SVP statutory schemes. French 
philosopher Michel Foucault compellingly argued that much that is labeled 
as pathology is in fact nothing more than deviance from social norms 
predominant at a given time, including norms regarding sexuality and 
proper gender behavior.284 Contemporary historians of psychiatry generally 
regard supposed pathological “conditions” as “constructions,” and often 
quite problematic ones.285 
Although Western societies, particularly through religious and legal-
political institutions, have long identified and condemned a range of sexual 
                                                                                                                 
 282. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. 
 283. See, e.g., Andreas De Block & Pieter R. Adriaens, Pathologizing Sexual Deviance: 
A History, 50 J. OF SEX RES., 276, 277 (2013). See generally JESSE BERING, PERV: THE 
SEXUAL DEVIANT IN ALL OF US (2013). 
 284. De Block & Adriaens, supra note 283, at 277. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, A 
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME 1: AN INTRODUCTION (1990); MICHEL FOUCAULT, A 
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME 2: THE USE OF PLEASURE (1990). 
 285. De Block & Adriaens, supra note 283, at 277. (“[P]sychiatrists’ and sexologists’ 
descriptions of new pathologies or types of persons should not be considered as discoveries 
but rather as inventions or constructions.”). 
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behaviors as deviant,286 the notion of such conduct as evidence of mental 
illness did not arise until the mid-nineteenth century with the increasing 
authority of psychiatry.287 As new works about sexual deviance and 
perversion appeared in the European medical literature, the criminalization 
of specific sexual acts also became more widespread.288 In time, some 
psychiatrists criticized the punishment of these behaviors and recommended 
treatment instead of punishment to eliminate these behaviors.289 
The publication in 1886 of Austrian psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-
Ebing’s Psychopathia Sexualis, which set forth a medically detailed 
account of specific pathologies, is considered a watershed moment in the 
medicalization of sexual deviance.290 The Psychopathia Sexualis differed 
from prior accounts because it argued that such conduct originated in an 
individual’s personality, not anatomy.291 Although the original work 
included extensive classification of pathological sexual feelings and 
behavior, it was only in later versions that Kraft-Ebbing discussed 
pedophilia and other forms of “paraphilia”;292 that is, sexual arousal not 
from heterosexual intercourse with adults but from non-standard sources, 
such as objects, animals, settings, and children.293 Krafft-Ebing, himself a 
forensic psychiatrist, noted the implications of his research for criminal law, 
but he observed that classifying conduct as normal, perverted, or criminal 
was not a simple matter.294 
Sigmund Freud, though clearly influenced by Krafft-Ebing’s approach, 
took a somewhat different tack regarding sexual deviance versus normality. 
Most individuals, Freud maintained, are “polymorphously perverse” during 
childhood, and a range of sexual interest remains quite common among the 
population.295 He wrote: “However infamous they may be, however sharply 
they may be contrasted with normal sexual activity, quiet consideration will 
show that some perverse trait or other is seldom absent from the sexual life 
                                                                                                                 
 286. Id. at 277-78. The word “perversion” originates from a broader term “used to denote 
an aberration or a deviation from a divine norm: any act that violated the laws of God was 
considered a perversion.” Id. at 278. 
 287. Id.  
 288. Id. at 279. 
 289. Id. 
 290. See id. at 280. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. at 281. 
 293. See id. at 280-81.  
 294. Id. at 281.  
 295. Id. at 282. 
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of normal people.”296 Accordingly, these desires signal dysfunction only 
when they are the source of compulsion, fixation, and exclusiveness such 
that they interfere with normative functioning.297 While this psychoanalytic 
approach further blurred the lines between normal and pathological 
sexuality, Freud, like Krafft-Ebing, assumed that a precise distinction in 
fact existed,298 and, in his later work, he maintained that most perversions 
originated from an unresolved castration anxiety and early sexual trauma.299  
As reviewed below, many elements of these early debates have resurfaced 
in contemporary American psychiatry, with significant implications for 
controversies regarding the extent to which psychopathology can be linked 
to sexual violence. 
3. The DSM and Paraphilias 
In the second half of the twentieth century, the DSM became the leading 
source of psychiatric classification. The APA published the first two 
editions, based primarily on psychoanalytic approaches, in 1952 and 
1968.300 They did refer to sexual disorders (the early editions lacked the 
diagnostic criteria seen in more recent editions), but these were placed 
within the personality disorders category, and the focus was on the 
relationship between the individual’s desires and predominant social 
norms.301 The texts did not place sexual perversions clearly within the 
realm of mental illness but, rather, treated them as types of social 
deviance.302   
                                                                                                                 
 296. SIGMUND FREUD, THE COMPLETE INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 
322 (James Strachey trans., 1966); see also SIGMUND FREUD, THREE ESSAYS ON SEXUALITY 
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 297. Jerome C. Wakefield, DSM-5 Proposed Diagnostic Criteria for Sexual Paraphilias: 
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195, 199 (2011). 
 298. Id. 
 299. De Block & Adriaens, supra note 283, at 282; David P. Bryden & Maren M. Grier, 
The Search For Rapists' “Real” Motives, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 171, 174-76 
(2011). 
 300. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (1952) [hereinafter DSM-I]; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter DSM-II].  
 301. DSM-I, supra note 300, at 38-39; DSM-II, supra note 300, at 44-45; see also De 
Block & Adrieans, supra note 283, at 285-86. 
 302. De Block & Adriaens, supra note 283, at 286. 
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As remarked above, the DSM-III, published in 1980, was a significant 
departure from the earlier editions. This edition is most notable for its 
presentation of specific diagnostic criteria for each disorder.303 The 
definitions and criteria it offered for disorders associated with sexual 
deviance, particularly for “pedophilia,” became increasingly embroiled in 
controversy and politics in subsequent editions. Starting with the DSM-III, 
the manual included a category called “paraphilias,” (or, as they are 
referred to in the current edition, DSM-5, “paraphilic disorders”) which are 
specific disorders associated with sexual attraction to people, things, or 
situations that are considered deviant or non-normal.304 Under the category, 
the manual lists disorders such as pedophilia, exhibitionism, and 
sadomasochism. Each edition presented a slightly different list of disorders 
and a slightly different set of diagnostic criteria for each.305 The central 
debate or tension pervading the development of these classifications was 
this: at what point does sexual attraction or desire signal or implicate 
psychopathology?306   
Since the field of psychiatry is centrally concerned with identifying and 
treating those whose mental disorders cause personal distress and impair 
functioning, many (including Freud, as indicated above) have taken the 
position that only when a persistent form of sexual attraction leads to such 
distress or impairment is it appropriate to label it as a disorder.307 Thus, the 
extent to which a subject’s sexual feelings deviated from social norms was 
less important for making the diagnosis of the presence of a “disorder” than 
the existence of distress or impairment of function for the subject himself or 
herself. This view stems in part from psychiatry’s wariness of classifying 
certain types of sexual attraction as disordered in light of the enormous 
controversy regarding the previous inclusion of homosexuality in the 
DSM’s list of sexual disorders.308 The elimination of homosexuality from 
the list in 1973 led to a debate about whether and which other forms of 
                                                                                                                 
 303. SHORTER, supra note 183, at 300-02. 
 304. The DSM-III-R list of paraphilias included: Fetishism, Transvestism, Zoophilia, 
Pedophilia, Exhibitionism, Voyeurism, Sexual Masochism, and Sexual Sadism. DSM-III, 
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DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 522-32 (4th ed. 1994) 
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 306. De Block & Adriaens, supra note 283, at 284-92. 
 307. Id. at 288-89; Wakefield, supra note 297, at 197, 200. 
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sexual deviation should be included in the manual, particularly where such 
deviation did not cause any distress to the individual (the key rationale used 
for removing homosexuality).309 The DSM-III included language in the 
forward noting a distinction between deviance and disorder310 and the lead 
editor of the manual, Robert Spitzer, acknowledged that the term “disorder . 
. . always involves a value judgment. ”311  
This emphasis on personal distress and impaired functioning became 
more apparent with the publication of the DSM-IV in 1994. Under the 
diagnostic criteria for the paraphilias, conduct based upon these urges could 
be criminal, but not pathological, in the absence of distress or limited 
functioning.312 With this revision, that edition further clarified that 
clinicians could not consider child sex offenders to be mentally ill unless 
their deviant behavior caused such distress or impairment.313 This 
modification, however, which moved the notion of paraphilia away from 
the problematic normal-abnormal dichotomy,314 elicited outrage among 
certain conservative groups who claimed that this would de-pathologize 
nondistressed pedophiles315 and give an “ego-syntonic well-functioning 
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specific protest cited by the authors apparently came from “Exodus International,” an anti-
gay Christian organization. Exodus International Shuts Down: Christian Ministry Apologizes 
to LGBT Community and Halts Operations, HUFFINGTON POST (June 21, 2013, 8:19 AM), 
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paraphilic a free pass as far as disorder goes.”316 Robert Spitzer later 
referred to the blowback as a “public relations disaster,”317 and the APA 
reversed the amendment (referred to as a “misinterpretation” by the editors) 
for those paraphilias “involving nonconsenting victims” to allow a 
diagnosis of paraphilia based upon either the individual’s acting on 
paraphilic urges with said victims or experiencing distress caused by such 
urges.318 In the “text revision” of DSM-IV six years later, the editors 
modified the criteria to make clear that acting on paraphilic urges could 
itself satisfy the “harm” requirement for the diagnosis of pathology, even if 
such activity was unaccompanied by “distress or interpersonal difficulty” 
for the person so diagnosed.319 
Another significant change in the DSM-IV was to the “A Criterion” part 
of each paraphilia diagnosis to allow clinicians to base a diagnosis on 
“recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or 
behaviors.”320 This revision was a technical adjustment required by changes 
in wording made in the other part of the diagnostic criteria for each 
paraphilia.321 It was only in hindsight that the editors and other 
commentators noted that the use of “or behaviors” as a disjunctive, in 
combination with the amendment regarding the “harm” requirement, could 
allow prosecution experts in SVP cases to assign a diagnosis of mental 
abnormality to sexual offenders “based only on their having committed 
sexual offenses (e.g., rape).”322 The DSM editors have asserted repeatedly 
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that this broad reading of the A Criterion is inconsistent with the basic 
conceptualization of paraphilias in the DSM: criminal conduct alone, even 
if it appears to be based on an underlying paraphilia, cannot establish a 
diagnosis for such a paraphilia.323 Given that the “core construct” of a 
paraphilia is the presence of “deviant arousal,” a clinical diagnosis must be 
based upon information beyond an instance of criminal conduct alone.324 As 
Michael First, one of the DSM-IV editors, explained in a 2010 editorial: “A 
paraphilia is . . . fundamentally a disturbed internal mental process (i.e., a 
deviant focus of sexual arousal) which is conceptually distinguishable from 
its various clinical manifestations . . . .”325 Since the best indicators of a 
sexual arousal pattern are a patient’s “self-reports” of fantasies, urges, and 
actions, obtained through a diagnostic interview, the criteria should not be 
interpreted in a way that would permit a clinician to “skip this crucial step” 
in the diagnostic process.326 To base a diagnosis on a person’s acts alone, 
therefore, “conflate[s] the underlying phenomenology of a paraphilia with 
its clinical manifestations.”327 
The paraphilias are not, strictly speaking, limited to the specific 
diagnostic labels, such as “pedophilia” and “exhibitionism,” set forth in the 
DSM. Beginning with the DSM-III the “paraphilias” category also included 
a catchall label: initially it was “Atypical Paraphilia,”328 and then, 
beginning with the DSM-III-R, it was “Paraphilia Not Otherwise 
Specified.”329 The purpose of this label was to acknowledge that the 
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 328. DSM-III, supra note 304, at 275. 
 329. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 290 (3rd. ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R]. 
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disorders specified in the category “paraphilia” did not represent the full 
range of nonconforming sexual interests, and it provided clinicians with a 
term to use for someone whose particular disorder (e.g. sexual interest in 
animals or in rubbing against strangers) did not meet the criteria for any 
specific disorder in the category.330 Each edition of the DSM provided a 
non-exhaustive list of examples of such other conditions.331 In successive 
editions the DSM editors removed some examples from the list, added 
others, and provided full criteria for some.332 The historical variability of 
the “NOS”—Not Otherwise Specified—category of paraphilias is evident, 
and researchers have never studied its diagnostic validity.333 
There are strong, conflicting opinions throughout psychiatry about the 
validity of the paraphilias and the implications of their use as a basis for 
SVP commitment.334 The intersection of psychopathology with social 
norms and religious and moral judgments about sexuality and sexual 
behavior has rendered the paraphilias among the most controversial 
diagnoses in the DSM.335 As noted above, the debate about the removal of 
homosexuality from the list of paraphilias had a profound impact on all 
later discussions of the inclusion, revision, or removal of diagnoses in that 
category. Several psychiatrists have continued to question whether there 
should be such a category at all. They have asked what justification there 
could be for classifying particular forms of sexual desire as disorders.336 
Scholars questioning the validity of the diagnosis of pedophilia as a mental 
disorder point to the wide variation, both historically and among states and 
countries today, regarding the minimum age of the sexual partner required 
to avoid prosecution for child sexual abuse.337 These commentators are 
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particularly concerned that indefinite detention of individuals can hinge on 
such widely varying considerations.338 
4. Research Undermines Presumed Connections Between Mental 
Disorders and Sex Crimes 
Another controversial question is whether a condition such as pedophilia 
can serve as a cause of criminal behavior, in which case the presence of the 
condition could serve as a predictor of future criminal conduct including 
sexual abuse and rape. Although it might appear that paraphilias are the 
category of mental disorder most obviously associated with violent sexual 
behavior, they are far from an ideal fit. Several researchers have found that 
sexually violent criminal conduct, and specifically child sexual abuse and 
rape, does not in fact strongly correlate with the presence of a paraphilia.339 
While most SVP laws take a “one size fits all” approach to offenders, 
research indicates that sex offenders are a “markedly heterogeneous group 
of criminals.”340 As one scholar notes, this “primary pathology attributed to 
sex offenders . . . is beginning to be discredited empirically.”341 
These empirical findings were the basis of Dr. First’s foremost concern 
about clinicians basing dubious pedophilia diagnoses upon actions alone: 
that is, the risk of a significant number of “false positive” diagnoses.342 Dr. 
First noted that sexually violent behavior can have a great number of 
underlying causes and that the paraphilias are limited to one specific kind of 
                                                                                                                 
 338. See, e.g., First & Halon, supra note 314, at 444; Frances et al., supra note 272, at 
375-76; Wakefield, supra note 297, at 196-97. 
 339. Alan R. Felthous & Leonore Simon, Introduction to This Issue: Sex Offenders Part 
One, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 1, 2 (2000) (noting that the consensus amongst clinicians who 
treat sex offenders is that “most sex offenders do not have a paraphilia”); First & Halon, 
supra note 314, at 446 (citing Neal W. Dunsieth et al., Psychiatric and Legal Features of 
113 Men Convicted of Sexual Offenses, 65 J. CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 293 (2004)); Simon, supra 
note 79, at 294 (“[D]eviant sexual fantasies do not exist in the majority of sex offenders . . . 
.”); see also Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 367 (noting that studies have shown that “a 
substantial proportion of rapists do not meet the criteria for any paraphilia”). 
 340. Prentky et al., supra note 334, at 456.  
 341. Simon, supra note 79, at 284. 
 342. First, supra note 312, at 1240. Dr. First apparently gave a deposition in which he 
attempted to explain the DSM’s paraphilias language was being interpreted and used in a 
way not intended by the editors, resulting in misdiagnoses of individuals with a paraphilia. 
In re Detention of McGary, 231 P.3d 205, 208-09 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). The transcript of 
this deposition was offered as evidence in a petition to terminate an SVP commitment based 
on a paraphilia diagnosis, but it was rejected by the trial court (which ruling was upheld on 
appeal) because Dr. First had not examined the petitioning individual. Id. at 209-10. 
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behavior: persistent, deviant sexual arousal.343 Inappropriate sexual 
conduct, like exhibitionism or sexual contact with minors, could 
alternatively be caused by “a manifestation of disinhibition or poor impulse 
control related to substance intoxication, a manic episode, or personality 
change due to a dementing illness,” or by “opportunism in a person with 
antisocial personality disorder.”344  As one example of such findings, Dr. 
First noted a study of child sex offenders in which only one-third had a 
pedophilic arousal response pattern.345   
Diagnosing individuals with specific mental disorders based on their 
sexual offenses against other adults is even more problematic. A diagnosis 
of “sexual sadism” could apply to all those who derive specific erotic 
pleasure from another person’s suffering,346 but it certainly does not apply 
to all rapists, even to those who commit multiple offenses.347 At the time 
the DSM-III-R was adopted, the editorial committee debated including a 
new diagnosis, “paraphilic coercive disorder,” among the paraphilias.348 
This proposal immediately generated controversy. Not only was there “little 
systematic research on the usefulness, reliability, validity, or definition of 
the proposed disorder,” but also many commentators raised concerns about 
turning rape into a mental disorder.349 The concern was not for the potential 
use of such a diagnostic category as a basis for preventive detention but 
rather to excuse criminal conduct.350 Ultimately, the absence of sufficient 
                                                                                                                 
 343. First, supra note 312, at 1240. 
 344. Id.; see also Fabian M. Saleh et al., The Management of Sex Offenders: Perspectives 
for Psychiatry, 18 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 359, 361 (2010) (noting the wide range of 
motivations and “environmental precipitants” related to sexual violence). 
 345. First, supra note 312, at 1240 (citing Michael C. Seto & Martin L. Lalumiere, A 
Brief Screening Scale to Identify Pedophilic Interests Among Child Molesters, 13 SEXUAL 
ABUSE 15 (2001)). 
 346. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 268, at 573 (“[T]he individual derives sexual excitement 
from the psychological or physical suffering (including humiliation) of the victim.”). 
 347. Simon, supra note 79, at 293. 
 348. Frances et al., supra note 272, at 380. 
 349. Id.  
 350. Id. Similarly, a diagnosis of pedophilia is specifically excluded from the Americans 
with Disabilities Act defining of “disability” out of concern that individuals might seek some 
kind of “accommodation” for such disorder. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2012); Adrienne L. 
Hiegel, Note, Sexual Exclusions: The Americans with Disabilities Act as a Moral Code, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1451, 1473-75 (1994). These are only a few examples of the inconsistent 
legal implications of having a mental disorder. 
674 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:619 
 
 
data to support the existence of a separate disorder led to the rejection of 
this proposal entirely.351 
5. The Absent Connection Between Psychiatric Assessment of Paraphilia 
and Determination of “Volitional Impairment”  
Of particular significance for SVP commitments is the fact that a 
diagnosis of pedophilia or other paraphilia, in addition to not being strongly 
correlated with acts of sexual violence, does not necessarily involve a lack 
of “volition” or form of compulsion, as required under the Hendricks-Crane 
analysis. As First and Halon write, a “diagnosis of a paraphilia does not 
imply that the person also has difficulty controlling his behavior.”352 The 
defining feature of the paraphilias is a particular source of “deviant” sexual 
arousal (not conduct), and as noted above, many people with such sexual 
interests, urges, or fantasies never act on them.353 As a result, some 
researchers “liken [a paraphilia] to an addiction, others to sexual 
orientation.”354   
Indeed, the DSM-IV-TR’s introductory language makes clear that none of 
the diagnoses in the manual imply an assessment of volitional control:  
[T]he fact that an individual’s presentation meets the criteria for 
a DSM-IV diagnosis does not carry any necessary implication 
regarding the individual’s degree of control over the behaviors 
that may be associated with the disorder. Even when diminished 
control over one’s behavior is a feature of the disorder, having 
the diagnosis in itself does not demonstrate that a particular 
individual is (or was) unable to control his or her behavior at a 
particular time.355 
                                                                                                                 
 351. Frances et al., supra note 272, at 380. It was not even retained as potential diagnosis 
for future study, as is done with some rejected diagnoses. Id.  
 352. First & Halon, supra note 314, at 450. 
 353. Id. 
 354. Casey Schwartz, What Science Reveals About Pedophilia, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 7, 
2011, 4:45 AM ET), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/12/06/what-science-
reveals-about-pedophilia.html. 
 355. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 268, at xxxiii. There is a category of disorders known as 
“Disruptive, Impulse-Control, and Conduct Disorders” such as kleptomania and pyromania. 
DSM-5, supra note 269, at 476-79. However, these are not associated with acts of sexual 
violence and therefore would not be appropriate predicates for an SVP commitment finding 
of mental abnormality that results in volitional impairment. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 
365. 
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This language reflects psychiatry’s consistent attempts to stay clear of 
weighing in on questions of “volition.” As one group of commentators 
noted: “Assessing volitionality is perhaps the most hopeless of all 
diagnostic quagmires.”356   
Psychiatrists have long rejected the notion that they have a special ability 
to predict future behavior, particularly dangerous conduct.357 They have 
also been ambivalent about their ability to understand and identify 
volitional impairment, particularly in the criminal context.358 Such concerns 
on the part of the psychiatric profession have led many states to eliminate 
volitional impairment (frequently referred to as “irresistible impulse”) as a 
basis for the insanity defense.359 As the APA famously cautioned regarding 
the limits of psychiatry: “The line between an irresistible impulse and an 
impulse not resisted is probably no sharper than that between twilight and 
dusk.”360 With respect to SVP laws, the Association for the Treatment of 
Sexual Abusers (a group of medical professionals) stated in its amicus brief 
to the Supreme Court in Crane that the concept of volitional impairment in 
SVP legal standards is “meaningless and unworkable.”361 Like the 
problematic “irresistible impulse” test for criminal responsibly, the ATSA 
argued, the notion of “volitional impairment,” if it even exists, should 
similarly be rejected because of the inability of experts to identify it.362 
Psychiatrists base their hesitation to make predictions in the SVP context 
in part on research undermining preconceptions about sex offender 
recidivism and its connection to psychopathology. Contrary to a common 
assumption, the recidivism rate among sex offenders for committing a 
future sex offense is actually quite low as compared with their propensity to 
relapse into other criminal behavior.363 Sexual offenders often have 
                                                                                                                 
 356. Prentky et al., supra note 334, at 457. 
 357. Simon, supra note 79, at 302; see also JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION 
OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 6 (1981). 
 358. First & Halon, supra note 314, at 451; John Monahan, The Scientific Status of 
Research on Clinical and Actuarial Predictions of Violence, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 300, 308-11 (David L. Faigman et 
al. eds., 1997). 
 359. MELTON ET AL., supra note 14, at 124. 
 360. Insanity Def. Work Group, American Psychiatric Association Statement on the 
Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681-85 (1983). 
 361. Brief for the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (No. 00-957), 2001 WL 
670067, at *2. 
 362. Id. at *4-7. 
 363. Lave, supra note 84, at 191; Simon, supra note 79, at 302-06. 
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nonsexual criminal histories and may recidivate through other forms of 
criminal or antisocial behavior.364 Research findings also call into doubt the 
assumption that the source of the behavior of sex offenders is a specific 
abnormality or condition.365 As one psychiatrist noted: “The possibility of 
forfeiture of liberty based not on current behavior, but rather on prediction 
of potential for future offending, imposes a stark obligation on the evaluator 
to ‘get it right.’”366 However, the consensus of the field is that such 
predictions cannot be done with “any precision.”367  
Just as statistical analysis reveals the absence of a strong correlation 
between a paraphilia and sexual violence,368 empirical studies also reveal 
that pedophilia—that is, the presence of intense sexual attraction to 
children—does not in itself indicate that a person is likely to engage in 
child sexual abuse.369 Although commitments of several men under SVP 
laws (particularly in the federal system) have been based solely upon a prior 
conviction for possession of child pornography, it is far from clear that 
viewing child pornography is indicative of sexual dangerousness.370 
                                                                                                                 
 364. See Simon, supra note 79, at 283, 302. 
 365. See, e.g., CYNTHIA CALKINS MERCADO ET AL., SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT, 
TREATMENT, AND CIVIL COMMITMENT: AN EVIDENCE BASED ANALYSIS AIMED AT REDUCING 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE 6 (2011), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/2435 
51.pdf (noting that even among the highest risk groups of sex offenders, recidivism rates 
were “quite low” and most sex crimes were not committed by “known offenders”); see also 
Simon, supra note 79, at 284 (“Although some sex offenders are at high risk to reoffend, 
there is no clear empirical basis for assessing which sex offenders present the most 
immediate risk for reoffending. Also, there is no evidence that sex offenders are any more 
mentally disordered than general criminal offenders.”). 
 366. Saleh et al., supra note 344, at 366. 
 367. Id. 
 368. See supra notes 339-342 and accompanying text. One researcher has argued that 
paraphilias are “taxonomically useless” to identify those sex offenders who would qualify as 
SVPs. Hamilton, supra note 22, at 28. 
 369. See Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 366. 
 370. See Emily Bazelon, Passive Pedophiles: Are Child Porn Viewers Less Dangerous 
than We Thought?, SLATE (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_ 
politics/crime/2013/04/child_pornography_viewers_how_dangerous_are_they.html; see also 
BERING, supra note 283, at 174-76 (providing an overview of research findings regarding the 
lack of strong correlation between viewing child pornography and engaging in child 
molestation). A 2013 study released by the U.S. Sentencing Commission found that one in 
three people convicted of possessing child pornography had engaged in acts classified as 
“criminal sexually dangerous behavior,” a category that includes “non-contact” crimes such as 
voyeurism and exhibitionism, and that the post-sentence sexual recidivism rate of the people so 
convicted was 7.4% (3.6% for “contact” offenses), which is lower than the rates for those 
specifically convicted of state sex crimes. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL CHILD 
2015]        DANGEROUS DIAGNOSES, RISKY ASSUMPTIONS 677 
 
 
6. ASPD as Alternative Basis of Mental Disorder 
Given that diagnoses of paraphilias do not appear, at least in the view of 
mainstream psychiatry, to be useful tools for identifying a mental disorder 
or abnormality that could be a predictor for a sex offender’s future acts of 
sexual violence, the question arises as to whether some other diagnoses 
might fit that need. As Dr. First noted in the statement quoted above, many 
other diagnoses are, in fact, more strongly associated with sexual violence 
than the presence of a mental disorder.371   
The diagnosis that is most obviously applicable to those who commit 
acts of sexual violence is Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD).372 
Indeed, ASPD is a diagnosis that, by definition, could apply to most people 
incarcerated in the United States.373 ASPD is often characterized by a 
pattern of criminal behavior, including committing sex crimes against 
children and nonconsenting adults.374 In the case of sexual offenders, then, 
a diagnosis of ASPD indicates that the acts of violence are indicative of a 
“pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others”375 
rather than the presence of a paraphilia. 
There is disagreement within psychiatry about whether personality 
disorder diagnoses, particularly ASPD, can support SVP commitments, 
either standing alone or in conjunction with one or more paraphilias.376 
                                                                                                                 
PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES (REPORT TO CONGRESS) ix, xv (2012), available at http:// 
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/sex-offense-
topics/201212-federal-child-pornography-offenses/Full_Report_to_Congress.pdf. 
 371. First, supra note 312, at 1240; see also supra notes 342-345 and accompanying text. 
 372. First & Halon, supra note 314, at 448.  
 373. Studies have estimated that anywhere from 40% to 80% of the male prison 
population would meet the ASPD diagnostic criteria. EWING, supra note 34, at 25; First & 
Halon, supra note 314, at 448-49; Thomas K. Zander, Civil Commitment Without Psychosis: 
The Law’s Reliance on the Weakest Links in Psychodiagnosis, 1 J. SEXUAL OFFENDER CIVIL 
COMMITMENT: SCI. & L., 17, 53 (2005), available at http://www.soccjournal.org/2005-
06/zander_2005.pdf. 
 374. Simon, supra note 79, at 294 (noting empirical findings indicate that “clinicians 
diagnose more convicted child molesters with antisocial personality disorder than with 
pedophilia”). 
 375. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 268, at 701.  
 376. See, e.g., Dean R. Cauley, The Diagnostic Issue of Antisocial Personality Disorder 
in Civil Commitment Proceedings: A Response to Declue, 35 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 475 
(2007); Gregory DeClue, Paraphilia NOS (nonconsenting) and Antisocial Personality 
Disorder, 34 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 495 (2006). A diagnosis of ASPD was usually inadequate 
for commitment under the old sexual psychopath laws, which focused on treatment of 
offenders, since those with ASPD are not generally regarded as being amenable to treatment; 
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Nothing in the Supreme Court’s precedent precludes basing an SVP 
commitment on such a diagnosis alone; there is no requirement that a 
person have a “sexual” disorder of some kind.377  The diagnosis of ASPD 
could apply to a great many rapists and child molesters, some of whom may 
also have paraphilias. Untangling such comorbidity, however, is not 
straightforward. As a result, it is exceedingly difficult for courts to identify 
whether the sexually offending behavior is merely criminal or also partly 
caused by a sexual pathology.378 Consequently, it is difficult to separate the 
typical recidivist sexual offender from one who suffers from “volitional 
impairment,” as required by Crane. 
The Supreme Court has never had to consider whether an ASPD 
diagnosis, standing alone, would be constitutionally adequate for an SVP 
commitment, and courts are divided on this question, since many SVP laws 
refer to “personality disorder” as well as mental abnormality.379 The Court’s 
opinion in Foucha suggests that ASPD would not be enough for post-
acquittal commitment since, in Foucha, the acquitee had an “antisocial 
personality.”380 ASPD, like other personality disorders, has never been 
regarded in criminal law as a volitional impairment sufficient to exempt an 
offender from criminal responsibility.381 Indeed, to treat it as such would 
call into question the conviction and incarceration of most of this country’s 
prison population.382 Furthermore, because ASPD is associated with 
“typical” recidivism, SVP commitments based solely upon the disorder 
would extend this extraordinary deprivation of liberty to a far greater 
segment of the population than substantive due process principles permit.383  
                                                                                                                 
rather, the ASPD is seen as a fixed personality feature. First & Halon, supra note 314, at 
449. 
 377. Frances et al., supra note 272, at 381-82. And indeed, this means that an SVP 
commitment could theoretically be based upon a diagnosis of substance abuse, mood 
disorders, or schizophrenia if some causal link to sexually violent behavior could be made. 
Id.  
 378. See id.  
 379. EWING, supra note 34, at 25; see also United States v. Wilkinson, 646 F. Supp. 2d 
194, 196 (D. Mass 2009) (rejecting use of ASPD as sole predicate mental disorder); In re 
Barnes, 689 N.W.2d 455, 459-60 (Iowa 2004) (upholding commitment based upon ASPD 
diagnosis alone); In re Adams, 588 N.W.2d 336, 340 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1998) (same). 
 380. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 78-79 (1992). 
 381. Kent A. Kiehl & Morris B. Hoffman, The Criminal Psychopath: History, 
Neuroscience, Treatment, and Economics, 51 JURIMETRICS 355, 368-69 (2011). 
 382. See supra note 373.  
 383. See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002). Despite many calls to revise the 
rather circular diagnostic criteria to address many of the resulting problems with its use, 
diagnostic criteria for ASPD were left unchanged by the editors of the DSM-5. See, e.g., 
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7. Psychiatry’s Response to SVP Laws and Hendricks-Crane Rationale 
The Court’s rationale in Hendricks-Crane assumes that there is a unique 
and distinctive pathology among dangerous sex offenders. As argued 
above, this assumption has no support in current medical thinking about 
either the mental condition of such offenders or the extent to which a 
mental health professional can identify those at particularly high risk of 
reoffending. In light of this unsettled connection between sexual violence 
and psychopathology and the absence of a reliable method for clinicians to 
predict future violence, the APA has repeatedly attempted to highlight the 
divergence between SVP laws and scientific understanding.  
The passage of the initial SVP laws in the early 1990s led the APA to 
appoint a Task Force on Sexually Dangerous Offenders.384  The report it 
released in 1999 (two years after the Hendricks opinion) was highly critical 
of such laws.385 Members of the task force noted that that the “question of 
whether all or some sexual offenders are mentally ill is complicated and 
controversial”386 and, similarly, that there was no consensus on the degree 
to which sex offenders have control over their behavior.387 Certainly, some 
offenders have paraphilias, the report acknowledged, but it also noted that 
paraphilias occur fairly frequently in those who never commit sex 
offenses.388 Personality and substance abuse disorders, it continued, are far 
more common in sex offenders than are paraphilias, and, significantly, 
these do not usually have “explanatory connection” to the offender’s 
behavior.389 In short, the task force report stated, “psychiatric nosology does 
                                                                                                                 
Morton Hesse, What Should Be Done with Antisocial Personality Disorder in the New 
Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V)?, 8 BMC 
MEDICINE 1, 2-4 (2010), available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/8/66; see 
also DSM-5, supra note 269, at 659; Zander, supra note 373, at 50-57 (reviewing criticisms 
of ASPD’s validity). However, the field trials leading to the release of DSM-5 revealed that 
the diagnosis has one of the lowest inter-rater reliability ratings (in the “questionable” 
range). Bret S. Stetka, A Guide to DSM-5, MEDSCAPE (May 21, 2013), http:// 
www.medscape.com/viewarticle/803884_2. Some commentators argue that such results 
should preclude any use of the disorder in forensic settings. Karen Franklin, DSM-5: 
Forensic Applications (Part II of II), IN THE NEWS: FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY, CRIMINOLOGY, 
AND PSYCHOLOGY-LAW (May 30, 2013), http://forensicpsychologist.blogspot.com/2013/05/ 
dsm-5-forensic-applications-part-ii-of.html. 
 384. APA, DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS, supra note 39, at vii. 
 385. Id. at viii, 172-76. 
 386. Id. at 4-5.  
 387. Id. at 5. 
 388. Id. at 44. 
 389. Id. at 9. 
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not contribute in a systematic way to clinical understanding or treatment of 
sex offenders.”390 The language of the report’s conclusion was strong:  
[S]exual predator commitment laws represent a serious assault 
on the integrity of psychiatry, particularly with regard to 
defining mental illness and the clinical conditions for 
compulsory treatment. Moreover, by bending civil commitment 
to serve essentially nonmedical purposes, sexual predator 
commitment statutes threaten to undermine the legitimacy of the 
medical model of commitment. 
 . . . . 
 . . . . [The SVP laws] establish a nonmedical definition of 
what purports to be a clinical condition without regard to 
scientific and clinical knowledge. In so doing, legislators have 
used psychiatric commitment to effect nonmedical societal ends 
that cannot be openly avowed. . . . [T]his represents an 
unacceptable misuse of psychiatry.391 
The APA asserted the inability of psychiatrists to predict future violence 
in its brief in Hendricks, but it was not the first time for the organization to 
do so. In the 1983 case Barefoot v. Estelle, in which the Supreme Court 
upheld the admissibility of psychiatric evidence on the issue of future 
dangerousness in a death penalty case,392 the APA had stated in its amicus 
brief that “‘[t]he unreliability of psychiatric predictions of long-term future 
dangerousness is by now an established fact within the profession.’”393 As it 
did again years later in Hendricks, the Supreme Court rejected the cautions 
of the mental health profession and left in place laws and practices whose 
legitimacy hinges on the profession’s ability to predict future conduct.394 
Although the APA is the world’s largest organization of professional 
psychiatrists and its official statements reflect the opinions of many in the 
profession,395 there are dissenting views in psychiatry with respect to the 
role of psychopathology in sexual violence. Indeed, there are segments of 
                                                                                                                 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. at 173-74 (emphasis added). 
 392. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896-99 (1983), superseded by statute on other 
grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (2012). 
 393. Id. at 920 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for 
American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 12). 
 394. Id. at 899. 
 395. About APA & Psychiatry, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.psychiatry.org/ 
about-apa--psychiatry (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). 
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the mental health profession that support the SVP laws and provide the 
research and expert testimony supporting the commitment of individuals. I 
provide examples of their views and opinions in the two sections that 
follow. 
Mental health professionals who support the SVP laws are primarily 
treatment providers who specialize in treating sex offenders, including 
those who work in state SVP programs, outside of the correctional or 
criminal setting.396 As one researcher has noted, this context can distort 
treatment providers’ views of such offenders, leading the providers to 
assume a degree of specialization in offenders’ behavior that those treated 
experience “deviant sexual arousal, which, if not treated, will result in 
future sex crimes.”397 Because these treatment providers lack expertise in 
criminological research, the mental health policies they promote continue to 
be based on misplaced assumptions about those who commit sex crimes—
in particular, the notion that such offenders are “mentally disordered, 
treatable, dangerous (if not treated), and at high risk to reoffend with 
another sex crime.”398  
It is not surprising that mental health professionals have differing views 
on SVP laws because of differences in their training, experience, and 
employment positions. The concern raised here, however, is with the 
existence of the debate itself, with its sharply divergent positions among 
those within the mental health field. Specifically, there is a vast discrepancy 
between, on the one hand, the standard nosology of the psychiatric 
profession and steadfast position of its primary organizations and, on the 
other hand, the role assumed for and assigned to psychiatry in the SVP 
laws. The SVP laws set up a complex relationship between mental health 
professionals and the legal system. And, as we will see in the section that 
follows, although courts have increasingly relied on psychiatric expertise in 
                                                                                                                 
 396. Simon, supra note 79, at 277. While three of five of the amicus briefs submitted in 
Hendricks on behalf of mental health associations supported striking down the law (the 
American Psychiatric Association, the Washington Psychiatric Association, and the National 
Mental Health Association), the two who supported the law were directly involved with the 
treatment of sex offenders, including the Menninger Foundation, which operated a 
psychiatric hospital in Kansas at the time, and which was joined on the brief by a series of 
“victims’ rights” and law-and-order organizations such as the New York Chapter of Parents 
of Murdered Children, Protecting Our Children, People Against Violent Crime, and Victims 
Outreach, Inc. Felhouse & Simon, supra note 339, at 2. Apparently, significant portions of 
the majority opinion in Hendricks were drawn from the Menninger Foundation’s amicus 
brief. Id. 
 397. Simon, supra note 79, at 279. 
 398. Id. at 278. 
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SVP proceedings to support individual commitments, much scientific 
understanding of the causes and prediction of violent sexual behavior has 
become, in the process, highly distorted. 
B. Pathologizing Predators in the Courtroom  
Both the state legislatures that developed the SVP laws and the Supreme 
Court in upholding them have always assumed that mental health 
professionals would play a central role in SVP proceedings. Their specific 
assumption was that these professionals would offer opinions regarding the 
risk of recidivism posed by particular individuals due to the presence of a 
mental abnormality or disorder that impaired their ability to refrain from 
committing acts of sexual violence. Indeed, courts and lawmakers have 
regarded these professional opinions as indispensable because laypersons 
are limited in their ability to identify mental conditions and to understand a 
condition’s potential relationship to volitional impairment.399 As discussed 
in the preceding section, however, there is scant scientific foundation for 
such assessments or predictions by mental health professionals, nor is there 
anything in psychiatric classification that corresponds to or otherwise 
supports the crucial SVP concept of the “sexual predator.” These well-
attested difficulties have not prevented state prosecutors from offering 
mental health expert testimony in support of SVP petitions; and most courts 
readily admit such testimony, even over strenuous objections from defense 
counsel, who often cite the controversies discussed above.400 Maintaining 
the role of expert evidence to support commitments in SVP proceedings has 
required a distortion of psychiatric understanding. It has also required a 
severe compromise of core values and practices of our justice systems.401 
One significant question in the implementation of SVP laws is what 
minimum degree of risk of future dangerousness can serve as a basis for 
indefinite detention.402 The Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas held that 
a state may involuntarily commit a mentally ill individual using a “clear and 
                                                                                                                 
 399. See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002); Boerner, supra note 58, at 570. 
 400. See infra notes 413-604 and accompanying text. 
 401. Finkel, supra note 100, at 243 (explaining how “the worst of times,” including the 
occurrence of horrible crimes, operates like a hydraulic pressure which can “distort clear 
concepts and bend established principles, as well as foreshorten perspective such that 
history's lessons no longer help frame current issues”); see also 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., 
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 11:23 (2011-2012 ed.).  
 402. See Jefferson C. Knighton et al., How Likely Is “Likely to Reoffend” in Sex Offender 
Civil Commitment Trials?, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 293, 293-98 (2014) (reviewing risk 
thresholds in SVP laws and their implementation). 
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convincing evidence” standard.403 This is a lower threshold of proof than 
the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard usually reserved for the criminal 
context.404 One of the rationales of the lower threshold, notwithstanding the 
liberty interest at stake, is the relative imprecision of psychiatric evidence, 
which generally serves as the primary proof offered in support of such 
commitments.405 The Addington Court explained the rationale for this 
reduced burden of proof in involuntary commitment cases: 
Whether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to either 
himself or others and is in need of confined therapy turns on the 
meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert 
psychiatrists and psychologists. Given the lack of certainty and 
the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question 
as to whether a state could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that an individual is both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous. 
 . . . . 
 The subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis render 
certainties virtually beyond reach in most situations. . . . 
Psychiatric diagnosis . . . is to a large extent based on medical 
‘impressions' drawn from subjective analysis and filtered 
through the experience of the diagnostician.406  
Understandably, some commentators have argued that the very fact that 
psychiatric diagnoses are imprecise and ambiguous suggests that only the 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard will adequately ensure fairness and 
due process in commitment proceedings.407 However, the Addington Court 
held it constitutionally acceptable for states to use a lower standard of proof 
because of the limitations and objectives of involuntary hospitalization: 
such commitment, the Court maintained, was limited to people with severe 
mental illness who pose a danger to themselves or others, and employing a 
higher standard of proof could “erect an unreasonable barrier to needed 
medical treatment.”408 Such reasoning, of course, has only limited 
application in the SVP context, where public safety, not treatment, is the 
                                                                                                                 
 403. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427-33 (1979). See generally Alexander Tsesis, 
Due Process in Civil Commitments, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 253 (2011). 
 404. Addington, 441 U.S. at 422.  
 405. Id. at 432-33.  
 406. Id. at 429-30. 
 407. Tsesis, supra note 403, at 282-300. 
 408. Addington, 441 U.S. at 432. 
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foremost objective. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court recently reiterated that 
the intermediate standard of proof in civil involuntary commitment 
proceedings meets due process requirements, even for indefinite 
commitment of SVPs.409  
To date, no Supreme Court decision has clarified precisely how 
dangerous to himself or others a person must be to satisfy that standard for 
involuntary commitment. The concept of dangerousness is itself quite 
vague and subject to a range of conceptualizations and analyses.410 For 
example, if a fact-finder is asked to conclude “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
that an individual is “likely” to commit future acts of sexual violence (the 
typical standard set by legislators in SVP laws), it is not clear whether the 
fact finder must have no reasonable doubt that there is at least a 35%, 50%, 
or 75% chance the defendant will reoffend.411 The danger of securing 
involuntary commitments on such uncertain grounds only compounds the 
significant problems presented by evidence admitted to support the central 
determination in SVP proceedings: whether the offender is “a sexually 
violent predator.” 
1. One Example of the Distortions: McGee v. Bartow 
The language in the Supreme Court’s opinions in Hendricks and Crane 
confers broad discretion on lawmakers to devise the specific terms used to 
meet the due process requirement of a mental condition for involuntary 
civil commitment.412 The language also encouraged experimentation and 
diverse approaches by legislatures and courts in regard to the 
implementation of the SVP laws. A 2010 opinion of the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit, McGee v. Bartow, demonstrates the troubling 
implications of the Supreme Court’s deference to lawmakers.413  
Michael McGee was committed in Wisconsin courts under that state’s 
SVP statute, which was adopted in 1994 and modeled closely on 
                                                                                                                 
 409. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 129-30 (2010) (upholding the SVP 
provisions of the Adam Walsh Act against a range of constitutional challenges). 
 410. See generally Eric S. Janus & Paul E. Meehl, Assessing the Legal Standard for 
Predictions of Dangerousness in Sex Offender Commitment Proceedings, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL'Y & L. 33 (1997); Knighton et al., supra note 402, at 293-98; Shoba Sreenivasan et al., 
Expert Testimony in Sexually Violent Predator Commitments: Conceptualizing Legal 
Standards of “Mental Disorder” and “Likely to Reoffend”, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & 
L. 471, 477-78 (2003); Frederick E. Vars, Delineating Sexual Dangerousness, 50 HOUS. L. 
REV. 855, 860-72 (2013). 
 411. See Finkel, supra note 100, at 259. 
 412. See supra notes 138-173 and accompanying text. 
 413. McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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Washington’s.414 Having exhausted his direct appeals for release through 
state courts, McGee then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the federal 
district court.415 McGee had to meet a particularly high standard to prevail 
on his petition, namely, that his continued detention was in violation of 
federal law, including the U.S. Constitution, rather than simply in violation 
of the applicable state law.416 
McGee’s only criminal conviction and sentencing had been in 1987, 
when he was convicted of burglary and the sexual assault of a woman 
during the course of the burglary.417 He served five years in prison and was 
released on parole.418 In 1992, while on parole, he was accused of two more 
sexual assaults, had his parole revoked, and served out the remaining three 
years of his sentence.419  Neither of the two subsequent allegations of sexual 
assault, one by a woman and another involving an adolescent male, led to a 
conviction.420 The state then filed a petition to commit McGee under the 
Wisconsin SVP law.421 He was committed in 1995 based on a jury verdict 
but released in 1999 when the commitment was reversed on a finding of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.422 His attorney had failed to discover 
important evidence that could have undermined the credibility of the two 
accusers from the 1992 allegations.423 A year later, in 2000, he was 
rearrested for failing a drug test and having contact with one of the alleged 
1992 victims. The state sought to commit him again.424 
At the bench trial during this second commitment hearing, the state 
based its case largely upon the testimony of two forensic psychologists.425 
One was a Department of Corrections psychologist, Dr. Caton Roberts, who 
opined that McGee had a “personality disorder NOS [Not Otherwise 
Specified] with antisocial features” and “was substantially probable to 
reoffend sexually if not detained and treated.”426 Roberts based his opinion, 
not on a clinical examination of McGee, but on “fifteen hours of review of 
                                                                                                                 
 414. Id. at 558. 
 415. Id. 
 416. Id. at 571-72. 
 417. Id. at 558-59.  
 418. Id. at 559. 
 419. Id. at 558-59. 
 420. Id. at 559. 
 421. Id.  
 422. Id. 
 423. Id. 
 424. Id. 
 425. Id.   
 426. Id. at 559-60. 
686 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:619 
 
 
Mr. McGee’s record.”427 The second expert to testify was Dr. Cynthia 
Marsh, who diagnosed McGee with “[P]araphilia NOS-nonconsent” and 
Personality Disorder NOS with antisocial features.428 Her diagnosis was 
also based only upon a review of records.429 Specifically, Marsh testified 
that she based her diagnosis primarily on Mr. McGee’s “history,” including 
the contested 1992 allegations, and that she employed three actuarial risk-
assessment tools.430 From these, she concluded that McGee was “much 
more likely than not to reoffend in a sexually violent manner.”431 
McGee’s attorneys argued on appeal that the diagnoses that served as the 
bases for satisfying the “mental illness” requirement were insufficient as a 
matter of due process.432  Specifically, they alleged that the diagnoses used 
were not generally accepted as being either valid or reliable within 
psychiatry (as noted earlier, the paraphilia category “nonconsent” invoked 
by Marsh had in fact been explicitly rejected by the APA) and that the 
labels did not have any standardized diagnostic criteria.433   
There was little case law upon which the Court of Appeals could 
evaluate such arguments. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit panel devised a 
specific standard for evaluating the constitutional adequacy of a diagnosis 
used to commit an individual. To prove that use of a diagnosis violated due 
process principles, the panel held, a petitioner must demonstrate that the 
diagnosis was “devoid of content, or . . . near-universal in its rejection by 
mental health professionals.”434 The panel later restated the standard as 
being a determination of whether the diagnosis was “empty of scientific 
pedigree.”435  
In explaining the standard, the panel devoted a considerable amount of 
the opinion to reviewing the text of the DSM and noted the editors’ 
cautions about using the manual in the forensic context, particularly by 
“untrained individuals” (most likely referring to lawyers and judges), to 
answer ultimate questions.436 The panel also noted that, while nothing in 
Supreme Court precedent expressly requires a valid DSM diagnosis as a 
prerequisite to a SVP commitment, such diagnostic labels could be useful 
                                                                                                                 
 427. Id. at 559. 
 428. Id. at 560, 574. 
 429. Id. at 560.  
 430. Id. 
 431. Id. 
 432. Id. at 574. 
 433. Id. 
 434. Id. at 577. 
 435. Id. at 581. 
 436. Id. at 578. 
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tools when applied with “prudence and caution.”437 However, the court did 
not explain what such prudence and caution involved or how its own 
application of the DSM’s text demonstrated such qualities. Indeed, the 
panel noted the broad discretion the Hendricks Court conferred to states to 
develop their own definitions of mental abnormality without referencing 
medical terminology.438 The panel then concluded that neither the absence 
of a specific diagnosis from the DSM’s text nor the existence of robust 
controversy about the diagnosis among mental health professionals was a 
basis to disregard such a diagnostic label entirely.439 Rather, the panel held, 
such facts bear only on the weight to be assigned to the label as part of the 
overall fact finding, not on its admissibility as evidence.440 In short, a 
heated debate within the field regarding a diagnostic label’s validity and 
reliability is not enough to exclude it from serving as a basis for indefinite 
detention. 
The McGee opinion illustrates many of the key problems with the role of 
psychiatric evidence in SVP proceedings and demonstrates the fundamental 
flaw in the Supreme Court’s assumption that such testimony would prevent 
SVP laws from sweeping too broadly. McGee’s primary challenge was to 
the state’s experts’ reliance on a set of diagnoses that were scientifically 
controversial and did not reflect any settled scientific understanding. The 
experts’ opinions in McGee reveal a range of additional concerns seen in 
other reported SVP cases, including basing opinions on inadmissible facts 
and data—such as uncharged alleged criminal conduct, rather than on 
clinical examinations—and using actuarial risk assessment tools.  
An examination of prosecution experts’ opinions about the likelihood of 
future acts of sexual violence in SVP proceedings reveals that they are 
based largely upon the respondent’s past behavior (alleged as well as 
proven) rather than, as required by the Hendricks-Crane rationale, an 
individualized medical assessment.441 This is because mental health 
professionals, in attempting to assess whether a person is likely to commit 
acts of sexual violence due to a volitional impairment stemming from a 
mental disorder, have little else but past behavior to go on in the absence of 
scientific guidance for making such an assessment, as explained in Part 
III.A. above. But, as a result, they predict future behavior based upon past 
behavior the same way we all do, and not upon any particular expertise. 
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 438. Id. at 576.   
 439. Id. at 580. 
 440. Id. at 581. 
 441. See infra notes 490-511 and accompanying text. 
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The perpetuation of these unreliable and misleading practices is facilitated 
by courts’ reluctance to assert their role as “gatekeepers” with regard to 
such expert testimony. 
2. Misuse of Diagnostic Labels 
A core role of the diagnoses in SVP proceedings is to explain the basis 
for an expert’s overall assessment that the respondent is likely to commit 
future acts of sexual violence. This stems from the statutory requirement, 
given central importance in the Supreme Court’s due process analysis in 
Hendricks and Crane, that the defendant have an identifiable “mental 
disorder”442 or “mental abnormality.”443 Although paraphilia diagnoses 
have a limited role in the clinical setting and, as stressed above, are highly 
controversial within the field of psychiatry generally, they enjoy broad 
acceptance in courts conducting SVP proceedings.444 As other 
commentators have noted, there is an established history of presenting 
psychiatric evidence of specific forms of psychopathology in support of 
involuntary commitment—for example, schizophrenia and other disorders 
characterized by psychosis.445 SVP commitment, by contrast, is generally 
based upon diagnoses, such as pedophilia and ASPD, that are “among the 
most controversial, and that have the most questionable validity, of all the 
mental disorders in the DSM.”446 As discussed above, the DSM's language 
regarding paraphilias is itself the product of negotiation and public relations 
management, and is subject to a range of interpretations. 
If used in a manner consistent with the DSM editors’ intentions, the 
diagnosis of a “paraphilia” addresses only the (abnormal) circumstances 
that occasion sexual arousal; it does not indicate an impaired ability to 
refrain from acting on the desires involved. Because existing DSM 
diagnoses have limited use for identifying the reference of the forensic term 
“sexual predator,” some experts testifying on behalf of states in SVP 
proceedings offer alternative presumptively “diagnostic” labels that either 
strain the DSM criteria’s language beyond its intended clinical application 
or fall outside of the diagnostic scheme entirely.447 In so doing, as in 
McGee, the experts essentially pathologize past criminal conduct.  
                                                                                                                 
 442. McGee, 593 F.3d at 573.  
 443. Id. at 580-81. 
 444. See supra notes 282-338 and accompanying text; see infra notes 450-489 and 
accompanying text. 
 445. See, e.g., Zander, supra note 373, at 18-19. 
 446. Id. at 72. 
 447. EWING, supra note 34, at 24. 
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The questionable nature of invoking such strained diagnoses in 
prosecuting SVP cases is compounded when the catchall “NOS” (not 
otherwise specified) categories are invoked or when forensic experts 
dispense altogether with the DSM’s criteria.448 With regard to NOS 
diagnoses in SVP proceedings, one commenter has observed: “Paraphilia 
NOS is a ‘proxy’ for the rejected diagnosis of paraphilic coercive disorder, 
and has offered legislators and mental health professionals carte blanche to 
invent criteria by which to deprive sex offenders of their freedom after they 
have completed their sentences.”449 
The psychiatric validity of SVP diagnoses is put in further doubt by their 
inconsistent use in courts. A survey of the reports of psychiatric experts in 
twenty-eight SVP cases conducted by Dr. Allan Frances, one of the editors 
of DSM-IV, found that, while government experts usually gave an initial 
diagnosis of Paraphilia-NOS, defense experts usually did not.450 Dr. 
Frances concludes that the diagnosis was, in his word, “justified” in only 
two of those cases whereas, in the other twenty-six cases, the respondents’ 
“sexual offenses had been opportunistic crimes forming part of a pattern of 
generalized criminal behavior, very often facilitated by substance 
intoxication.”451 Government evaluators, Dr. Frances observes, seemed to 
base the Paraphilia-NOS diagnosis not on an overall pattern of behavior 
suggestive of fundamental pathology but only or primarily on the fact of 
prior conviction for sexual crimes.452 Several other studies of psychiatric 
reports have also noted strong geographic variation in the rates at which 
various diagnoses (for example, paraphilia-NOS as compared to pedophilia) 
are used to support SVP petitions.453 Variability of this kind casts further 
                                                                                                                 
 448. Id.; see also Allan Frances & Michael B. First, Paraphilia NOS, Nonconsent: Not 
Ready for the Courtroom, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 555, 555-60 (2011). The initial 
idea behind the “Paraphilia NOS” label or diagnosis—which is used almost exclusively in 
SVP proceedings—has been credited to Dennis Doren, the lead forensic evaluator in 
Wisconsin’s SVP program. Good & Burstein, supra note 84, at 27-28. 
 449. Allan Frances, DSM-5 Rejects Coercive Paraphilia, PSYCH. TODAY (May 26, 2011), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/dsm5-in-distress/201105/dsm-5-rejects-coercive-para 
philia. 
 450. Allan Frances, My Review of 28 Sexually Violent Predator Cases, PSYCH. TODAY 
(Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/dsm5-in-distress/201203/my-rev 
iew-28-sexually-violent-predator-cases. 
 451. Id. 
 452. Id. 
 453. See, e.g., Shan Jumper et al., Diagnostic Profiles of Civilly Committed Sexual 
Offenders in Illinois and Other Reporting Jurisdictions: What We Know So Far, 56 INT’L. J. 
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 838, 845 (2012) (finding that pedophilia was 
diagnosed in persons targeted for commitment under Illinois’s law at a “significantly higher 
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doubt on the independent reliability, or scientifically objective validity, of 
such diagnoses and has further fueled the significant ethical concerns within 
psychiatry about the forensic use of Paraphilia-NOS diagnoses.454 
As seen in McGee, even where a court is made aware that an examiner’s 
use of a psychiatric diagnosis is patently inconsistent with the DSM’s 
language and commentary within the psychiatric field, the court is unlikely 
to reject the use of the diagnosis as a basis for satisfying the mental disorder 
or abnormality requirement for SVP commitment.455  The McGee court 
squarely acknowledged that there was “heated professional debate” about 
using the diagnostic label Paraphilia NOS Nonconsent456 and that McGee’s 
position that “the consensus professional view that [such] . . . diagnosis is 
                                                                                                                 
rate” (59%) than those in proceedings in Minnesota, Texas, Wisconsin, and Florida, that 
Paraphilia-NOS was diagnosed in Illinois more frequently (51%) than in Wisconsin (37.5%), 
and that fifty-six percent of sex offenders in SVP proceedings in Arizona have been 
diagnosed with Paraphilia NOS and nearly two-thirds with Pedophilia). The jurisdictions 
included in the study were: Illinois, Texas, Florida, Wisconsin, Washington, California, 
Arizona, and Minnesota. The study included all persons targeted for commitment since the 
“vast majority” of those detained for commitment under the statute are eventually 
committed. Id. at 842; see also Richard W. Elwood et al., Diagnostic and Risk Profiles of 
Men Detained Under Wisconsin's Sexually Violent Person Law, 54 INT’L. J. OFFENDER 
THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 187, 193 (2010) (concluding that pedophilia was 
diagnosed in Wisconsin at a higher rate than in Florida but at a lower rate than in 
Washington or Arizona); Julia E. McLawsen et al., Civilly Committed Sex Offenders: A 
Description and Interstate Comparison of Populations, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 453, 
461 (2012) (analyzing diagnostic trends under Nebraska’s SVP law). 
 454. See, e.g., Allen Frances, Rape, Psychiatry, and Constitutional Rights: Hard Cases 
Make for Very Bad Law, PSYCHOL. TODAY (June 28, 2010), https://www.psychologytoday. 
com/blog/dsm5-in-distress/201006/rape-psychiatry-and-constitutional-rights (“The most 
disturbing turbulence at the boundary between psychiatry and the law is the misuse of a 
makeshift psychiatric diagnosis (‘Paraphilia Not Otherwise Specified, nonconsent’) to justify 
the involuntary, indefinite psychiatric commitment of rapists. This is a disguised form of 
preventive detention (often for life), a violation of due process, and an abuse of 
psychiatry.”); see also First & Halon, supra note 314, at 444 (“We contend that, during the 
process of adjudication of SVP commitment trials, profound and avoidable errors are made 
by some mental health professionals who invalidly diagnose paraphilia, assert that there is 
volitional impairment based solely on the fact that the offender has a paraphilia diagnosis, 
and thus wrongly claim that the statutorily defined SVP commitment criteria are adequately 
addressed by the clinical diagnoses.”); Good & Burstein, supra note 84, at 24-28 (criticizing 
the use of “fictitious mental disorders” by forensic evaluators testifying in SVP 
proceedings); Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 369 (“Force-fitting a diagnosis or creating a 
new DSM diagnosis to justify commitment is clearly unethical for psychologists.”). 
 455. See generally Hamilton, supra note 22, at 40-51. 
 456. McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 579-81 (7th Cir. 2010). 
2015]        DANGEROUS DIAGNOSES, RISKY ASSUMPTIONS 691 
 
 
invalid” is “not without support in the professional literature.”457 It even 
noted that the lack of diagnostic standards for the label “results in poor 
diagnostic reliability.”458 Nevertheless, the court denied McGee’s claim that 
his commitment, based upon such contested diagnoses, amounted to a 
violation of his due process rights.459 In denying his claim, the court 
concluded that the fact that the use of the label found some support in the 
medical literature took it outside the realm of a diagnosis “empty of 
scientific pedigree” or “near-universal” in rejection.460   
Several courts have faced similar questions about the admissibility of 
opinions that include diagnostic labels attached to the catchall “Paraphilia 
NOS.” In addition to the Paraphilia NOS-nonconsent label seen in McGee 
and other cases,461 another such label created and used almost exclusively 
by prosecution experts in SVP proceedings is “paraphilia NOS, hebephilia,” 
a term used to indicate sexual interest in adolescents.462 “Pedophilia,” under 
the DSM’s criteria, can only be applied to those who have persistent sexual 
interest in children under the age of fourteen.463  Like “nonconsent,” the 
term “hebephilia” appears nowhere in the DSM, and there is no disorder 
recognized in the manual for sexual interest in teens.464 In United States v. 
Carta,465 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed a district 
court’s denial of a commitment petition brought under the Adam Walsh 
Act. The district court had ruled that “Paraphilia NOS-Hebephilia,” which 
was one of the labels for the respondent’s mental abnormality offered in 
support of the government’s petition, was not generally recognized as a 
                                                                                                                 
 457. Id. at 580. 
 458. Id. 
 459. Id. at 581.  
 460. Id.  
 461. See, e.g., Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 606, 612 (7th Cir. 2010) (reaching same 
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Disorder”).   
 464. Franklin, supra note 462, at 760-61. 
 465. United States v. Carta, 592 F.3d 34, 44 (1st Cir. 2010). 
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serious mental illness that could support an involuntary commitment.466 The 
disorder was characterized by the government’s testifying expert as a 
“sexual preference for young teens . . . till about age seventeen.”467 In 
reversing such ruling, the appeals court acknowledged that the DSM 
contains no reference to hebephilia or a sexual interest in teens but reasoned 
that the specific diagnosis offered in support of the commitment in that case 
was simply “Paraphilia NOS,” which does appear in the DSM, and that the 
government’s expert had used the term “hebephilia” as a way to describe 
the object of the respondent’s fixation, namely adolescents.468 It also held 
that, in any event, the “serious mental illness” requirement of the SVP 
statute “is not limited to either the consensus of the medical community or 
to maladies identified in the DSM.”469  
Most courts, when presented with testimony from a government witness 
applying a label that purports to be an expansion on the catchall Paraphilia-
NOS as central evidence of the respondent’s “mental illness or 
abnormality,” have admitted and based commitments on such evidence. 
They have done so even where the respondent’s expert directly challenged 
                                                                                                                 
 466. United States v. Carta, 620 F. Supp. 2d 210, 217 (D. Mass. 2009), rev’d and 
remanded by 592 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 467. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Another judge in the District of 
Massachusetts also excluded expert testimony based upon a “hebephilia” diagnosis. See 
United States v. Shields, No. 07-12056-PBS, 2008 WL 544940, at *2 (D. Mass. Feb. 26, 
2008) (ruling that “hebephilia” could not in itself serve as a serious mental disorder for 
purpose of commitment under the Adam Walsh Act and that there was insufficient evidence 
of the applicability of Paraphilia-NOS in that case). However, that same judge later admitted 
evidence of a hebephilia diagnosis, based upon the appeals court opinion in Carta. See 
United States v. Wetmore, 766 F. Supp. 2d 319, 331 (D. Mass. 2011) (basing commitment, 
in part, on expert testimony of “paraphilia not otherwise specified, characterized by 
hebephilia”). 
 468. Carta, 592 F.3d at 41. On remand, Carta was committed after a seven-day trial. 
United States v. Carta, No. 07-12064-PBS, 2011 WL 2680734, at *25 (D. Mass. July 7, 
2011). The district court’s ruling was affirmed on appeal. United States v. Carta, 690 F.3d 1, 
8 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 469. Carta, 690 F.3d at 4; see also United States v. Caporale, 701 F.3d 128, 136-37 (4th 
Cir. 2012) (adopting reasoning in the First Circuit’s 2010 Carta opinion). By contrast, while 
the court in United States v. Neuhauser admitted testimony that the respondent should be 
committed based upon a diagnosis of hebephilia, it later concluded that, in light of the fact 
that “a large number of clinical psychologists believe [it] is not a diagnosis at all, at least for 
forensic purposes,” it was “inappropriate” to base a commitment upon such diagnosis. No. 
5:07-HC-2101-BO, 2012 WL 174363, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 20, 2012). The court also 
observed in its opinion: “It is important to note that Mr. Neuhauser's sexual orientation 
toward pubescent boys, which he openly admitted in his testimony is, standing alone, 
insufficient to justify his civil commitment under the Adam Walsh Act.” Id. at *3. 
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the scientific basis for using such a label and testified about the 
considerable controversy about it within psychiatry.470 One New Jersey 
Superior Court opinion noted that the state’s expert had acknowledged that 
the Paraphilia-NOS diagnosis is used by examiners “‘in order to code for 
rape or coercive or non-consent sex’”; the commitment was nonetheless 
affirmed on appeal.471 Some courts adopt the reasoning in Carta: the fact 
that “Paraphilia-NOS” itself is in the DSM (albeit without criteria 
established or confirmed by research or field trials) is sufficient to permit a 
prosecution expert to claim any form of persistent sexual interest not 
described in the DSM as appropriately falling under that catchall label.472   
As noted earlier, some prosecutors have attempted to meet the “mental 
disorder or abnormality” requirement of an SVP statute with a diagnosis of 
Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD),473 and respondents frequently 
challenge such use under the holding and analysis in Foucha.474 For 
example, in Brown v. Watters, a federal court habeas case brought by a man 
committed under Wisconsin’s SVP law, the respondent presented expert 
testimony to challenge the ASPD diagnosis used by the state’s expert 
witness.475 Specifically, his forensic psychiatrist testified that ASPD is a 
“‘circular diagnosis’ that is ‘descriptive of many criminals, but doesn't 
really tell [an evaluator] much,’” and that “the psychiatric profession does 
not generally view individuals with ASPD ‘as people who have serious 
difficulty in controlling their behavior.’”476  The district and appeals courts 
concluded that, as with the controversies regarding paraphilias, a fact finder 
                                                                                                                 
 470. See, e.g., In re Hutchcroft, No. 11-1838, slip op. at *2-3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 31, 
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 473. See supra notes 372-383 and accompanying text. 
 474. See, e.g., Adams v. Bartow, 330 F.3d 957, 961 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 475. Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 614 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 476. Id. at 607 (alteration in original). 
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may consider such differing views when determining the weight to be 
assigned to the diagnosis, but the existence of debate within the psychiatric 
community does not itself provide a basis to exclude a diagnosis.477 
Courts do differ, however, in their treatment of ASPD diagnoses as bases 
for SVP commitment. For example, a federal district court judge in 
Massachusetts rejected the use of ASPD as the predicate mental disorder in 
an SVP case brought under the Adam Walsh Act. In United States v. 
Wilkinson, the court denied the Government’s petition (the respondent was 
nearing the end of a sixteen-year sentence for being a felon in possession of 
a firearm, and two of his sex crimes had occurred twenty-five years prior or 
longer) and concluded: “The government has not proven that Antisocial 
Personality Disorder alone ever causes a person to have serious difficulty in 
controlling his conduct. In essence, the evidence indicates that individuals 
with severe forms of that disorder may often make unlawful choices, but 
they are able to control their conduct.”478  Significantly here, the court had 
conducted a careful review of the literature regarding ASPD and SVP 
proceedings and concluded that there was little support for an SVP 
commitment on that diagnosis alone, without some additional finding of a 
sexual disorder indicating limited volitional control.479 Indeed, given that 
studies estimate a large majority of the prison population at any given time 
could be diagnosed with ASPD, using ASPD as the sole predicate diagnosis 
would violate the limitations required in Crane that the individual subject to 
the SVP commitment not be a “typical recidivist” but someone with an 
identifiable pathology affecting volitional control of sexual violence.480  
Where a government expert in an SVP proceeding bases an opinion on a 
DSM paraphilia diagnosis such as pedophilia, notwithstanding the DSM 
editors’ clarifying statements to the contrary, he or she often bases such 
diagnoses largely upon a respondent’s past criminal behavior or other 
                                                                                                                 
 477. Id. at 612-14. The Seventh Circuit also concluded that the respondent had misread 
the holding on Foucha and that in any event Crane provided the key authority on the 
question of the adequacy of a diagnosis in an SVP commitment proceeding. Id. at 613. Mr. 
Brown was also unsuccessful on his claim that the state should be judicially estopped from 
using ASPD as a basis for commitment where state law precludes a criminal defendant from 
using the diagnosis as a basis for an insanity defense. Id. at 615-16. 
 478. 646 F. Supp. 2d 194, 196 (D. Mass 2009). 
 479. Id. at 202-08; accord State v. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d 239, 249-51 (N.Y. 2014) 
(holding that an SVP commitment may not be based solely upon a history of sexual crimes 
and a diagnosis of ASPD because the diagnosis “establishes only a general tendency toward 
criminality, and has no necessary relationship to a difficulty in controlling one's sexual 
behavior”). 
 480. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002); Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 368. 
2015]        DANGEROUS DIAGNOSES, RISKY ASSUMPTIONS 695 
 
 
conduct rather than (or even in the absence of) evidence of persistent, 
intense urges or fantasies.481 In these situations, “legal criteria for a crime 
and the psychiatric criteria for mental disorder tend to converge,” which 
runs counter to the DSM editors’ caution that social deviance in itself 
should not be thought to constitute a mental disorder.482 The editors of 
DSM-IV attempted to limit the forensic implications of the paraphilias by 
stating in an editorial that assigning a diagnosis based solely on a person’s 
criminal history was incorrect: “Defining paraphilia based on acts alone 
blurs the distinction between mental disorder and ordinary criminality. 
Decisions regarding possible lifelong psychiatric commitment should not be 
made based on a misreading of a poorly worded DSM-IV criterion item.”483 
As discussed below, the editors’ recommendation that this confusion be 
alleviated through text revisions in the DSM-5 went unheeded.484  
Aside from the DSM editors’ cautionary statements, there is a significant 
additional reason to question testifying experts’ diagnostic impressions 
using labels such as ASPD or Paraphilia-NOS in SVP proceedings. The 
results of studies of “inter-rater reliability” (the likelihood that two experts 
will arrive at the same diagnosis when evaluating the same offender) in the 
SVP context are unsettling. A study of evaluators applying DSM criteria to 
those identified for commitment under Florida’s SVP law revealed a 
reliability level in the “poor” range; this result was consistent with earlier 
studies of SVP evaluators.485 The author of the Florida study attributes the 
                                                                                                                 
 481. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 368. 
 482. Wakefield, supra note 297, at 202. The practice of basing diagnoses of paraphilia 
solely on past criminal behavior has met with mixed responses from courts, generally 
depending upon the extent to which the defense expert convincingly explains the error in 
interpretation and application of the DSM criteria or upon whether or not the court, for 
whatever reasons, exercises discretion in following the DSM. See, e.g., United States v. 
Springer, 715 F.3d 535, 546-47 (4th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of SVP petition despite 
testimony of government experts that respondent had pedophilia based upon his prior sexual 
acts with children). 
 483. Michael B. First & Allen Frances, Issues for DSM-V: Unintended Consequences of 
Small Changes: The Case of Paraphilias, 165 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1240, 1240 (2008), available 
at http://ajp.psychiatryonline.org/doi/abs/10.1176/appi.ajp.2008.08030361?url_ver=Z39.88-20 
03&rfr_id=ori%3Arid%3Acrossref.org&rfr_dat=cr_pub%3Dpubmed; see also Frances, DSM-
5 Writing Mistakes Will Cause Great Confusion, supra note 322 (noting that the use of “or” in 
the DSM-IV-TR B Criterion is his “greatest regret” about that edition because “[t]his one 
stupid slip contributed to the unconstitutional preventive detention of thousands of sex 
offenders”). 
 484. See infra notes 610-625 and accompanying text. 
 485. Jill S. Levenson, Reliability of Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment Criteria 
in Florida, 28 L. & HUMAN BEHAV. 357, 363-64 (2004). 
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findings both to “[e]valuator bias” and, more significantly, to the fact that 
“practitioners are faced with diagnostic criteria that contradict both 
empirical research and clinical conceptualization.”486 Similarly, the authors 
of a 2013 study of 375 SVP evaluations conducted in New Jersey found 
low reliability, that is, only “poor to fair agreement” among clinicians as to 
the presence of the paraphilias and other disorders on which the 
commitments were based.487 The authors remarked that such high levels of 
inconsistency are a “widespread issue” across states and diagnostic 
categories.488 What one commentator calls the DSM’s “idiosyncrasies and 
shortcomings” have a significant impact on the reliability of expert opinion 
offered in SVP proceedings and, thereby, on the justification of the 
indefinite commitment of respondents.489 
3. Basing Opinions on Records and Inadmissible Evidence 
The opinions of the prosecution experts who testified in McGee were not 
derived from methods and sources of information generally associated with 
sound and reliable medical assessments. The experts testified as to their 
diagnostic opinions of Mr. McGee and their assessments of his volitional 
impairment solely on the basis of information compiled and furnished to 
them by government attorneys without ever having examined the 
respondent.490 Such practices are common in SVP proceedings, often 
because the respondent refuses to be examined.491 Government experts, in 
such cases, typically review criminal investigation reports and alleged 
victims’ statements492 (including information that would be inadmissible in 
                                                                                                                 
 486. Id. at 366. Other studies have generally documented the extent to which diagnostic 
assessment by mental health professionals exhibits unconscious biases and the operation of 
other cognitive mechanisms that can lead to distorted opinions. See generally CAROL TAVRIS 
& ELLIOT ARONSON, MISTAKES WERE MADE (BUT NOT BY ME): WHY WE JUSTIFY FOOLISH 
BELIEFS, BAD DECISIONS, AND HURTFUL ACTS 97-126 (2007). 
 487. Anthony D. Perillo et al., Examining the Scope of Questionable Diagnostic 
Reliability in Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Evaluations, 37 INT’L. J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 
190, 193-95 (2014). 
 488. Id. at 196. 
 489. Levenson, supra note 485, at 366.  
 490. McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 559-60 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 491. Colleen D. Duffy, The Admissibility of Expert Opinion and the Bases of Expert 
Opinion in Sex Offender Civil Management Trials in New York, 75 ALB. L. REV. 763, 774 
(2012). 
 492. See Rebecca L. Jackson et al., The Adequacy and Accuracy of Sexually Violent 
Predator Evaluations: Contextualized Risk Assessment in Clinical Practice, 3 INT’L J. 
FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 115, 125 (2004). 
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a criminal proceeding493) and utilize these accounts of conduct to identify 
“symptoms.”494 Other mental health professionals have condemned such 
practice by forensic psychiatrists as a specific violation of professional 
ethics.495   
The McGee panel placed great stock in the DSM’s recognition of the role 
of “clinical judgment” in cases of mental disorder where precise DSM 
criteria are not met, such as when clinicians apply an “NOS” (i.e., not 
otherwise specified) label. One medical dictionary defines “clinical 
judgment” as “the application of information based on actual observation 
of a patient combined with subjective and objective data that lead to a 
conclusion.”496 What the panel in McGee failed to note was that the two 
testifying forensic experts had in fact never had the opportunity to use their 
“clinical judgment” when arriving at their conclusions about McGee’s 
condition, including what they testified as to his diagnosis and volitional 
impairment, since they had never observed the “patient.”  Rather, they had 
simply reviewed evidence acquired by others, namely, law enforcement 
officials, and had drawn their conclusions therefrom. Here again, the 
testimony of experts in McGee was hardly unique for SVP proceedings. A 
survey of evaluation methods by forensic experts in such proceedings found 
that “documentation” of that kind, that is, police reports, treatment records, 
and institutional records, were the most important sources they considered 
in assessing respondents for SVP commitment.497 
Because of evidence rules, such as Federal Rule of Evidence 703, that 
permit an expert to base an opinion on inadmissible facts and data where 
others in the field reasonably rely on such sources, the use of inadmissible 
evidence to arrive at an opinion does not in itself generally lead to the 
exclusion of such opinion at trial.498 The evidence rules can also, in some 
instances, permit such otherwise inadmissible facts and data themselves to 
be admitted to explain or support an opinion.499 However, one appellate 
                                                                                                                 
 493. See, e.g., State v. Mark S., 87 A.D. 3d 73, 78-79 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011); see also 
Duffy, supra note 491, at 763. 
 494. See Hamilton, supra note 22, at 576-77. 
 495. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 370. 
 496. MOSBY'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 380 (9th ed. 2013) (emphasis added). 
 497. Rebecca L. Jackson & Derek T. Hess, Evaluation for Civil Commitment of Sex 
Offenders: A Survey of Experts, 19 SEXUAL ABUSE 425, 431 (2007). 
 498. FED. R. EVID. 703. 
 499. Id. (“[I]f the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the 
opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in helping the jury 
evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.”). See generally Duffy, 
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court, applying principles of due process because the proceeding “may 
result in a serious deprivation of the defendant’s interest in liberty,” has 
specifically held that an expert witness for the state in an SVP proceeding 
could not base his or her opinion upon inadmissible hearsay even if it 
would otherwise be admissible under rules similar to FRE 703.500  Rather, 
the court stated, “because hearsay can permeate the evidence used to 
commit a sex offender, a victim's hearsay statements in police reports or 
presentence reports must have special indicia of reliability to satisfy due 
process” before they can serve as the basis for the expert’s opinion.501 
In some SVP proceedings, the information about the respondent’s past 
criminal activity provided to expert witnesses, and even to the fact finder, is 
never tested through the adversarial process in a criminal trial. For example, 
in McGee, the predicate conviction on which the SVP petition against the 
respondent was based dated from 1987, more than twelve years before the 
trial on petition.502 However, at the trial, the state also offered evidence of 
alleged conduct that was the basis of his probation violations, even though 
McGee had never been convicted for such conduct.503 Other courts have 
also permitted evidence of uncharged alleged criminal conduct to be 
admitted and considered as part of SVP proceedings.504 For example, a 
Washington appeals court affirmed the commitment of a man who had been 
convicted of three rapes where the trial court in his commitment hearing 
had admitted the testimony of a “criminal justice professor” who had 
concluded, based upon an analysis of uncharged crimes bearing the 
respondent’s modus operandi in a database, that the man could have 
committed an additional seventeen unsolved sexual assaults.505 
Ironically, although courts permit experts to base opinions regarding 
dangerousness on criminal conduct alone, at least one court noted a lack of 
criminal conduct (specifically, violence against persons) is insufficient to 
demonstrate that a person does not pose a high risk of committing acts of 
                                                                                                                 
supra note 491 (reviewing the application of the “professional reliability” exception to the 
hearsay rule in SVP proceedings in several states). 
 500. In re A.M., Jr., 797 N.W.2d 233, 261 (Neb. 2011). 
 501. Id.; see also Jenkins v. State, 803 So. 2d 783, 786-87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) 
(holding that SVP commitment cannot be based upon hearsay evidence). 
 502. McGee v Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 558-59 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 503. Id. at 559. 
 504. See, e.g., In re Coe, 250 P.3d 1056, 1067-68 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011); In re Williams, 
253 P.3d 327, 337 (Kan. 2011); Boyce v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 691 S.E.2d 782, 785-
86 (Va. 2010); In re Miller, 210 P.3d 625, 633 (Kan. 2009). 
 505. In re Coe, 250 P.3d at 1060-65. 
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violence in the future. In one recent SVP case, United States v. Volungus,506 
the primary predicate offense was possession of child pornography; there 
was no evidence that the defendant had actually molested any children.507 
The respondent acknowledged at his SVP trial that he was attracted to 
children, and the evidence showed that he was obsessed with child 
pornography.508 At trial and on appeal, he challenged the Government’s 
expert’s conclusion that his diagnosis of pedophilia supported a finding that 
he posed a high risk for engaging in molestation.509 Specifically, he argued 
(and offered expert testimony in support) that, despite his strong sexual 
attraction to children, he had in fact exercised control over acting on his 
urges by not committing acts of molestation.510 The trial and appeals courts 
rejected such arguments and concluded that his pedophilia and pornography 
use were evidence of a “trajectory” that “would cause him serious difficulty 
in refraining from child molestation in the future.”511 Such inferences run 
counter to the research findings discussed earlier regarding the lack of any 
clear causal links between attraction to children and engaging in acts of 
sexual molestation against them. 
The disturbing trends seen in the methods used by experts testifying on 
behalf of the government in SVP cases reflect that they have no scientific 
foundation on which to assess “volitional impairment,” and therefore 
necessarily base their conclusions largely on the respondents’ history of 
criminal behavior. Indeed, courts apply little scrutiny to an expert’s 
assessment of the respondent’s volitional impairment as such.512 Where 
                                                                                                                 
 506. United States v. Volungus, 730 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 507. Id. at 42-45. The respondent had been convicted ten years earlier of “attempted 
molestation” for having online contact with someone he thought was a fourteen-year old girl, 
but was in fact the fictional creation of an undercover FBI agent. Id. at 43. 
 508. Id. at 45-46.  
 509. Id.  
 510. Id. at 48-49. 
 511. Id. at 48. The appeals court conflated an “inability to control attraction,” which is 
not sufficient to support an SVP commitment under Hendricks-Crane, and an inability to 
control one’s behavior. See id. at 47-49. Those on a gluten-free diet may have an 
uncontrolled attraction to chocolate cake, yet manage to avoid eating it based on concerns 
about the adverse consequences of doing so. 
 512. For example, the New York Appellate Division upheld an SVP commitment against 
a challenge based on insufficient evidence where the state’s expert opined that the 
respondent had difficulty controlling his behavior because he was aware that he “had a 
problem” with exposing himself to people yet continued to do so. State v. Richard VV., 74 
A.D.3d 1402, 1403-04 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). Curiously, the forensic expert also considered 
the fact that the respondent met most of the diagnostic criteria for ASPD to be further 
indication that he was unable to control his behavior. Id. However, there is nothing in that 
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experts rely primarily upon law enforcement or prosecution files, such as 
witness statements or criminal histories, to render an opinion about 
volitional impairment, they engage in essentially the same process and use 
the same information as ordinary lay fact finders do when they evaluate 
evidence offered by the state at trial. This raises the question of what 
“helpful” opinion testimony such experts actually bring to the courtroom 
and, conversely, whether they are simply doing the fact finder’s job (albeit 
from an arguably biased perspective) under the guise of offering their 
“expertise.”513  
Given the variability and unreliability of expert testimony in SVP 
proceedings, it is not surprising that, overall, mental health professionals’ 
predictions of recidivism by SVPs appear to be no more accurate than those 
made by laypersons on the basis of general knowledge. Empirical studies 
confirm what psychiatrists themselves have long stated to be the case: their 
predictions of recidivism by SVPs are little better than chance.514 A 2004 
study concluded that experts were accurate in predicting future sexual 
violence about one-half of the time.515 This study also confirmed many 
other concerns about the reliability of expert opinion in SVP cases, such as 
the emotional impact of reviewing victims’ statements and other 
information in criminal records on the development of an evaluator’s 
opinion and the existence of an overall bias favoring “locking up” prior 
offenders regardless of the actual risk they pose.516 
These findings are consistent with prior studies of clinical judgment that 
have long established that, due to the operation of a range of cognitive 
biases, such judgment, even by intelligent, ethical, and well-trained 
                                                                                                                 
diagnosis that is associated with volitional impairment. See also Eric S. Janus, Sex Offender 
Commitments: Debunking the Official Narrative and Revealing the Rules-in-Use, 8 STAN. L. 
& POL'Y REV. 71, 83-84 (1997). 
 513. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if . . . 
the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue . . . .”). 
 514. Jackson et al., supra note 492, at 124; see also Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar 
Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting Violent Behavior in a Post-Daubert 
World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845, 1869-71 (2003). 
 515. Jackson et al., supra note 492, at 124, 127. 
 516. Id. at 125. Another factor in the poor results was the fact that most of the terms in 
the applicable legal standards were not sufficiently “operationalized,” meaning that the 
specific terms are poorly defined (if they are defined at all). Id. 
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professionals, is significantly inaccurate.517 For example, where a 
professional fails to grasp the complexity of the circumstances that can lead 
to various outcomes, the degree of confidence she feels in her conclusion, 
rather than being a measure of its accuracy, may indicate just the 
opposite.518 Also, it appears that the very act of predicting the likelihood of 
a rare event, because it involves visualizing the possibility of that event, 
leads to overestimating the risk of its occurrence.519 As psychologist Daniel 
Kahneman has observed: “Errors of prediction are inevitable because the 
world is unpredictable,” and yet “we resist our limited ability to predict the 
future.”520 We are easily misled by both hindsight bias (i.e., we 
overestimate the extent to which we can identify causal relationships but 
base decisions on the assumption that we have identified them correctly) 
and by a “readiness to ascribe propensity to behavior” (i.e., we see 
behaviors that may be strongly affected by context as reflections of 
underlying inclinations).521 Both of these general cognitive tendencies can 
influence the thinking of testifying experts, and both can influence the way 
fact finders weigh expert testimony in making SVP commitment 
determinations. 
4. Using Actuarial Tools 
Expert opinion evidence offered by prosecutors in SVP cases is not 
always based on diagnostic assessment alone. The appeals court opinion in 
McGee notes that both of the State’s experts also used actuarial risk 
assessment (ARA) instruments to arrive at their conclusions about the 
respondent’s specific degree of risk of recidivism.522 Because McGee did 
not challenge such use on appeal, the description of their testimony on the 
role of such tools is very limited.523  Dr. Marsh testified regarding the 
scores she assigned to McGee under the three tools she used to arrive at her 
conclusion, and she indicated that “subjects with scores similar to Mr. 
McGee’s in each of these instruments reoffended at rates of between forty-
                                                                                                                 
 517. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW, 238-42 (2011); TAVRIS & 
ARONSON, supra note 486, at 97-126. 
 518. KAHNEMAN, supra note 517, at 212. 
 519. Id. at 333. 
 520. Id. at 217-20. 
 521. Id. at 199-201. 
 522. McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 559-60 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 523. Id. 
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eight and fifty-four percent over a six- to fifteen-year period following 
release.”524 
The McGee opinion does not specify which ARA tools were used or 
described in testimony by the testifying experts, but they were likely among 
those commonly used by forensic examiners offering evidence in support of 
SVP commitment. The appropriateness of the use of tools such as the 
“Static-99,” Rapid Risk Assessment for Sexual Offense Recidivism 
(RRASOR), or Sex Offender Risk Appraisal Guide (SORAG) as a basis for 
expert opinions in support of SVP commitment is an unsettled question in 
the courts.525 Some forensic examiners have advocated greater use of ARA 
tools, which they characterize as especially objective, to address the 
problems of bias and low inter-rater reliability accompanying clinical 
judgment and diagnostic assessment described above.526 A growing number 
of experts use risk-prediction actuarial tools to inform their opinions and to 
support their testimony about the risk of recidivism, the “final and most 
nebulous” part of the SVP analysis,527 posed by a respondent. One study of 
evaluation methods found that the vast majority of forensic evaluators used 
one or more tools as part of the assessment process.528 The guidelines 
issued by the Association for the Treatment of Sex Offenders require use of 
such tools, although no single tool has emerged as the preferred.529 
These instruments are generally developed from studies of sex offenders 
that isolate a number of specific “factors,” including the number of sex 
offense convictions and characteristics of the individual’s victims (age, 
gender, and relationship to the individual), associated with those who 
recidivate.530 Those factors are assembled into what are essentially 
checklists. Many of the instruments can be completed without evaluating 
the individual but simply from reviewing records, including court records. 
The results indicate what percentage of those individuals in the study who 
share the offender’s factors went on to commit new crimes (sometimes 
identified by arrests rather than convictions). After the factors are entered, 
the tool yields a score that places the individual in a risk range, such as 
                                                                                                                 
 524. Id. at 560. 
 525. Melissa Hamilton, Public Safety, Individual Liberty, and Suspect Science: Future 
Dangerousness Assessments and Sex Offender Laws, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 697, 721-25 (2011) 
(explaining how STATIC-99 and RRASOR were developed and are administered). 
 526. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 372-73. 
 527. Jackson & Hess, supra note 497, at 428, 434 (noting that 95.1% of respondents used 
such instruments and 73.2% listed them as “essential” to the evaluation process). 
 528. Id. at 434. 
 529. Id. at 426. 
 530. EWING, supra note 34, at 36-38. 
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“high risk,” and may offer a percentage of likelihood of reoffending.531 
Thus, the tools are not psychological tests,532 nor are they predictors of an 
individual’s specific likelihood to re-offend.533 The expert witness testifies 
that the actuarial analysis of objective factors places the respondent at a 
specific level of risk of reoffending,534 although such a conclusion is not 
keyed to any legal criteria.535 The tools also shed no light on the questions 
of abnormality or volitional impairment. 
Some commentators have advocated for the complete replacement of 
clinical judgment with the use of actuarial instruments, given results of 
studies suggesting this change would yield improved accuracy.536 Noted 
behavioral psychologist Paul Meehl argued decades ago that clinical 
judgment is inferior to actuarial analysis,537 and other researchers have 
replicated and reinforced his findings many times since his initial studies.538 
Empirical studies have shown that ARAs are specifically better predictors 
of recidivism than “clinical judgment” alone,539 a standard that does not 
seem to be all that difficult given the exceptionally poor ability of forensic 
examiners to predict recidivism.540  
However, as other commentators have stressed, there are reasons to 
approach the use of ARAs in SVP proceedings with considerable caution. 
The use of ARAs is highly controversial among legal and mental health 
professionals, and critics of ARAs have noted their limited effectiveness.541 
                                                                                                                 
 531. Jackson & Hess, supra note 497, at 439. 
 532. Indeed, one study of evaluation procedures noted how less frequently psychological 
testing is used in the SVP context as compared with other forensic evaluations, such as for 
insanity and competency. Id. at 437-38. 
 533. United States v. Hall, 664 F.3d 456, 464 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 534. See, e.g., Lieberman v. Kirby, No. 10 C 2570, 2011 WL 6131176, at *3-6 (N.D. Ill. 
Dec. 8, 2011). 
 535. Jackson & Hess, supra note 497, at 439. 
 536. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 514, at 1871. See generally Eric S. Janus 
& Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: 
Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443 (2003).  
 537. PAUL E. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION: A THEORETICAL 
ANALYSIS AND A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 94-95 (1954). 
 538. Janus & Prentky, supra note 536, at 1455. 
 539. Daniel A. Krauss et al., Dangerously Misunderstood: Representative Jurors' 
Reactions to Expert Testimony on Future Dangerousness in a Sexually Violent Predator 
Trial, 18 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 18, 20 (2012); Janus & Prentky, supra note 536, at 
1455-58; Prentky et al, supra note 26, at 372. 
 540. Such findings are consistent with studies of accuracy of many different kinds of 
predication across disciplines. See generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 517, at 222. 
 541. Krauss et al., supra note 539, at 20; Saleh et al., supra note 344, at 366. 
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One of the biggest shortcomings of the Static-99 and similar instruments is 
that they assess risk based on a series of “static” factors that do not change 
(such as the age of first offense, characteristics of the victims etc.) over an 
offender’s lifetime.542 They therefore may fail to account for dynamic 
factors such as life circumstances and participation in treatment, because 
the instruments are based on the assumption that one’s risk never changes, 
even if one makes choices to address the underlying propensity.543 As a 
result, other than perhaps a decrease due to aging, a person’s score will not 
change significantly. A person’s score could be the same the day of release 
from incarceration and ten years later, even after leading an entirely law-
abiding life during the interim.544 Such an approach to risk assessment fails 
to take into account not only the passage of time, but also the events that 
occurred (or did not occur) during such time, thus rendering any such 
assessment severely liable to inaccuracy.545 Some instruments do not even 
consider the mitigating effect of age on risk of recidivism.546 A few scholars 
have advocated for a uniform use of “dynamic risk factors” before a final 
risk assessment is made using ARAs,547 although research has not yet 
suggested how best to integrate such factors.548  
The SVP laws and the call for risk assessment as the core question in the 
proceedings have spawned a cottage industry of developing new 
instruments, each of which promises to be more precise that those 
developed (and in use) before it.549 However, no consensus in the field has 
emerged regarding which test is most applicable and appropriate in the SVP 
commitment setting,550 or for predicting dangerousness generally, 551 and 
                                                                                                                 
 542. Tamara Rice Lave, Controlling Sexually Violent Predators: Continued 
Incarceration at What Cost?, 14 NEW. CRIM. L. REV. 213, 240-45 (2011); see also Hamilton, 
supra note 525, at 724-25. 
 543. Krauss et al., supra note 539, at 20. 
 544. For an example of how the use of an ARA can have an impact on risk assessment of 
a person who commits a crime at a young age, see Nora Hertel, Sex Offender Awaits Second 
Chance, WISCONSIN WATCH (Feb. 4, 2014), http://wisconsinwatch.org/2014/02/sex-
offender-awaits-second-chance/. 
 545. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 378. 
 546. Id. at 375. 
 547. Id. at 383-85. 
 548. Good & Bursteiin, supra note 84, at 30. 
 549. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 371-72; 2 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 401, § 11:28.  
 550. Black v. Voss, 557 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1105-07 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (noting that 
respondent’s expert criticized the government’s experts for using the STATIC-99 test to 
assess risk for reoffending because that test addressed criminal activity, not sexual deviancy, 
and advocated use of the RRASOR test instead). 
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there are some sharp differences in opinion and approach among 
psychologists who have developed and used various instruments.552 Many 
commonly used ARAs have been criticized for being unreliable. For 
example, the SVR-20 (at least as of 2000) used only broad categories of 
risk (high, medium, and low), and there were no inter-rater reliability rates 
for specific factors.553 There is also no consensus what level of predictive 
validity is sufficient for the instruments to be considered a useful tool for 
predicting recidivism.554 
ARAs, even at their best, can still be used poorly.555 Although the 
instruments are ostensibly objective, the evaluators who administer them 
are not immune from common failings of human judgment and bias, and 
the concept of “risk” is itself a construct subject to different 
understandings.556 A simple difference in how the outcome of a risk is 
presented, in terms of a probability versus a frequency, can affect how high 
a professional assesses the risk.557 Also, the objective factuality of some of 
the individual factors considered in the instruments may not be as clear as 
initially assumed. For example, a factor such as participation in or 
compliance with treatment can be a complex question where there is limited 
access to treatment,558 where the treatment is cursory, or where the 
treatment requires disclosure or other actions by the committed person that 
could lead to lengthier commitment in the absence of Fifth Amendment 
protections. The use of instruments or set “factors” can also lead to “cherry 
picking” the factors to be considered in the analysis, which can also lead to 
skewed results.559 Some scholars suggest that experts’ practice of making 
individualized “adjustments” to scores may be little more than “dressing up 
                                                                                                                 
 551. M. Neil Browne & Ronda R. Harrison-Spoerl, Putting Expert Testimony in Its 
Epistemological Place: What Predictions of Dangerousness in Court Can Teach Us, 91 
MARQ. L. REV. 1119, 1198-1204 (2008). 
 552. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 373-80. 
 553. Terence W. Campbell, Sexual Predator Evaluations and Phrenology: Considering 
Issues of Evidentiary Reliability, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 111, 120-21 (2000). 
 554. Good & Burstein, supra note 84, at 34. 
 555. Janus & Prentky, supra note 536, at 1493-97. 
 556. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 514, at 1871. 
 557. Risks phrased in the form of the probable occurrence of specific events are evidently 
less “vivid” than ones phrased in the form of a frequency. KAHNEMAN, supra note 517, at 
330 (“Experienced forensic psychologists and psychiatrists are not immune to the effects of 
the format in which risks are expressed.”). 
 558. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 379. 
 559. Id. at 378-79; Good & Burstein, supra note 84, at 30-31 (arguing that ARAs for 
SVPs may be “systematically biased”). 
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clinical judgment with actuarial science.”560 Given such problems, several 
scholars have suggested that the use of ARAs by examiners in SVP 
proceedings is unethical.561 
Testimony based upon ARA tools has received a mixed reaction in the 
courts. Some courts resist admitting opinions based on such tools more than 
they resist admitting those based solely upon diagnostic impressions.562 In 
at least one case, a court rejected the forensic expert testimony because the 
ARA employed failed to take into account events in the respondent’s life 
that had transpired since the “factors” used in the assessment.563 Some 
courts are uncertain about how much weight is appropriate to give to the 
specific scores from such tests. For example, in In re Williams, a Kansas 
appeals court reversed an SVP commitment because the government’s 
expert had testified that the respondent’s score, which was lower than a 
50% chance of reoffending, was too low to sustain such a commitment.564 
The Kansas Supreme Court reversed that ruling, however, arguing that 
there was other evidence to support a finding that the respondent was likely 
to engage in acts of sexual violence.565 Finally, some courts have excluded 
testimony based on ARA results altogether because of concerns about 
unfair prejudice.566 
Despite the shortcomings of ARAs, many courts have embraced the 
tools, seeing them as akin to psychological tests or as amounting to an 
objective predictor of a particular offender’s individual likelihood of re-
offending.567 In United States v. Shields, for example, the Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit upheld a commitment order based upon expert 
testimony employing ARA tools even though the Government’s experts 
conceded such tools were only “moderate” predictors of recidivism and that 
there were significant reliability problems with the results of the tools used 
in that particular case (including, among other things, that the results were 
                                                                                                                 
 560. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 380. 
 561. Campbell, supra note 553, at 128. 
 562. Krauss et al., supra note 539, at 37; Daniel A. Krauss & Nicholas Scurich, Risk 
Assessment in the Law: Legal Admissibility, Scientific Validity, and Some Disparities 
Between Research and Practice, 31 BEHAV. SCI & L. 215, 225-27 (2013). 
 563. Commonwealth of Virginia v. Squire, 685 S.E.2d 631, 632-33 (Va. 2009) (affirming 
dismissal of SVP petition despite expert testimony that actuarial tests placed the respondent 
in the highest risk category).  
 564. In re Williams, 214 P.3d 1225, slip op. at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009), rev’d, 253 P.3d 
327 (Kan. 2011). 
 565. In re Williams, 253 P.3d 327, 338 (Kan. 2011). 
 566. Janus & Prentky, supra note 536, at 1487-92. 
 567. EWING, supra note 34, at 40-44. 
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based on data obtained entirely outside of the U.S.).568 The appeals court 
concluded that it should be left to the fact finder to decide the weight given 
to such evidence.569 
5. Sparse Use of Daubert-Frye Analysis 
As Allan Frances has implored: “SVP courts must insist on good 
science.”570 In the 1923 case of Frye v. United States, the U.S. District 
Court applied a new admissibility standard for expert testimony, which was 
later widely adopted by state courts: judges must consider a theory’s 
“general acceptance” in the relevant scientific community before allowing 
its admission.571 The U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in Daubert v. 
Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals572 requires a trial court to act as a 
“gatekeeper” with regard to the scientific evidence presented; the court 
must make its own determination of reliability of such evidence, based in 
part on general acceptance as well as on the presence of other indicators of 
“good science.”573 The controversial nature of psychiatric diagnoses 
discussed above, combined with the significant liberty interest at stake in 
SVP proceedings, suggest that trial courts in such proceedings should 
exercise particular vigilance in the “gatekeeping” role. However, the case 
law reveals a significant abdication of this responsibility by the courts.574 
Legal scholars vary widely in their opinions of the type of gatekeeping 
scrutiny that courts should afford to expert testimony by mental health 
professionals generally, and this range of legal opinion has implications for 
SVP cases. At one extreme, some commentators argue that psychiatry has 
little to offer courts in such cases. For example, Samantha Godwin has 
labeled psychiatry a “pseudoscience” that lacks sufficient reliability to be 
                                                                                                                 
 568. United States v. Shields, 649 F.3d 78, 89 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 569. Id. at 89-90. In that case, the trial court used an advisory jury, which concluded that 
there was insufficient evidence of likelihood of the respondent reoffending. Id. at 84. 
However, the court ultimately concluded that the Government had met its burden. Id. at 85. 
 570. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 386. 
 571. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by FED. R. 
EVID. 702. 
 572. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 573. Id. at 590-95. One instance in which a court noted that expert testimony fell short of 
the Frye test and therefore could not serve as a basis for an SVP commitment is one of the 
very few reported opinions involving a female respondent. In re Coffel, 117 S.W.3d 116, 
129 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). 
 574. Alexander Scherr, Daubert & Danger: The “Fit” of Expert Predictions in Civil 
Commitments, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 2-3 (2003). 
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considered at all in involuntary commitment hearings.575 Other scholars 
have suggested that, while there may be some utility for mental health 
testimony in a range of legal contexts, diagnoses themselves should not 
generally be admitted.576 Still other scholars suggest that standards for 
admissibility of expert evidence should be relaxed for mental health 
testimony and that courts should use an “informed speculation” approach, 
particularly for evidence offered by a criminal defendant to excuse criminal 
conduct.577 
Courts as well are divided on how to apply Daubert and Frye when 
deciding whether to admit expert psychiatric opinions as evidence in SVP 
proceedings. Indeed, the Daubert opinion was not cited at all by the McGee 
court, despite McGee’s direct attack on the scientific basis of the state’s 
experts. The Washington Supreme Court addressed the question of the 
applicability of Frye to the admissibility of expert testimony shortly after 
enactment of its SVP law. In In re Young, the court rejected the 
respondent’s argument that the court should not have allowed the state’s 
expert to base an opinion on a diagnostic label that did not appear in the 
DSM.578 Quoting a law review article by Alexander Brooks, the court 
reasoned: 
The fact that pathologically driven rape, for example, is not yet 
listed in the DSM–III–R does not invalidate such a diagnosis. . . . 
What is critical for our purposes is that psychiatric and 
                                                                                                                 
 575. Samantha Godwin, Bad Science Makes Bad Law: How the Deference Afforded to 
Psychiatry Undermines Civil Liberties, 10 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 647, 647 (2012). The most 
significant deficiency Godwin identifies is the lack of validity of the “somatic reality” of 
psychiatric diagnoses, since they are based entirely on symptomatology, not scientific 
testing. Id. at 662. 
 576. Daniel W. Shuman, Persistent Reexperiences in Psychiatry and Law: Current and 
Future Trends for the Role of PTSD in Litigation, in POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER IN 
LITIGATION: GUIDELINES FOR FORENSIC ASSESSMENT 1, 7 (Robert I. Simon ed., 2d ed. 2003) 
(“Both Daubert and the DSM make clear that it is not appropriate to assume that a 
psychiatric diagnosis is relevant to, let alone dispositive of, an issue in a case.”); Daniel W. 
Shuman, Softened Science in the Courtroom: Forensic Implications of a Value-Laden 
Classification, in DESCRIPTIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS: VALUES, MENTAL DISORDERS, AND THE 
DSMS 217, 224-25 (John Z. Sadler ed., 2002); Morse, supra note 274, at 601-04; Smith, 
supra note 184, at 69 . 
 577. See generally Richard J. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health 
Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VAND. L. 
REV. 427, 427-50 (1980). 
 578. 857 P.2d 989, 1016-18 (Wash. 1993), superseded on other grounds as stated in In 
re Thorell, 72 P.3d 708 (Wash. 2003). 
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psychological clinicians who testify in good faith as to mental 
abnormality are able to identify sexual pathologies that are as 
real and meaningful as other pathologies already listed in the 
DSM.579 
Such “good faith” approaches to the admissibility of psychiatric evidence, 
however, should raise significant concerns in both the law and medical 
fields. One group of commentators noted that courts should be wary of the 
use of new or “stretched” diagnoses with “no empirical track record 
providing evidence for such a linkage.” 580 “Perhaps worse,” they caution, 
“we are conferring on unvalidated diagnoses the presumptive medical 
authority of the DSM.”581 
On the other hand, and in accord with such recommended caution, some 
courts have urged trial courts to apply additional scrutiny to expert opinion 
evidence offered in support of SVP commitments. For example, an Illinois 
appeals court held that a novel diagnosis such as Paraphilia NOS-
Hebephilia must be subject to a Frye hearing before it can be presented to a 
fact finder.582  The analysis in In re Detention of New began with finding 
that expert testimony based on a diagnosis “presupposes a mental condition 
exists as a matter of scientific evidence.”583 The court noted the 
considerable controversy over the “hebephilia” label and concluded that 
“[a] Frye hearing is appropriate to determine whether an emerging 
diagnosis is an actual illness or disorder.”584 The court observed, strikingly, 
that “[j]ustice does not put the fact finder in the position of culling good 
science from bad.”585 The court correctly noted that, above all, the 
reasoning of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Hendricks mandated a 
scrutiny of the science offered in support of an SVP commitment. Since 
SVP laws are ostensibly based upon a need for treatment, not retribution, 
the court reasoned that “if a respondent in an SVP proceeding does not 
                                                                                                                 
 579. Id. at 1001 (quoting Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionality and Morality of 
Civilly Committing Sexually Violent Predators, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 709, 733 
(1992)) (alteration in original). More recently another Washington appeals court, in In re 
Berry, noted that many courts have held that the Frye rule has no application to the question 
of whether a diagnosis of Paraphilia-NOS may be admitted in an SVP proceeding. 248 P.3d 
592, 595-96 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). 
 580. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 370. 
 581. Id. 
 582. In re New, 992 N.E.2d 519, 521, 528-31 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). 
 583. Id. at 528. 
 584. Id. at 529.  
 585. Id. 
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suffer from an actual mental disorder, then there is nothing to cure, and 
commitment is pointless.”586  
On balance, however, there is little question that, even in the era of 
Daubert and similar rules designed to ensure that only reliable expert 
testimony is admitted, clinical psychiatric testimony is rarely excluded.587 
By the time the Court decided Daubert, the role of psychiatric testimony 
was so embedded in legal decision-making that it was inconceivable to 
courts that they should scrutinize, much less reverse, this practice.588 
Indeed, as the Supreme Court noted in Barefoot v. Estelle: “The suggestion 
that no psychiatrist's testimony may be presented with respect to a 
defendant's future dangerousness is somewhat like asking us to disinvent 
the wheel.”589   
The analysis in McGee is remarkable for how far it strays from the core 
principles set forth in the Daubert opinion. Presumably, the panel did not 
apply that standard because of the specific posture of the case. McGee was 
not a direct appeal challenging the lower court’s evidentiary rulings on such 
testimony.590 Rather, because McGee’s attorneys brought a habeas petition, 
the court considered only whether there was a constitutional violation.591 
The evidence rules, and cases interpreting them such as Daubert, impose a 
more specific and therefore higher standard for admissibility than does the 
Constitution.592 But courts routinely follow the lower standard when, as in 
the SVP context, they analyze admissibility to determine the 
constitutionality of an ongoing deprivation of someone’s liberty. Barefoot 
                                                                                                                 
 586. Id. at 530.  
 587. Scherr, supra note 574, at 58-61. 
 588. Krauss et al., supra note 539, at 38; see also SLOBOGIN, supra note 187, at 28-29. 
 589. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896 (1983), superseded on other grounds by 28 
U.S.C. § 2253 (2012). 
 590. McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2010). In any event there is no 
indication that McGee raised Daubert-based challenges in his original proceeding. 
 591. Id. at 561-62. As one court of appeals panel explained, federal courts’ review of 
claims of evidentiary errors is severely limited in the habeas context:  
Habeas review does not ordinarily encompass garden-variety evidentiary 
rulings. As we have said: “The federal judiciary holds no roving commission to 
monitor case-by-case compliance with rules of evidence. . . .” In this case, 
petitioner's objections to the trial court's evidentiary rulings do not implicate 
errors of constitutional dimension and, therefore, are not “proper grist for the 
federal habeas mill.” 
Palmariello v. Superintendent of M.C.I. Norfolk, 873 F.2d 491, 494 (1st Cir. 1989) (citations 
omitted). 
 592. Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1071, 1072-76 (2003).   
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in particular, which upheld the use of psychiatric evidence about future 
dangerousness in the face of research suggesting the low reliability of such 
predictions, suggests a very low standard for admissibility of expert 
evidence.593 Such lack of scrutiny of expert evidence is highly questionable 
where the state is offering the evidence to rationalize indefinite detention.   
That most courts distinguish between the admissibility standards 
regarding expert testimony in the evidence rules and due process 
jurisprudence raise the question of whether the admission of expert 
testimony in a manner apparently inconsistent with Daubert can itself 
implicate due process. No court has addressed that question squarely, and 
that question was not before the Seventh Circuit in McGee. However, in 
cases where a person’s constitutional rights to liberty are at stake, there 
clearly are due process implications for a court’s role as gatekeeper 
regarding expert opinion.594 Courts should take into account in their due 
process analyses that these invented or extended diagnoses or ARAs—
employed almost exclusively in the SVP commitment (rather than clinical) 
context—would not pass either a Daubert or a Frye gatekeeping standard. 
Indeed, these made-for-trial expert opinions appear to be precisely the kind 
of testimony that the Ninth Circuit excluded in Daubert.595   
As discussed below, the call to include some of these extended diagnoses 
in the DSM-5 was inextricably intertwined with arguments about the 
usefulness of such diagnoses in SVP proceedings. This fact should signal to 
courts that expert opinions in such proceedings do little more than use 
medicalized terminology to tell courts and juries what to conclude. Also, 
given mainstream psychiatry’s consistent rejection of recidivism prediction 
and the lack of peer-reviewed research supporting it, there is a serious 
                                                                                                                 
 593. Id. at 1091-92. Giannelli also rejects the reasoning that the standard could be lower 
because it was an analysis under the constitution, not the rules of evidence; the “death is 
different” principle necessarily means that evidence offered in support of the death penalty 
should have to meet higher, not lower, standards of reliability. Id. at 1092. 
 594. The Supreme Court has not considered this issue, or the continuing validity of 
Barefoot v. Estelle, in light of Daubert. See Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 616 (7th Cir. 
2010) (rejecting argument of SVP respondent based on Daubert-Frye in an appeal of SVP 
commitment because “neither . . . purports to set a constitutional floor on the admissibility of 
scientific evidence”); Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 514, at 1859; Giannelli, 
supra note 592, at 1091-92. 
 595. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming 
exclusion of expert testimony that was based solely upon research conducted for purposes of 
litigation). 
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question whether any expert prediction of future dangerousness could pass 
a strict Daubert test.596 
Although courts admit expert testimony regarding future dangerousness 
(whether based upon clinical judgment, ARAs, or both), they leave the 
determination of the weight to be assigned to such testimony to the fact 
finder, which is often a jury or, in some states, an elected judge.597  There 
are two fundamental problems with this practice. First, it ignores the limited 
ability of laypersons to critically assess the opinions of expert witnesses, 
one of the core rationales for the Daubert “gatekeeping” requirement.598 
The ability to uncover and assess problems in reliability can be especially 
challenging for laypersons with respect to the often ipse dixit opinions599 
offered by mental health professionals.   
The second problem concerns the nature of SVP proceedings and the 
specific task assigned to fact finders: determining whether a convicted sex 
offender should be permitted to be at large in society. It seems unlikely that 
a fact finder could render a decision on such a question without fear of 
repercussions if its conclusion that a respondent posed a low risk of 
committing future acts of sexual violence proved to be wrong.600 SVP 
commitment is a decision that puts the fact finder between an offender and 
a potential “next victim.” There has been limited research on to what extent 
expert testimony about future risk influences jurors’ decision-making.601 
                                                                                                                 
 596. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 514, at 1857. 
 597. Minnesota, Washington, and Wisconsin, for example, elect trial court judges. MINN. 
CONST. art. 6, § 7; WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 5; WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 6. Even courts that 
reject the government expert’s opinion in an SVP proceeding generally do so under weight 
or “credibility” principles (after admitting the testimony) rather than excluding the opinion 
under either a Daubert (or rule 702) or due process analysis. See, e.g., United States v. 
Wilkinson, 646 F. Supp. 2d 194, 201 (D. Mass. 2009). 
 598. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (“‘Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite 
misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in 
weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules 
exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses.’”). 
 599. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (noting that an expert’s 
opinion is not sufficiently reliable to be admitted when it is “connected to existing data only 
by the ipse dixit of the expert”). 
 600. Cf. People v. Shazier, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215, 224 (Ct. App. 2012), rev’d and 
remanded, 298 P.3d 178 (Cal. 2013) (vacating SVP commitment due to prosecutorial 
misconduct because, in part, prosecutor’s closing argument included references to the 
proximity of schools to where respondent would be living and asking jurors to consider what 
their friends’ and family members’ reactions would be if they denied the commitment). 
 601. Krauss et al., supra note 539, at 21. Florida courts specifically permit use of the 
term “sexually violent predator” in SVP commitment proceedings, notwithstanding concerns 
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Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine how a jury of laypersons, after 
hearing an expert opine that based on an ARA instrument, a child rapist has 
a 33% chance of reoffending (i.e., raping another child) would not commit 
that person. Indeed, recent research of decision making by jurors in actual 
SVP trials reveals that many follow something along the lines of former 
Vice President Dick Cheney’s “one percent doctrine” and conclude that, in 
such cases, any amount of risk, no matter how small, is too much to 
accept.602 Judges are not immune from similar concerns about the 
implications of their rulings. One Circuit Judge on the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit, dissenting from an opinion affirming a district court’s 
denial of an SVP petition, wrote: “though we may never learn the 
consequences of a poor predictive judgment on our part, I fear that some 
young child somewhere will experience them,” and noted that there are “sad 
and scarring consequences of a guess gone awry.”603  This judge likely 
articulated the mental calculations made by many juries and jurists involved 
with these cases.604 
This review of law and practice in SVP proceedings has demonstrated 
that the prevalent use of psychiatric evidence in such proceedings is a 
distortion of medical views of pathology of sexual violence—including 
appropriate diagnostic methods and prediction of future conduct—and also 
legal principles regarding the admissibility of expert opinion. This 
distortion includes cases where expert opinion is based on unreliable 
methodology or data that runs counter to predominant views of the 
                                                                                                                 
raised by the defense bar that the term is “extremely inflammatory, prejudicial, and 
misleading” and would deprive respondents of due process. Standard Jury Instructions-
Criminal Cases (99-2), 777 So. 2d 366, 367-68 (Fla. 2000). The committee developing the 
jury instructions agreed, however, that the term should not be overused to the extent that it 
becomes a “feature” of the trial. Id. 
 602. Knighton et al., supra note 402, at 300-02 (finding that many jurors in SVP 
proceedings “viewed even a 1% chance of reoffending as indicating that an offender is likely 
to reoffend”). Cheney stated: “If there's a 1% chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al-
Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our 
response.” Ron Suskind, The Untold Story of al-Qaeda's Plot to Attack the Subway, TIME, 
June 26, 2006, at 27.  
 603. United States v. Springer, 715 F.3d 535, 548, 551 (4th Cir. 2013) (Wilkinson, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added).  
 604. There have not been empirical studies of the rates of commitment in bench versus 
jury trials, but there are anecdotal press reports of jurors rejecting SVP commitment 
petitions. See, e.g., Karen Franklin, Another One Bites the Dust: Hollow SVP Prosecution 
No Match for Jurors’ Common Sense, IN THE NEWS (Oct 27, 2012), http://forensic 
psychologist.blogspot.com/2012/10/another-one-bites-dust-hollow-svp.html (the blog author 
was one of the defense experts in that case). 
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psychiatric field and risks misuse by, or the misleading of, the fact finder.605 
These fundamental and extensive distortions of sound science and justice 
are the inevitable and unavoidable result of the courts’ experiment with 
SVP laws. These distortions also demonstrate that many in the psychiatric 
field accurately predicted the dangers of SVP laws when the SVP 
experiment began.   
C. Fixing the Science to Fit the Courtroom   
The opinions in Hendricks and Crane assumed that there was a “bright 
line separating an SVP/SDP mental disorder from ordinary criminal 
behavior.”606 Such line-drawing, however, “tests a no-man’s land between 
psychiatry and the law.”607 Many scholars and commentators in the fields of 
both law and psychiatry believe that the forensic use of psychiatric 
evidence, and particularly diagnoses, is unscientific and grossly misleading. 
Accordingly, there have been many calls to fix the problem, sometimes by 
fixing the science.   
Commentators who maintain that science does have something to offer 
in SVP proceedings tend to speak of the “disturbing frequency” with which 
“bad science” appears in those proceedings.608 This conception of the 
problem in SVP cases suggests that there may be a role for “good” (or at 
least “better”) science and, indeed, there have been many suggestions and 
proposals for ways to improve the forensic science evidence admitted.  
Proposed fixes could include changing the way clinical diagnoses are 
approached, changing the diagnoses themselves, and either supplementing 
or replacing the diagnostic assessments with the use of actuarial tools. 
However, none of these modifications would solve the core problem set up 
by the Hendricks-Crane rationale: in a highly adversarial context, with very 
high stakes for the individual and society, courts are asked to look to the 
conclusions of psychiatric examiners to answer a normative moral question. 
1. Addressing Problems with Diagnoses 
The nature of the problem concerning diagnostic labels in SVP 
proceedings differs significantly depending upon one’s perspective. Some 
psychiatric commentators, such as Allan Frances, complain that experts 
testifying for the state misuse existing diagnoses such as Pedophilia or 
                                                                                                                 
 605. See Hamilton, supra note 22, at 556-72; see also Prentky et al., supra note 334, at 
456. 
 606. Frances et al., supra note 272, at 383. 
 607. Id. at 383. 
 608. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 361. 
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ASPD, or invent diagnoses such as Paraphilia NOS-Nonconsent, which 
have not been set forth in the DSM or otherwise been sanctioned by 
psychiatry.609 Due to the “particularly high stakes for respondents,” these 
commentators are concerned about the potential for large numbers of “false 
positive” diagnoses.610 Accordingly, there have been calls to revise DSM 
language to eliminate any potential for such behavior-based approach to 
diagnosis.611  
Mental health professionals offering testimony for the states in SVP 
proceedings, by contrast, see the problem in terms of a failure of the DSM 
or the field of psychiatry to provide forensically usable categories.612 Some 
of these experts believe the science fails to reflect the reality of mental 
conditions underlying acts of sexual violence.613 They are concerned about 
ambiguities that lead to court challenges to their testimony or present 
potential barriers to fact finders receiving their opinions.614 This group, 
therefore, advocated for revisions to the paraphilias in the DSM-5 so that 
there would be a clearer basis in the psychiatric nosology for identifying the 
mental disorders most commonly seen in SVPs.615  
These commentators also noted the practical need for preserving the 
potential for an approach to assigning a paraphilia diagnosis based on prior 
                                                                                                                 
 609. See, e.g., First & Frances, supra note 315; Frances, et al., supra note 272; Frances & 
First, supra note 462; Allan Frances & Richard Wollert, Sexual Sadism: Avoiding Its Misuse 
in Sexually Violent Predator Evaluations, 40 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 409, 409-
16 (2012). 
 610. First, supra note 312, at 1239 (internal citations omitted). 
 611. Id. at 1242. 
 612. See, e.g., Ray Blanchard et al., Pedophilia, Hebephilia, and the DSM-V, 38 
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 335, 347-49 (2009); John Matthew Fabian, Diagnosing and 
Litigating Hebephilia in Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment Proceedings, 39 J. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 496, 497-501 (2011); John Matthew Fabian, Paraphilias and 
Predators: The Ethical Application of Psychiatric Diagnoses in Partisan Sexually Violent 
Predator Civil Commitment Proceedings, 11 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 82, 84-90 (2011); 
Raymond Knight & David Thornton, Dialogue on Paraphilic Coercive Disorder: Moving 
Toward an Empirically Based Consensus, 12 SEX OFFENDER L. REP. 33, 33-36 (2011); 
Robin J. Wilson, Paraphilic Coercive Disorder: A Clinical and Historical Perspective, 12 
SEX OFFENDER L. REP. 35, 35-36 (2011). 
 613. See, e.g., Blanchard et al., supra note 612, at 347-49.  
 614. See, e.g., Fabian, supra note 612, at 501-04; Paul Stern, Paraphilic Coercive 
Disorder in the DSM: The Right Diagnosis for the Right Reason, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL 
BEHAV. 1443, 1444 (2010). 
 615. See, e.g., Ray Blanchard, The DSM Diagnostic Criteria for Pedophilia, 39 
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 304, 313-15 (2009); David Thornton, Evidence Regarding the 
Need for a Diagnostic Category for a Coercive Paraphilia, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 
411, 416-17 (2010). 
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behavior as essential to those offering testimony in support of 
commitments.616 Respondents are often uncooperative with evaluators,617 or 
clinical evaluation may not be included in the diagnostic process.618 
However, most psychiatrists developing specific DSM diagnostic criteria 
assume that they will be used as part of clinical assessment, including 
patient interviews, in therapeutic, not forensic, settings.619 
The array of views regarding the use and validity of DSM labels reflects 
the adversarial setting of SVP proceedings, and it should come as no 
surprise that the outcome of the debate over the proposed changes for 
DSM-5 resolved nothing and left the paraphilias essentially unchanged.620 
The proposals for change did, however, garner fierce debate and prompt a 
flood of papers and editorials while they were under consideration.621 The 
varied commentaries brought to the surface many of the controversies about 
psychiatry’s role in SVP commitments discussed above. 
The outcome of the debate was a compromise that resulted in 
maintaining essentially the same approach of the DSM-IV-TR.622 DSM-5 
                                                                                                                 
 616. See, e.g., Blanchard, supra note 615, at 306. 
 617. First, supra note 312, at 1240-41. 
 618. See Jackson & Hess, supra note 497, at 426 (noting that there are no standards for 
what must be included in a forensic evaluation of an SVP respondent).  
 619. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 14, at 43-44 (noting that, in the therapeutic context, 
the most important tool for diagnosis and assessment is “the clinical interview—a dialogue 
with the patient exploring present mental state, past experiences, and desires for the future”). 
 620. Michael B. First, DSM-5 and Paraphilic Disorders, 42 J. AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY 
& L. 191, 192 (2014).  
 621. Id. at 192, 199-200; see also Fred S. Berlin, Commentary on Pedophilia Diagnostic 
Criteria in DSM-5, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 242 (2011); John Matthew Fabian, 
Diagnosing and Litigating Hebephilia in Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment 
Proceedings, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 496 (2011); First, supra note 312, at 1239; 
First & Halon, supra note 314, at 451-52; Franklin, supra note 462, at 751; Raymond 
Knight, Is a Diagnostic Category for Paraphilic Coercive Disorder Defensible?, 39 
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 419 (2009); Robert Prentky & Howard Barbaree, Commentary: 
Hebephilia—A Would-be Paraphilia Caught in the Twilight Zone Between Prepubescence 
and Adulthood, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 506, 506 (2011); Wakefield, supra note 
297, at 205-06; Howard Zonana, Sexual Disorders: New and Expanded Proposals for the 
DSM-5—Do We Need Them?, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 245, 248-49 (2011).  
 622. DSM-5, supra note 269, at 697. Pedophilia is now “Pedophilic Disorder” but the 
diagnostic criteria themselves are unchanged. The category of “Paraphilia Not Otherwise 
Specified” has been replaced with “Other Specified Paraphilic Disorder” and has more 
extensive explanatory text than that in DSM-IV-TR. Id. at 705. There is also a new category 
for “Unspecified Paraphilic Disorder,” which is used in similar contexts as the “Other 
Specified” disorders but the “clinician chooses not to specify the reason that the criteria are 
not met for a specific paraphilic disorder,” such as where there is insufficient information for 
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simply maintained the tension between deviance and disorder with which 
psychiatry has been increasingly aware.623 By making minimal changes to 
the paraphilias, the APA rejected many revisions proposed by those who 
support the state in SVP commitment proceedings, such as adding the 
categories hebephilia or paraphilic coercive disorder.624 Allan Frances 
nonetheless remains concerned that the revised paraphilias section is “an 
ambiguous hodgepodge [which] will surely be misused in sexually violent 
predator hearings where every word is given legal spin.”625 Michael First 
has cautioned that the DSM-5’s paraphilias language—in terms of both 
what was changed and what was not—may cause continued confusion and 
misuse in forensic settings, especially SVP commitment proceedings.626 
The DSM-5’s editors evidently shared Frances’s concern to some extent 
(he was an editor of an earlier edition himself), but they also did not want to 
see the influence of the manual wane in legal settings. The new DSM’s 
“Cautionary Statement for Forensic Use” is longer than the previous one, 
more explicit in its explanation of the limited purpose for which the manual 
was devised (i.e., assisting mental health professionals with assessment and 
treatment in clinical settings), and now has a clearer title.627 But the 
statement begins with a sales pitch for its use in forensic contexts; it states 
that, “[w]hen used appropriately,” the “diagnoses and diagnostic 
information” in the manual can “assist legal decision makers” in 
involuntary commitment cases where the “presence of a mental disorder is 
the predicate.”628 The manual may also, it states, “facilitate legal decision 
makers’ understanding of the relevant characteristics of mental 
disorders.”629 Especially significantly here, it also suggests “diagnostic 
information about longitudinal course may improve decision making when 
                                                                                                                 
a more specific diagnosis. Id. For a helpful discussion of all of the changes to the Paraphilias 
category in the DSM-5, see generally First, supra note 620. 
 623. First, supra note 620, at 195-200; see also supra notes 286-338 and accompanying 
text. 
 624. See supra notes 612-615 and accompanying text; see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
PARAPHILIC DISORDERS 1-2 (2013), available at http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/Paraphilic 
%20Disorders%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (describing what revisions were finally accepted for 
publication in DSM-5). 
 625. Allan Frances, DSM-5 Badly Flunks the Writing Test, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (June 11, 
2013), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/blogs/dsm-5/dsm-5-badly-flunks-writing-test?cid= tw. 
 626. First, supra note 620, at 195-200. 
 627. DSM-5, supra note 269, at 25. Previously the language was simply titled 
“Cautionary Statement.” DSM-IV-TR, supra note 313, at xxxvii. 
 628. DSM-5, supra note 269, at 25. 
 629. Id. 
718 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:619 
 
 
the legal issue concerns an individual’s mental functioning at a past or 
future point in time.”630   
The new DSM statement also includes cautions about taking forensic use 
too far and, in places, the language appears to specifically address experts 
and judges involved in SVP proceedings. The statement cautions against 
the risk of misunderstanding arising from “the imperfect fit between the 
questions of ultimate concern to the law and the information contained in 
clinical diagnosis.”631 It also emphasizes that “in most situations” more 
information about the individual is “usually required beyond that 
contained” in the diagnosis.632 The statement emphasizes that use of the 
manual for assessment by “insufficiently trained individuals is not advised,” 
and it notes that “a diagnosis does not carry any necessary implications 
regarding . . . the individual’s degree of control over behaviors that may be 
associated with the disorder.”633 Given, however, that similar cautionary 
language has been disregarded with some regularity in SVP proceedings (as 
discussed above), such warnings are likely to have little effect on the 
widespread use of psychiatric diagnoses in court settings, even in resolving 
factual questions regarding volitional impairment associated with mental 
abnormality. 
2. Using Actuarial Tools as a Check on or to Replace Clinical Judgment 
As noted above,634 some legal scholars and some in the mental health 
profession have advocated use of ARA instruments either in addition to635 
or in place of diagnostic assessment and clinical judgment.636 The appeal of 
such tools is obvious: they would permit testifying experts to offer more 
accurate predictions while avoiding the unsettled realm of psychiatric 
diagnoses. One recent empirical study suggested that jurors may give more 
weight to “less scientifically valid unstructured clinical expert testimony 
                                                                                                                 
 630. Id. (emphasis added). 
 631. Id. 
 632. Id. 
 633. Id.  
 634. See supra notes 526-540 and accompanying text.  
 635. Some researchers have proposed used of “Guided Clinical Risk Assessments,” 
which use a number of factors that associated with recidivism but are not necessarily static, 
such as low self-esteem and “general psychological distress.” Campbell, supra note 553, at 
120. However, studies have not demonstrated these to be sufficiently reliable for forensic 
use. Id. 
 636. See, e.g., Robin J. Wilson et al., Pedophilia: An Evaluation of Diagnostic and Risk 
Prediction Methods, 23 SEXUAL ABUSE 260, 271 (2010) (advocating exclusive use of ARAs 
in SVP prediction). 
2015]        DANGEROUS DIAGNOSES, RISKY ASSUMPTIONS 719 
 
 
over more accurate actuarial assessment.”637 However, in addition to 
ARAs’ problems with reliability (discussed in the previous section), there 
are fundamental conceptual and moral problems as well. The most 
significant problem with the use of ARAs in SVP proceedings is that these 
tools are designed only to assess the statistical risk of recidivism, not, as 
required by the Hendricks-Crane standard, the existence of volitional 
impairment.638 Nor are ARAs designed to assess the presence of “mental 
disorder,” another core requirement of the SVP statutes and a component of 
their constitutional floor.639 Moreover, because these instruments largely 
use information that can be gleaned simply from a review of a respondent’s 
records alone—without an interview—the forensic examiners employing 
them, like those who misuse paraphilia diagnoses as discussed above, are 
constructing a state of underlying volitional impairment based solely on a 
selective record of past actions.   
Social scientists and others who advocate replacing clinical judgment 
with these tools to ensure more accurate assessments invoke studies 
showing superior prediction rates for those based on actuarial tools.640 
There is also, however, a general wariness about using statistics to predict 
individual human behavior and, as noted by many social scientists, a 
resistance to doing so. As Daniel Kahneman observes: “The debate about 
the virtues of clinical and statistical prediction has always had a moral 
dimension. . . . The aversion to algorithms making decisions that affect 
humans is rooted in the strong preference that many people have for the 
natural over the synthetic or artificial.”641 Significantly, this aversion 
appears to be even stronger when the “decisions are consequential.”642   
Although these emotional responses to the general use of actuarial tools 
to make predictions about human outcomes strike many researchers as 
irrational, the “moral dimension” of such reactions bears special 
consideration in the context of a legal proceeding such as SVP 
commitment. In his short story, The Minority Report, Phillip K. Dick 
evoked the specter of using “science” to determine what we will do in the 
                                                                                                                 
 637. Daniel A. Krauss et al., Dangerously Misunderstood: Representative Jurors’ 
Reactions to Expert Testimony on 
Future Dangerousness in a Sexually Violent Predator Trial, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
18, 33 (2012). 
 638. See supra notes 151-152 and 165-169 and accompanying text. 
 639. First & Halon, supra note 314, at 450-51. 
 640. See, e.g., MEEHL, supra note 537, at 94-95.  
 641. KAHNEMAN, supra note 517, at 228. 
 642. Id. 
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future and then detaining individual people as a result of such “precrime 
predictions” to paint a frightening dystopian picture.643 Using statistically 
gathered numbers to assess the likelihood of individual human behavior—
especially as the sole basis for an indefinite commitment—is patently 
inconsistent with a justice system that emphasizes individualized treatment 
rather than determinations based on group-based behavior, such as “guilt by 
association.”644 Indeed, such “moral dimensions” have a central place in our 
legal system, and the fact that there is such discomfort at using actuarial 
methods to determine whether to remove someone from society indefinitely 
is indicative that such methods are out of place in SVP proceedings.  
The sharpness of the debates regarding the use of psychiatric diagnostic 
assessments and ARA instruments in SVP proceedings, with strong but 
conflicting evidence on both sides, encourages a significant third 
perspective: the entire SVP commitment model, with the essential role it 
assigns to forensic assessment of the likelihood of recidivism, is inherently 
unworkable.645 Because findings of mental abnormality and dangerousness 
are constitutionally required in such proceedings, the question of whether 
we can reliably assess the relevant pathology and risk directly implicates 
the committed persons’ liberty interests.646 What these debates reveal is that 
                                                                                                                 
 643. See generally PHILIP K. DICK, THE MINORITY REPORT AND OTHER CLASSIC STORIES 
(Pantheon Books 2002). 
 644. Janus & Meehl, supra note 410, at 60-61; cf. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 345 
(1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Due Process Clause establishes a powerful 
presumption against unnecessary official detention that is not based on an individualized 
evaluation of its justification.”). David Faigman recently examined the difficulty of offering 
expert opinion regarding an individual based upon research findings about a group: “In 
terms of scientific inference, reasoning from the group to an individual case presents 
considerable challenges and, simply put, is rarely a focus of the basic scientific enterprise. In 
the courtroom, it is the enterprise.” David L. Faigman et al., Group to Individual (G2i) 
Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 420 (2014) (emphasis 
added). 
 645. See First, supra note 620, at 200 (“Paraphilic disorders, by virtue of their forensic 
import, exemplify the difficulty of integrating psychiatric concepts and concerns with those 
of the legal system and society in general.”). 
 646. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 371; see also Janus & Prentky, supra note 536, at 
1458. This is not to suggest that clinical judgment and ARAs are the only methods proposed 
for predicting risk of sexual violence. For example, legal scholar Adam Lamparello has 
advocated use of neuroscience to predict violent behavior. Adam Lamparello, Using 
Cognitive Neuroscience to Predict Future Dangerousness, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
481, 488-92 (2011). However, at this time, there have been no studies of the use evaluating 
brain activity through functional MRI imaging to predict such violence. Moreover, it is by 
no means clear that such technology will correct any of problems inherent in the SVP 
commitment model discussed herein. See generally Steven K. Erickson, The Limits of 
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neither approach—clinical judgment or actuarial instruments—is 
sufficiently reliable to ensure that SVP laws are not sweeping too broadly. 
The making of predictions generally, not the methodology used to make 
them, is the problem.  
Given that all the proposed fixes to the invocation of psychiatric science 
in SVP proceedings fall short of addressing the fundamental problems seen 
in the case law, the question for legal scholars and analysts becomes 
whether the courtroom can be fixed to fit the existing science instead.647 
While some degree of judicial leniency regarding the admissibility of expert 
testimony by mental health professionals is arguably appropriate for many 
kinds of cases, especially when a personal injury plaintiff or a criminal 
defendant raises the issue of mental injury or disorder, there are compelling 
reasons to apply far more scrutiny to such evidence in SVP cases. One 
reason is certainly the high-stakes outcomes of such cases. Another no less 
significant concern is the power assigned by the laws to mental health 
professionals in order to meet the due process requirements in the 
Hendricks-Crane rationale.  
A few rulings by courts suggest that a more assertive role by trial judges 
as gatekeepers could prevent due process violations in individual cases, and 
several legal scholars have made recommendations along these lines.648 It 
remains true, however, that courts overwhelmingly admit suspect science in 
SVP trials and leave it to the fact finder to decide how much weight to give 
such expert opinion.649 Most courts, like the McGee trial court, leave issues 
regarding the validity of the methods used—including use of the diagnostic 
labels and ARAs—entirely to the assessment of the fact finder. Lower 
courts’ implementation of Hendricks-Crane has made clear that they are 
                                                                                                                 
Neurolaw, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 303 (2012); Daniel S. Goldberg, Against 
Reductionism in Law and Neuroscience, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 321 (2012).   
 647. Samuel Jan Brakel, Psychiatrists and Law, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Nov. 19, 2010), 
http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/forensic-psychiatry/psychiatrists-and-law. 
 648. Hamilton, supra note 22, at 52; Prentky et al., supra note 334, at 458; see also Vars, 
supra note 410, at 895-97 (arguing that due process requires that courts commit individuals 
only upon a finding that there is at least a 75% risk that the person will commit an act of 
sexual violence within the next five years). 
 649. See, e.g., McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 581 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
controversy over validity of a diagnosis is a “proper consideration for the factfinder in 
weighing the evidence that the defendant has the “mental disorder” required by statute”); In 
re Det. of Lopez, 166 Wash. App. 1012, 2012 WL 295462, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) 
(“The validity of [the state’s expert’s] diagnosis was a matter for the jury to evaluate.”); In 
re Lieberman, 929 N.E.2d 616, 632 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010), vacated by 237 Ill. 2d 557 (Ill. 
2010); see also Hamilton, supra note 22, at 594. 
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uninterested in playing a more active role in screening out such expert 
testimony. As long as courts retain the current legal framework for 
evaluating the admissibility of such evidence, we should expect the same 
tendencies to prevail.   
Indeed, were trial courts to assume the role of aggressive gatekeeper in 
SVP proceedings, such practice would fundamentally alter how, and 
whether, SVP laws were implemented. The irreconcilable conflict between 
the known limits of the science of psychiatry and the statutory requirements 
of the SVP laws could result in the exclusion of a significant amount of 
evidence offered in support of commitment and thereby reveal the inherent 
unworkability of the SVP commitment model. In other words, serious 
judicial gatekeeping in the SVP context would effectively nullify the laws. 
Trial courts are generally reluctant to undermine the objectives of elected 
legislators, especially when such policies have broad public support and, as 
here, have been upheld by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, it is unlikely 
that trial courts could be convinced to widely and consistently reject 
psychiatric evidence in SVP commitment proceedings.650 
IV. Revisiting the Hendricks-Crane Rationale  
The SVP commitment laws have no shortage of critics from within law, 
psychiatry, and other fields.651 Many criticize the ways the laws are 
implemented; others argue that they reflect failed, flawed, and misplaced 
policies that merely score political points.652 Still others insist that they are 
based on myths about sex offenders and unfounded assumptions about the 
potential for their treatment and rehabilitation.653 Most of these criticisms, 
                                                                                                                 
 650. And of course, absent further action from the Supreme Court, Barefoot v. Estelle 
remains good law, at least in theory.  The Court was recently presented with a petition for 
certiorari that could have provided an opportunity to revisit Barefoot v. Estelle and the 
standard for admissibility of expert psychiatric evidence on future dangerousness, but it 
declined to hear the case. Coble v. Texas, 330 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 3030 (2011). Accordingly, the Court appears uninterested in providing 
courts any further guidance on the admissibility of such evidence anytime soon. 
 651. See, e.g., Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 226, at 5-17; see also JANUS, supra note 20, at 
87-92 (arguing that the laws are antifeminist because they perpetuate a number of harmful 
myths about rape and child abuse, such as that such acts are largely committed by 
“predators” rather than relatives and acquaintances of the victims); LANCASTER, supra note 
29, at 233-34 (tracing the “sex panic” underlying many modern sex offender laws to less 
overt expressions of homophobia and racism). 
 652. See Simon, supra note 79, at 281. 
 653. Id. Simon summed up her assessment of SVP laws as follows: 
[T]hese legal policies and mental health practices targeting offenders who 
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however, do not directly address the constitutionality of the laws. Instead, 
in light of the Hendricks-Crane rulings, critics commonly assume that the 
question of their constitutionality has been settled.654  
In this Article, my focus has been the validity of the rationale of the 
opinions that are thought to have settled that question. As discussed in Part 
II, that rationale, as delivered in the Hendricks-Crane holdings, presumes 
the integrity of using a mental-illness model for the deprivation of liberty 
permitted by SVP laws. By extension, the medical, and therefore legal, 
legitimacy of the prosecution of these laws depends on the testimony of 
mental health professionals weighing in on the question of respondents’ 
pathology and volitional control. That testimony, however, is inherently 
problematic: it is unreliable at best and, at worst, hollow.  
Since the crucial medical opinions offered in SVP proceedings regarding 
who is a “predator” with a “volitional impairment”—as distinct from a 
“typical recidivist”—are routinely based on conclusions drawn from 
reviewing the record of a respondent’s prior acts of sexual violence, those 
opinions are, in effect, tautologies.655 The term “sexual predator” has no 
psychiatric meaning; it is used simply to name a group of sexual offenders 
from whom we want to protect the public. It is like the term “weed,” which 
has no botanical meaning but which we use simply to refer to plants of 
which we want to rid our gardens. In the absence of a scientific basis for 
determining whether or not a person is a “sexual predator,” the task 
assigned to forensic experts in SVP proceedings is to make a normative 
determination; this delegation of moral decision-making to psychiatry is 
inconsistent with core notions of due process. Accordingly, the 
constitutionality of such laws is, in fact, far from settled.  
Some judges have recognized the dangers and implications of attempting 
to align psychiatry with the problematic concept of a “sexually violent 
                                                                                                                 
commit sex crimes thrive despite the absence of empirical evidence that sex 
offenders are distinguishable from other offenders; that sex offenders are any 
more mentally disordered (and treatable) and dangerous than other offenders; 
and that mental health professionals are competent to make predictions of 
dangerousness. 
Id. 
 654. See, e.g., Janus & Prentky, supra note 536, at 90. 
 655. See also La Fond, supra note 23, at 162 (“The primary evidence for all of these 
elements—mental disorder, volitional impairment, and dangerousness—is the same; an 
offender's past history of committing sex crime(s). Simply put, a sex offender who has 
committed a qualifying sex crime thereby provides evidence that is legally sufficient to be 
committed as a SVP.” (alteration in original)). 
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predator.” In a 2010 concurring opinion in an SVP appeal, Justice Richard 
Sanders of the Washington Supreme Court wrote:  
[I]f the scientific community does not recognize such a condition 
[as Paraphilia NOS-Nonconsent], much less possess any 
methodology to identify individuals with such a condition, the 
statutory test [for SVP commitment] cannot be met. 
 . . . . 
 Without a scientifically recognized condition that compels a 
person to commit sex offenses, civil confinement also runs afoul 
of the constitution . . . . 
 . . . . 
 Where a person is deprived of his or her freedom based upon 
opinion testimony lacking scientific credibility, reliability, and 
accepted methodology, courts must step forward and announce 
with the courage of a small child that the Emperor wears no 
clothes.656 
This is a remarkable acknowledgement—and call to action—regarding 
the fundamental problem with these laws. However, the entire opinion, 
including this concurrence, was later withdrawn upon a motion for 
reconsideration by the State.657 
Courts appear to be stuck in a box of their own creation. As captured in 
Minority Report, the ability to predict future crime or violence holds 
tantalizing appeal for a society.658 Even if we lack the technology available 
in the story, we are inclined to think that many instances of horrifying 
criminal violence could have been prevented if someone, especially some 
scientist, psychiatrist, or other expert, had recognized its likelihood and 
taken steps to prevent it. As scientists themselves have repeatedly told us, 
however, and as courts cannot fail to acknowledge,659 our general 
presumption regarding the ability of scientists, and specifically of those in 
                                                                                                                 
 656. State v. McCuistion, 238 P.3d 1147, 1155 (Wash. 2010) (Sanders, J., concurring), 
overruled by 275 P.3d 1092 (Wash. 2012). The Washington Supreme Court ordered a 
hearing on a committed person’s petition for release. Id. at 1153. 
 657. McCuistion, 275 P.3d at 1097. 
 658. See generally DICK, supra note 643. 
 659. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983); United States v. Umana, 
707 F. Supp. 2d 621, 634 (W.D.N.C. 2010); United States v. Taveras, 424 F. Supp. 2d 446 
(E.D. Tex. 2006); Lamparello, supra note 646, at 488-92. 
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the psychiatric profession, to predict future violence far exceeds their actual 
ability. However, despite these acknowledged limits—and the 
constitutional values at stake when they are disregarded—courts continue to 
uphold statutes based on just such mistaken assumptions. The SVP laws are 
not the only examples of this problem but perhaps the most stark and far-
reaching ones. The Supreme Court has never identified a constitutionally 
acceptable error rate for predictions of future violence, although its pre-
Daubert opinion in Barefoot suggested that a disturbingly high error rate 
would be acceptable.660 Such a low standard for acceptability gives courts 
and legislators broad freedom to take significant legal actions based on an 
assessment of risk and to use psychiatry as a means to identify such risks. 
Courts have permitted legislators to effectively delegate a crucial normative 
question to the field of psychiatry and, in so doing, have disregarded the 
field’s own disavowal of its ability to fulfill that role competently and 
ethically.   
These objectionable and harmful patterns of delegation must be changed 
from within the law. Nearly forty years ago, the noted circuit court Judge 
David Bazelon cautioned courts about delegating “delicate questions of 
state intervention” to mental health professionals.661 In comments that bear 
particularly on the questions examined in this Article, he explained:   
[S]tate intervention involves a serious compromise of individual 
rights and hence a difficult balancing of power between the state 
and the individual, where the stakes are highest for human and 
personal rights. Courts have traditionally been the protector of 
individual rights against state power, and there is no reason why 
the particularly difficult problems in the area of state 
intervention are any different. We cannot delegate this 
responsibility to the medical professions. Those disciplines are, 
naturally enough, oriented toward helping people by treating 
them. Their value system assumes that disturbed or disturbing 
individuals need treatment, that medical disciplines can provide 
it, and that attempts to resist it are misguided or delusionary. The 
medical disciplines can no more judge the legitimacy of state 
intervention into the lives of disturbed or disturbing individuals 
                                                                                                                 
 660. Jackson et al., supra note 492, at 126. 
 661. David L. Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization and the Adversary 
Process, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 897, 910 (1975). 
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than a prosecutor can judge the guilt of a person he has 
accused.662 
The Supreme Court, in deciding Kansas v Hendricks, did not heed Judge 
Bazelon’s caution or give full consideration to the implications of drawing 
the line at mental abnormality. In light of what we have learned from the 
enforcement of these laws, it is clear that courts must revisit their validity. 
The social implications of SVP laws bear some emphasis. By 
pathologizing and not merely condemning the rapist and molester, and by 
relying upon a psychiatric and not merely moral construction of sexual 
violence, these laws and their implementation fuel a stigmatizing view of 
mental illness more generally—the view, that is, that being labeled with a 
psychiatric diagnoses signals that one may be dangerously “out of control,” 
and therefore a threat to society. Indeed, language in Hendricks directly 
supports this view:  
A finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a 
sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary 
commitment. We have sustained civil commitment statutes when 
they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of 
some additional factor, such as a ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental 
abnormality.’ These added statutory requirements serve to limit 
involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a 
volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their 
control.663 
Such reasoning links acts of violence and mental illness in a misleading and 
damaging way. Most sexual offenders do not have serious mental disorders, 
as discussed above. But the Court’s longstanding pronouncement that 
illness can serve as a basis for detention encouraged lawmakers and courts 
to pathologize sex offenders to permit their removal from society in a 
manner inconsistent with notions of due process.664 In this respect, SVP 
laws reflect the dual problematic trends of criminalizing the mentally ill and 
pathologizing criminals. 
The use of paraphilias, that is, deviant sexual arousal, as the basis for 
most SVP commitments is particularly troubling given the controversy 
regarding whether the DSM should even list such conditions as disorders 
for clinical purposes. Some observers suggest that commitments made on 
                                                                                                                 
 662. Id. 
 663. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358-59 (1997) (emphasis added).  
 664. Janus, supra note 63, at 15. 
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this basis carry broad legal implications. Jerome Wakefield, for example, 
has flagged what he regards as “a dangerous slippery slope implicit in these 
legal developments.”665 He reasoned:  
A pluralistic society is based on respect for human difference 
and acceptance of the enormous range of normal variation in 
tastes and desires. If sexual peculiarities that are labeled 
disorders and are offensive to others can be the grounds for civil 
commitment on the basis of the harm they do to the public, then 
it is not clear why other peculiarities that may be labeled 
disorders and may be out of control of the afflicted individual — 
such as, say, depression or anxiety that detracts from the 
efficiency of others and thus harms them — need remain 
constitutionally immune to such provisions in the future.666 
SVP commitment laws carry implications for the field of psychiatry as 
well. Many within the psychiatric field, conscious of their limited 
knowledge of the nature of sexual offenses and offenders, are exceedingly 
uncomfortable with the role assigned to them by the laws.667 The task given 
to forensic experts in SVP proceedings can be even more challenging than 
the typical dangerousness prediction. Not only is the expert being asked to 
make an assessment of a person’s long-term risk for sexual violence, such 
determination must be made of someone who has been incarcerated, 
sometimes for a lengthy period of time, making prediction of his future 
behavior in public especially difficult.668 Psychiatrists also note that danger-
prediction as a predicate to detention strays far from the central role of 
psychiatry, which is to alleviate mental suffering and distress.669 Employing 
a host-parasite metaphor, psychiatrist James L. Knoll warns that SVP laws 
put psychiatry at risk of becoming “co-opted by a political agenda.”670 The 
prosecution of such an agenda through these laws, Knoll observes, would 
jeopardize the “autonomous functioning, and thus the reliability, of the 
                                                                                                                 
 665. Wakefield, supra note 297, at 197. 
 666. Id. 
 667. See supra notes 190-201, 342-370, and 384-398 and accompanying text. 
 668. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 358. 
 669. Jerome C. Wakefield, False Positives in Psychiatric Diagnosis: Implications for 
Human Freedom, 31 THEORETICAL MED. BIOETHICS 5, 9 (2010) (“Treatment of disorder is 
the essential defining mission of psychiatry.”). 
 670. James L. Knoll, The Political Diagnosis: Psychiatry in the Service of the Law, 
PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (May 13, 2010), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/sexual-offenses/poli 
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science,” and transform psychiatry into “a new organism entirely—one that 
serves the ends of the criminal justice system.” 671 
The constitutional infirmities of the SVP laws revealed in this Article 
serve as compelling reasons for their legislative repeal. Moreover, as noted 
earlier and certainly of significance to legislators, the laws are expensive 
and of questionable safety benefit to the public. States heeded the advice of 
the GAP report in the 1970s and repealed the “sexual psychopath” laws.672 
They should once again take seriously psychiatry’s disavowal of its ability 
to identify predators. At this time, however, there is no indication of any 
jurisdiction moving to repeal or significantly reform its SVP commitment 
laws.673   
If state policymakers hesitate to change SVP laws out of fear of political 
backlash, a somewhat “quieter” option for states is to slow the rate of 
commitment under such laws and increase the rate of release of those 
committed previously. The State of Wisconsin is following this route 
presently. The state has committed nearly 500 individuals since enacting its 
SVP law in 1994.674 It released only thirty-one individuals between 1994 
and 2009, but released 114 in the four years between 2009 and 2013.675 It 
took these steps in light of recent research suggesting that recidivism risks 
for “certain types of individuals” were lower “than previously thought.”676 
Those who were released received treatment and monitoring in their 
communities, and the legislature enacted new laws to expand the 
community-monitoring program.677   
States could also consider programs that may obviate the need for 
commitment altogether, such as sentencing options for sexually violent 
crimes that leave questions of mental illness out of the equation.678 For 
example, states could follow Maine’s example and adopt supervised release 
laws, which provide for an extended period of community supervision in 
                                                                                                                 
 671. Id. 
 672. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.   
 673. Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 226, at 9-10. 
 674. Nora Hertel, Wisconsin Freeing More Sex Offenders from Mental Lockup, WIS. 
WATCH (Feb. 2, 2014), http://wisconsinwatch.org/2014/02/wisconsin-freeing-more-sex-off 
enders-from-mental-lockup/. 
 675. Id. 
 676. Id.   
 677. Id.  
 678. See, e.g., John M. Fabian, Kansas v. Hendricks, Crane and Beyond: “Mental 
Abnormality,” and “Sexual Dangerousness”: Volitional vs. Emotional Abnormality and the 
Debate Between Community Safety and Civil Liberties, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1367, 
1418-20 (2003). 
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lieu of probation as part of a sentence for a sex offense.679 Although 
Maine’s law is aimed at preventing recidivism among sex offenders 
specifically, its use does not depend on a determination of a mental disorder 
but rather on whether the defendant is a “repeat sex offender” as defined 
under the law680 in addition to a series of other factors.681 Currently, few 
courts evaluating SVP petitions consider whether existing alternatives may 
minimize a risk of recidivism.682 If more such programs were in place, their 
availability could provide an argument against commitment in individual 
cases.683 
Regardless, however, of whether the states decide to follow such 
alternatives to SVP commitment proceedings, there is a central role and 
responsibility for the Supreme Court with respect to these laws. Given the 
demonstrably dubious basis of the Hendricks-Crane rationale in light of 
how that reasoning has played out in actual SVP commitments and the 
exceedingly serious implications of leaving the holding in place, the Court 
must revisit the constitutionality of the SVP laws.   
While the Court is appropriately loathe to overrule itself, it can follow 
the example it set when it overruled Bowers v. Hardwick684 in Lawrence v. 
Texas.685 The justices noted in Lawrence that striking down the Texas 
sodomy law at issue in that case would place it squarely in conflict with the 
precedent it had set seventeen years earlier in Bowers, when it upheld 
Georgia’s law; “[t]he doctrine of stare decisis,” it cautioned, “is essential to 
the respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the stability of the 
law.”686 However, the Court also noted that this doctrine “is not an 
                                                                                                                 
 679. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, §§ 1231-1233 (2013); State v. Cook, 2011 ME 94 ¶ 24, 26 
A.3d 834, 843-44. In the case at hand, the sentencing court imposed the following conditions 
of release: limiting contact with the victim and other children, undergoing evaluation and 
treatment, and community monitoring. Id. ¶ 18, 26 A.3d at 841. 
 680. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A §§ 1231(2)(A), 1252(4-B)(A).  
 681. Cook, ¶¶ 27-29, 26 A.3d at 844-45. 
 682. One of the few courts to engage in this analysis is the district court of Massachusetts 
in United States v. Wilkinson, which considered the fact that the respondent was facing 
charges for a probation violation in state court as well as supervised release through the 
federal probation office. 646 F. Supp. 2d 194, 208 (D. Mass. 2009). 
 683. For a more thorough review of alternatives to current sex offender policy, including 
SVP commitment laws, see JANUS, supra note 20, at 113-29.  
 684. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 685. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 686. Id. at 577. 
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inexorable command; rather, it ‘is a principle of policy and not a 
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.’”687  
Significantly here, in applying these judicial principles to the 
constitutionality of sodomy laws, the Court noted the publication of several 
scholarly “criticisms of the historical premises relied upon by the majority 
and concurring opinions in Bowers.”688 Upon reexamination of those 
premises, the Court found that it had based the earlier opinion on erroneous, 
or at least overstated, historical grounds689 and that “[t]he rationale of 
Bowers does not withstand careful analysis.”690  Here, a comparable 
examination mandates that the Court acknowledge that its earlier opinions 
on SVP laws were based on erroneous medical grounds and that its core 
rationale “does not withstand careful analysis.” 
V. Conclusion  
The responsibility to make rationally informed policy rests, of course, 
with lawmakers. In many ways, it is hard to fault the drafters and supporters 
of the first SVP laws, particularly those acting in the immediate wake of 
almost inconceivably horrifying crimes such as Earl Shriner’s. But once a 
policy is enacted, even if it was based largely on immediate public outrage, 
fear, and avoidance of risk, it is nearly impossible to undo. The fear and 
sense of high risk, even if later understood by lawmakers themselves to be 
exaggerated, may still be potent among many segments of the public—
often, as in the case of the “sexually violent predator,” stoked by myths and 
exploitative media representations, and reinforced by the existence of the 
laws themselves.691 In light of this political reality, the courts have a 
significant role to play in the evaluation of the basis for laws enacted in 
response to specific outrage-evoking events. 
                                                                                                                 
 687. Id. (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).  
 688. Id. at 567-68. The Court also noted that the Bowers opinion had not induced any 
“individual or societal reliance on Bowers of the sort that could counsel against overturning 
its holding once there are compelling reasons to do so.” Id. at 577. 
 689. Id. at 571 (“In summary, the historical grounds relied upon in Bowers are more 
complex than the majority opinion and the concurring opinion by Chief Justice Burger 
indicate. Their historical premises are not without doubt and, at the very least, are 
overstated.”). 
 690. Id. at 577. 
 691. See John Douard & Eric S. Janus, Beyond Myth: Designing Better Sexual Violence 
Prevention, 34 INT’L. J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 135, 135 (2011) (“[L]aws [targeting sex offenders] 
have defined—or said another way, created—a new ‘kind’ of person—qualitatively different 
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more bluntly, ‘the sex predator.’”). 
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The Earl Shriner case had particular characteristics that shaped the SVP 
laws. Shriner’s prior involvement with the criminal justice system and the 
unsuccessful attempt to use the standard involuntary commitment 
procedures to keep him away from potential victims persuaded the public 
and the policymakers who served them that the state’s laws contained a 
gaping omission. Reports of his crimes fed the widespread public 
perception that child sexual abuse is rampant and that our criminal justice 
system is powerless to control it. There was and remains a general belief 
that sex offenders have high rates of recidivism, are mentally ill, cannot 
control their impulses, and cannot be successfully treated or supervised in 
the community. With a previously convicted offender like Shriner, there 
seemed to be clear warning signs right there. Viewed retrospectively after 
his subsequent acts of violence, Shriner appeared to many observers clearly 
to be a sexual criminal who was all but certain to re-offend after his release. 
It also seemed that the state should have a mechanism to act on such signs 
to prevent the reoccurrence of such crimes by other convicted offenders—
specifically, a law that would “lock them away” if experts identified signs 
indicating that the offenders posed a distinct risk of victimizing children 
and others.  
Clarity of hindsight, however, is often taken for intrinsic predictability, 
and our general intuitions about risk—even the instructed intuitions of 
experts—are often grossly inaccurate.  
In the public and legislative reactions to the Earl Shriner case, the 
mistakes were many and mutually reinforcing. The first mistake was to 
generalize improperly from the particular circumstances of Shriner’s acts. 
While Shriner’s crime against a random victim led an anxious public to 
conceive of the sex offender as a kind of “bogeyman,” always lying in wait, 
always ready to strike whatever innocent children were near, research has 
shown that sexual violence is generally highly circumstantial and 
contingent, that it occurs under a range of contextual and individual 
conditions, and that it most often involves victims who have prior family, 
social, or institutional relationships to the perpetrator.692  
                                                                                                                 
 692. LANCASTER, supra note 29, at 76-79. Similarly, the common perception of a sex 
offender or predator is one who lurks around schools, playgrounds, and candy stores waiting 
to lure trusting children into their cars or residences. Such stereotypes lead to community 
notification laws, sex offender registries, and restrictions on offenders’ residence. In fact, the 
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The second key mistake was the assumption by the public and legislators 
that mental health experts could identify sexually violent individuals and 
prevent sexual violence through a process of legal commitment. As 
demonstrated in this Article, psychiatry lacks the knowledge and the 
instruments to identify who is most likely to commit future acts of sexual 
violence or to predict the likelihood of violence by a specific individual. 
The implementation of SVP laws has been likened by two forensic 
psychiatrists to the Salem Witch trials of the seventeenth century.693 In an 
essay making the comparison, they argue that the suggestion that clinicians 
can identify the true predators among us creates a dangerous and false sense 
of security for the public.694 Commitment of large numbers of sexual 
offenders under SVP laws does not enhance public safety. The laws reflect 
the public’s fears and groundless beliefs, not the realities of either sexual 
violence or the capacities of mental health experts. SVP laws are 
dangerous, damaging, and unconstitutional, and the experiment must be 
shut down. 
                                                                                                                 
 693. Good & Burstein, supra note 84, at 24. 
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